rich1.0npub1xvnnyhz8e4eklaakjc9xgm5w8pzkuckt923uacz2cftqdqx23g7q3c5rqghttps://nostr.ae/npub1xvnnyhz8e4eklaakjc9xgm5w8pzkuckt923uacz2cftqdqx23g7q3c5rqgnjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2015-12-29 📝 Original message:How could this possibly be enforced? On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Dave Scotese via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > There have been no decent objections to altering the block-selection > mechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the same time) as > described at > > http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226 > > Key components are: > > - Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using only transactions that have been > in your mempool for some time as oBTCDD ("old BTCDD"). > - Use "nearly the same time" to mean separated in time by your guess > of the average duration of block propagation times. > - When two block solutions come in at nearly the same time, build on > the one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that came in first. > > The goal of this change is to reduce the profitability of withholding > block solutions by severely reducing the chances that a block solved a > while ago can orphan one solved recently. "Came in first" seems more > easily gamed than "most oBTCDD". As I wrote there, "*old coins* is > always a dwindling resource and *global nodes willing to help cheat* is > probably a growing one." > > I will write a BIP if anyone agrees it's a good idea. > > On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev < >>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and >>> small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt >>> where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil >>> attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small >>> and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying >>> problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time >>> is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with <30% >>> hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated >>> by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures. >>> >> >> Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network >> reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or >> vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network >> bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than <$0.02/kwh >> electricity, for example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric >> miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access >> to 10gbit university connections and free electricity. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> > > > -- > I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a > techie? > I own Litmocracy <http://www.litmocracy.com> and Meme Racing > <http://www.memeracing.net> (in alpha). > I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist <http://www.voluntaryist.com> > which now accepts Bitcoin. > I also code for The Dollar Vigilante <http://dollarvigilante.com/>. > "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi > Nakamoto > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151229/01725358/attachment.html>