<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1tfk373zg9dnmtvxnpnq7s2dkdgj37rwfj3yrwld7830qltmv8qps8rfq0n</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1tfk373zg9dnmtvxnpnq7s2dkdgj37rwfj3yrwld7830qltmv8qps8rfq0n</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-10-21&#xA;📝 Original message:On Monday, October 19, 2015 2:01:04 PM Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev wrote:&#xA;&gt; The proposal is implemented (see below), by computing the normalized&#xA;&gt; transaction ID when adding them to the UTXO and storing them along with the&#xA;&gt; coin state. OP_CHECKSIGEX mostly duplicates OP_CHECKSIG and&#xA;&gt; OP_CHECKMULTISIG, but I&#39;m hoping somebody can give me some pointers into&#xA;&gt; how to best refactor the common functionality into reusable blocks. And the&#xA;&gt; annotating incoming transactions with their normalized inputs is a bit&#xA;&gt; cumbersome, maye somebody has some pointers here as well?&#xA;&#xA;This doesn&#39;t completely close malleability (which should be documented in the &#xA;BIP), so I&#39;m not sure it&#39;s worth the cost, especially if closing malleability &#xA;later on would need more. How about specifying flags upfront in the UTXO-&#xA;creating transaction specifying which parts the signature will cover? This &#xA;would allow implementation of fully malleability-proof wallets.&#xA;&#xA;Additionally, you have a flag to control whether the opcode behaves as VERIFY &#xA;or not. Non-VERIFY is not possible as a softfork (without doing a second/new &#xA;P2SH) since it can be negated.&#xA;&#xA;Luke</html></oembed>