<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1dalwmzu6f0yqdl0cy8qeaa6zcrzkara3jh8jjv7zky5s0tuypatsu07r9n</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1dalwmzu6f0yqdl0cy8qeaa6zcrzkara3jh8jjv7zky5s0tuypatsu07r9n</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2023-01-01&#xA;🗒️ Summary of this message: A proposal for a halving system based on average difficulty is suggested, but it does not address the immediate danger of profit margins and hashing power. A demurrage soft-fork may be a more plausible solution.&#xA;📝 Original message:Is a storage fee averaged out over many future blocks - but not hardcoded value and regulated by a free market?&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;The problem with demurrage I see is that the fee is taken when you spend. There is no additional income for miners if people are still hoarding.&#xA;In tail emission even if people are still hoarding - the fee is taken immediately and is distributed to miners.&#xA;&#xA;We have a hope there is still the global adoption ahead (most of countries are like El Salvador). It may increase price and marketcap of Bitcoin by order of magnitude.&#xA;And that&#39;s why hoarding in demurrage may still exist: due to extremely appealing long-term risk/reward (i.e. relatively small, delayed tax versus huge possible profit)&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;W dniu 2022-12-31 00:29:08 użytkownik Peter Todd &lt;pete at petertodd.org&gt; napisał:&#xA;&gt; On Fri, Dec 23, 2022 at 07:43:36PM +0100, jk_14 at op.pl wrote:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Necessary or not - it doesn&#39;t hurt to plan the robust model, just in case. The proposal is:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; Let every 210,000 the code calculate the average difficulty of 100 last retargets (100 fit well in 210,000 / 2016 = 104.166)&#xA;&gt; and compare with the maximum of all such values calculated before, every 210,000 blocks:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; if average_diff_of_last_100_retargets &gt; maximum_of_all_previous_average_diffs&#xA;&gt; &#x9;do halving&#xA;&gt; else&#xA;&gt; &#x9;do nothing&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; This way:&#xA;&gt; &#xA;&gt; 1. system cannot be played&#xA;&gt; 2. only in case of destructive halving: system waits for the recovery of network security&#xA;&#xA;First of all - while I suspct you already understand this issue - I should&#xA;point out the following:&#xA;&#xA;The immediate danger we have with halvings is that in a competitive market,&#xA;profit margins tend towards marginal costs - the cost to produce an additional&#xA;unit of production - rather than total costs - the cost necessary to recover&#xA;prior and future expenses. Since the halving is a sudden shock to the system,&#xA;under the right conditions we could have a significant amount of hashing power&#xA;just barely able to afford to hash prior to the halving, resulting in all that&#xA;hashing power immediately having to shut down and fees increasing dramatically,&#xA;and likely, chaotically.  Your proposal does not address that problem as it can&#xA;only measure difficulty prior to the halving point.&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;Other than that problem, I agree that this proposal would, at least in theory,&#xA;be a positive improvement on the status quo. But it is a hard fork and I don&#39;t&#xA;think there is much hope for such hard forks to be implemented. I believe that&#xA;a demmurrage soft-fork, implemented via a storage fee averaged out over many&#xA;future blocks, has a much more plausible route towards implementation.&#xA;&#xA;-- &#xA;https://petertodd.org &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org</html></oembed>