<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1kc0zulxt7j4a0ayhzhrz7jk84y7tm4026qcky7w97hlfkxxap24qnwjfw4</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1kc0zulxt7j4a0ayhzhrz7jk84y7tm4026qcky7w97hlfkxxap24qnwjfw4</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-09-03&#xA;📝 Original message:Some comments:&#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* The 75% rule is meaningless here. Since this is a pure relaxation of&#xA;rules, there is no such thing as &#34;invalid version 4 blocks&#34;&#xA;&#xA;&#x9;* &#xA;&#xA;The implication threshold is unclear. Is it 95% or 80%?&#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* Softfork requires a very high threshold (95%) to &#34;attack&#34; the&#xA;original fork. This makes sure that unupgraded client will only see the&#xA;new fork.&#xA; &#x9;* In the case of hardfork, however, the new fork is unable to attack&#xA;the original fork, and unupgraded client will never see the new fork.&#xA;The initiation of a hardfork should be based on its acceptance by the&#xA;economic majority, not miner support. 95% is an overkill and may&#xA;probably never accomplished. I strongly prefer a 80% threshold rather&#xA;than 95%.&#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* As I&#39;ve pointed out, using 20-percentile rather than median creates&#xA;an incentive to 51% attack the uncooperative minority.&#xA;https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010690.html&#xA;&#xA;Having said that, I don&#39;t have a strong feeling about the use of&#xA;20-percentile as threshold to increase the block size. That means the&#xA;block size is increased only when most miners agree, which sounds ok to&#xA;me. &#xA;&#xA;However, using 20-percentile as threshold to DECREASE the block size&#xA;could be very dangerous. Consider that the block size has been stable at&#xA;8MB for a few years. Everyone are happy with that. An attacker would&#xA;just need to acquire 21% of mining power to break the status quo and&#xA;send us all the way to 1MB. The only way to stop such attempt is to 51%&#xA;attack the attacker. That&#39;d be really ugly. &#xA;&#xA;For technical and ethical reasons, I believe the thresholds for increase&#xA;and decrease must be symmetrical: increase the block size when the&#xA;x-percentile is bigger than the current size, decrease the block size&#xA;when the (100-x)-percentile is smaller than the current size. The&#xA;overall effect is: the block size remains unchanged unless 80% of miners&#xA;agree to. &#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* Please consider the use of &#34;hardfork bit&#34; to signify the hardfork:&#xA;&#xA;https://www.reddit.com/r/bitcoin_devlist/comments/3ekhg2/bip_draft_hardfork_bit_jl2012_at_xbthk_jul_23_2015/&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;https://github.com/jl2012/bips/blob/master/hardforkbit.mediawiki &#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* Or, alternatively, please combine the hardfork with a softfork. I&#39;m&#xA;rewriting the specification as follow (changes underlined):&#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* Replace static 1M block size hard limit with a floating limit&#xA;(&#34;hardLimit&#34;).&#xA;&#xA;&#x9;* &#xA;&#xA;hardLimit floats within the range 1-32M, inclusive.&#xA;&#xA;&#x9;* &#xA;&#xA;Initial value of hardLimit is 1M, preserving current system.&#xA; &#x9;* Changing hardLimit is accomplished by encoding a proposed value&#xA;within a block&#39;s coinbase scriptSig.&#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* Votes refer to a byte value, encoded within the pattern &#34;/BVd+/&#34;&#xA;Example: /BV8000000/ votes for 8,000,000 byte hardLimit. If there is&#xA;more than one match with with pattern, the first match is counted.&#xA; &#x9;* Absent/invalid votes and votes below minimum cap (1M) are counted as&#xA;1M votes. Votes above the maximum cap (32M) are counted as 32M votes.&#xA; &#x9;* A new hardLimit is calculated at each difficult adjustment period&#xA;(2016 blocks), and applies to the next 2016 blocks.&#xA; &#x9;* Calculate hardLimit by examining the coinbase scriptSig votes of the&#xA;previous 12,000 blocks, and taking the 20th percentile and 80th&#xA;percentile.&#xA; &#x9;* New hardLimit is the median of the followings:&#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* min(current hardLimit * 1.2, 20-percentile)&#xA; &#x9;* max(current hardLimit / 1.2, 80-percentile)&#xA; &#x9;* current hardLimit&#xA;&#xA; &#x9;* version 4 block: the coinbase of a version 4 block must match this&#xA;pattern: &#34;/BVd+/&#34;&#xA; &#x9;* 70% rule: If 8,400 of the last 12,000 blocks are version 4 or&#xA;greater, reject invalid version 4 blocks. (testnet4: 501 of last 1000)&#xA; &#x9;* 80% rule (&#34;Point of no return&#34;): If 9,600 of the last 12,000 blocks&#xA;are version 4 or greater, reject all version &lt;= 3 blocks. (testnet4: 750&#xA;of last 1000)&#xA; &#x9;* Block version number is calculated after masking out high 16 bits&#xA;(final bit count TBD by versionBits outcome).&#xA;&#xA;Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-09-02 23:33 寫到:&#xA;&gt; BIP 100 initial public draft:&#xA;&gt; https://github.com/jgarzik/bip100/blob/master/bip-0100.mediawiki [1]&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Emphasis on &#34;initial&#34; This is a starting point for the usual open&#xA;&gt; source feedback/iteration cycle, not an endpoint that Must Be This&#xA;&gt; Way.&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Links:&#xA;&gt; ------&#xA;&gt; [1] https://github.com/jgarzik/bip100/blob/master/bip-0100.mediawiki&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list&#xA;&gt; bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&#xA;&gt; https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&#xA;&#xA; &#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150903/9bfb6c46/attachment.html&gt;</html></oembed>