<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3l</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3l</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2023-05-07&#xA;🗒️ Summary of this message: Dual-funded 0-conf can be made safe if the initiator uses swap-in-potentiam addresses, allowing for immediate transfer to a 0-conf Lightning channel.&#xA;📝 Original message:&#xA;Good morning t-bast, and list,&#xA;&#xA;Dual-funded 0-conf can be made safe in the following case:&#xA;&#xA;* If the initiator uses swap-in-potentiam addresses (with initiator as Alice, acceptor as Bob).&#xA;&#xA;If the initiator stalls, then the acceptor can retaliate by refusing to sign the swap-in-potentiam UTXOs forever after that, thus also locking their funds until the swap-in-potentiam times out, thus preventing this liquidity griefing from being cost-free.&#xA;&#xA;The expected use-case is that a user expects onchain operations to be slow and take multiple confirmations to receive.&#xA;Once there is deep confirmation that a swap-in-potentiam address has been funded, then it can be transferred immediately to a 0-conf Lightning channel.&#xA;&#xA;The initiator still needs to trust that the acceptor does not double-spend out from under the initiator, but see LSPS3 Promise To Unconditionally Fund 0-conf.&#xA;Also, it looks like you are allowing for the initiator to trust the acceptor in that case, as I believe you are taking the point of view of the acceptor of the dual-funding flow.&#xA;&#xA;Regards,&#xA;ZmnSCPxj</html></oembed>