<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1rv5ajnhgrc0wq3ulrk6tcjkgsaq8h4rs5rtsvrnklz4j0lw40egqphc5wt</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1rv5ajnhgrc0wq3ulrk6tcjkgsaq8h4rs5rtsvrnklz4j0lw40egqphc5wt</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-06-25&#xA;📝 Original message:That description makes sense.  It also makes sense to separate out the &#xA;hard fork from the soft fork process.   Right now some people want to &#xA;use the soft fork procedure for a hard fork simply because there is no &#xA;other way to do it.&#xA;&#xA;I am under the impression that most users expect changes/improvements &#xA;that would require a hard fork so I think some kind of process needs to &#xA;be developed.  Taking the responsibility off the shoulder of the core &#xA;maintainer also makes sense.  The hard fork issue is too much of a &#xA;distraction for people trying to maintain the nuts and bolts of the &#xA;underlying system.&#xA;&#xA;I saw a suggestion that regularly scheduled hard forks should be &#xA;planned.  That seems to make sense so you would have some sort of &#xA;schedule where you would have cut off dates for hard-fork BIP &#xA;submissions.  That way you avoid the debates over whether there should &#xA;be hard forks to what should be contained within the hard fork (if &#xA;needed).  It makes sense to follow the BIP process as close as &#xA;possible.  Possibly adding another step after &#34;Dev acceptance&#34; to &#xA;include input from others such as merchants/exchanges/miners/users.  It &#xA;will only be an approximation of &#34;decentralization&#34; and the process &#xA;won&#39;t be perfect but if you want to move forward then you need some way &#xA;to do it.&#xA;&#xA;Russ&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;On 6/25/2015 4:05 PM, Tier Nolan wrote:&#xA;&gt; On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 2:50 AM, Mark Friedenbach &#xA;&gt; &lt;mark at friedenbach.org &lt;mailto:mark at friedenbach.org&gt;&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;     I&#39;m sorry but this is absolutely not the case, Milly. The reason&#xA;&gt;     that people get defensive is that we have a carefully constructed&#xA;&gt;     process that does work (thank you very much!) and is well documented.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; There is no process for handling hard forks, which aren&#39;t bug fixes.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Soft forks have a defined process of something like&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; - BIP proposal + discussion&#xA;&gt; - Proposed code&#xA;&gt; - Dev acceptance&#xA;&gt; - Release&#xA;&gt; - Miner vote/acceptance&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; The devs have a weak veto.  If they refuse to move forward with &#xA;&gt; changes, miners could perform a soft fork on their own.  They don&#39;t &#xA;&gt; want to do that, as it would be controversial and the devs know the &#xA;&gt; software better.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; The miner veto is stronger (for soft forks) but not absolute.  The &#xA;&gt; devs could checkpoint/blacklist a chain if miners implemented a fork &#xA;&gt; that wasn&#39;t acceptable (assuming the community backed them).&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; When ASICs arrived, it was pointed out by some that the devs could hit &#xA;&gt; back if ASICs weren&#39;t made publicly available.  If they slightly &#xA;&gt; tweaked the hashing algorithm, then current generation of ASICs would &#xA;&gt; be useless.   The potential threat may have acted as a disincentive &#xA;&gt; for ASIC manufacturers to use the ASICs themselves.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Moving forward with agreement between all involved is the recommended &#xA;&gt; and desirable approach.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Consensus between all parties is the goal but isn&#39;t absolutely &#xA;&gt; required.  This escape valve is partly what makes consensus work.  If &#xA;&gt; you dig your heels in, then the other side can bypass you, but they &#xA;&gt; have an incentive to try to convince you to compromise first.  The &#xA;&gt; outcome is better if a middle ground can be found.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Hard forks are different.  The &#34;checks and balances&#34; of weak vetoes &#xA;&gt; are not present.  This means that things can devolve from consensus to &#xA;&gt; mutual veto.  Consensus ceases to be a goal and becomes a requirement.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; This is partly a reflection of the nature of hard forks.  Everyone &#xA;&gt; needs to upgrade.  On the other hand, if most of the various groups &#xA;&gt; upgrade, then users of the legacy software would have to upgrade or &#xA;&gt; get left behind. If 5% of the users decided not to upgrade, should &#xA;&gt; they be allowed to demand that nobody else does?&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; There is clearly some kind of threshold that is reasonable.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; The fundamental problem is that there isn&#39;t agreement on what the &#xA;&gt; block size is.  Is it equal in status to the 21 million BTC limit?&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; If Satoshi had said that 1MB was part of the definition of Bitcoin, &#xA;&gt; then I think people would accept it to the same extent as they accept &#xA;&gt; the 21 million coin limit.  It might cause people to leave the coin &#xA;&gt; though.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; It was intended to be temporary, but people have realized that it &#xA;&gt; might be a good idea to keep it.  In effect both sides could argue &#xA;&gt; that they should be considered the status quo.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; I wonder if a coin toss would be acceptable :).  &#34;Come to an agreement &#xA;&gt; or we decide by coin toss&#34;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list&#xA;&gt; bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&#xA;&gt; https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&#xA;&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150625/f1c23619/attachment.html&gt;</html></oembed>