rich1.0npub1r8mnta5rneza3ujqtckuz6m8es0mvvzq35ec7v4nz3lq99l3wzlsrtu3anhttps://nostr.ae/npub1r8mnta5rneza3ujqtckuz6m8es0mvvzq35ec7v4nz3lq99l3wzlsrtu3annjumphttps://nostr.ae📅 Original date posted:2022-11-03 📝 Original message:AJ/Antoine et al > What should folks wanting to do coinjoins/dualfunding/dlcs/etc do to > solve that problem if they have only opt-in RBF available? Assuming Alice is a well funded advisory, with enough resources to spam the network so that enough nodes see her malicious transaction first, how does full-rbf solve this vs. opt-in rbf? Cheers, -Yancy On 2022-10-27 19:21, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev wrote: > On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 11:56:45AM +0200, John Carvalho via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > >> I took the time to read your whole post. Despite a diplomatic tone, I >> find >> your takeaways from all your references to remain conveniently biased >> for >> protecting the plan of RBF > > Yes, I am heavily biased against zeroconf: there's no way I'd > personally > be willing to trust it for my own incoming funds, no matter how much > evidence you show me that it's safe in practice. Show me a million > transactions where every single one worked fine, and I'm still going to > assume that the payment going to me is going to be the one that makes > the error rate tick up from 0% to 0.0001%. That's okay; just because I > wouldn't do something, doesn't mean other people shouldn't. > > It does mean I'm not going to be a particularly good advocate for > zeroconf > though. I mean, I might still be a fine advocate for giving people time > to react, making it clear what's going on, finding ways that might make > everyone happy, or just digging it to random technical details; but, > for me, I'm more interested in a world where chargebacks are > impossible, > not where we just make the best of what was possible with technology > from five or ten years ago. > > But that's fine: it just means that people, like yourself, who will > tolerate the risks of zeroconf, should be involved in the discussion. > >> You show multiple examples where, when I read them, I assume the next >> thing >> you will say will be "so we really should stop trying to impose >> optional >> features, particularly when they affect existing use cases" but >> instead you >> persist. > > Sure, that's natural: you read a sign saying "you can have any ice > cream > you want for 5c" and think "Awesome, who wouldn't want cheap chocolate > ice cream!!" and see me going for a Golden Gaytime and think "wtf > dude". > Different strokes. > > For me, I see the gmaxwell github comment I quoted saying: > > There is also a matter of driving competent design rather than lazy > first thing that works. > > and think "yeah, okay, maybe we should be working harder to push > lightning > adoption, rather than letting people stick with wallet UX from 2015" > and have altcoins take over >50% of payment volume. > > Likewise, > > There is also a very clear pattern we've seen in the past where > people take anything the system lets them do as strong evidence that > they have a irrevocable right to use the system in that way, and that > their only responsibility-- and if their usage harms the system it's > the responsibility of the system to not permit it. > > seems a pretty good match against your claim "I expect the things I do > with Bitcoin today to work FOREVER." Better to nip that thinking in the > bud; and even if the best time to do that was years ago, the second > best > time to do it is still now. > > By contrast, from the same post, I'd guess you're focussing on: > > Network behavior is one of the few bits of friction > driving good technical design rather than "move fast, break things, and > force everyone else onto my way of doing thing rather than discussing > the design in public". > > and thinking "yeah, move fast, break things, force everyone else -- > that's exactly what's going on here, and shouldn't be". > > But that's also okay: even when there is common ground to be found, > sometimes it requires actual work to get people who start from > different > views to get there. > >> The problem is that RBF has already been an option for years, and >> anyone >> that wants to use it can. > > Is that true? Antoine claims [1 [1]] that opt-in RBF isn't enough to > avoid > a DoS issue when utxos are jointly funded by untrusting partners, and, > aiui, that's the main motivation for addressing this now. > > [1] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html > > The scenario he describes is: A, B, C create a tx: > > inputs: A1, B1, C1 [opts in to RBF] > fees: normal > outputs: > [lightning channel, DLC, etc, who knows] > > they all analyse the tx, and agree it looks great; however just before > publishing it, A spams the network with an alternative tx, double > spending her input: > > inputs: A1 [does not opt in to RBF] > fees: low > outputs: A > > If A gets the timing right, that's bad for B and C because they've > populated their mempool with the 1st transaction, while everyone else > sees the 2nd one instead; and neither tx will replace the other. B and > C can't know that they should just cancel their transaction, eg: > > inputs: B1, C1 [opts in to RBF] > fees: 50% above normal > outputs: > [smaller channel, refund, whatever] > > and might instead waste time trying to fee bump the tx to get it mined, > or similar. > > What should folks wanting to do coinjoins/dualfunding/dlcs/etc do to > solve that problem if they have only opt-in RBF available? > > If you're right that opt-in RBF is enough, that question has a good > answer. I don't believe anyone's presented an answer to it in the 17 > months since Antoine raised the concern. > >> passive aggression >> escalation >> unfair advantage >> oppressive, dark-pattern design >> strong-arming and shoe-horning > > Do you really think any of that was helping your cause? > > Cheers, > aj > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev Links: ------ [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20221103/bccd03d2/attachment-0001.html>