<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1kf0ppcjaguxekg24yx6smgxlu73qn0k8lm0t2wrqc0scpl7u3sgsmf3f58</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1kf0ppcjaguxekg24yx6smgxlu73qn0k8lm0t2wrqc0scpl7u3sgsmf3f58</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-06-14&#xA;📝 Original message:Miner voting, while imperfect, is the least-worst of various solutions&#xA;which inject market input into the system.  It is is known quantity, field&#xA;tested, and must be sustained, in public, over a time span of months.  As&#xA;this thread shows, stakeholder and direct user voting is nigh impossible to&#xA;get right.&#xA;&#xA;Choosing block size is fundamentally a central bank directive shaping the&#xA;fee market.  Whatever actor or algorithm or natural equilibrium picks the&#xA;block size, that choice will dictate the level of competition for fees, the&#xA;level of scarcity of an economically scarce resource.  Picking the block&#xA;size advantages some businesses over others, some business models over&#xA;others.  Software (and software devs) should not be the ones picking that&#xA;limit.&#xA;&#xA;Checks-and-balances are also important.  BIP 100 notably includes two steps&#xA;at which user input is visibly and actively injected:   1) hard fork to&#xA;enable, and 2) a second hard fork if the system is to scale beyond 32MB.&#xA;The network users (not miners) twice approve the system.  Further, one must&#xA;remember all the basic miner incentives that do align with users, notably&#xA;that of maintaining the value of bitcoin tokens as their primary income&#xA;stream.&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 12:16 AM, Stephen &lt;stephencalebmorse at gmail.com&gt;&#xA;wrote:&#xA;&#xA;&gt; While this idea is theoretically interesting because it involves many&#xA;&gt; stakeholders, rather than just miners, I think in practice this would not&#xA;&gt; work very well. Users don&#39;t want to worry about this kind of technicality,&#xA;&gt; they just want to be able to make a transaction and have it be processed.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; In addition, while this gives stakeholders some weight with the fees they&#xA;&gt; supply, these fees are marginal compared to the block size subsidy. If this&#xA;&gt; proposal were actually implemented, I think miners would vote for whatever&#xA;&gt; they think is best, and users would not contradict them with their votes to&#xA;&gt; ensure a fast confirmation time. Users are incentivized to be in agreement&#xA;&gt; with miners because the miners provide them with the confirmations they&#xA;&gt; need, but fees do not provide a great incentive for miners to be in&#xA;&gt; agreement with users, and likely won&#39;t for some time.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Best,&#xA;&gt; Stephen&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; On Jun 12, 2015, at 2:11 PM, Peter Todd &lt;pete at petertodd.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed&#xA;&gt; &gt; entirely, with a &#34;soft&#34; limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by&#xA;&gt; &gt; hashing power.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over&#xA;&gt; &gt; the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions&#xA;&gt; &gt; themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included&#xA;&gt; &gt; in a block casting a specific vote.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; We can simplify Garzik&#39;s vote to say that one of the nVersion bits&#xA;&gt; &gt; either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some&#xA;&gt; &gt; fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a&#xA;&gt; &gt; nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or&#xA;&gt; &gt; decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an&#xA;&gt; &gt; indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via&#xA;&gt; &gt; fees to vote according to user wishes.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; Of course, to cast a &#34;don&#39;t care&#34; vote we can either define an&#xA;&gt; &gt; additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we&#xA;&gt; &gt; can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a&#xA;&gt; &gt; mechanism such as replace-by-fee.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; See also John Dillon&#39;s proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; --&#xA;&gt; &gt; &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;&gt; &gt; 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; &gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list&#xA;&gt; &gt; Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net&#xA;&gt; &gt; https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------&#xA;&gt; _______________________________________________&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development mailing list&#xA;&gt; Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net&#xA;&gt; https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;-- &#xA;Jeff Garzik&#xA;Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist&#xA;BitPay, Inc.      https://bitpay.com/&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150614/a0c711a4/attachment.html&gt;</html></oembed>