<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1wtx5qvewc7pd6znlvwktq03mdld05mv3h5dkzfwd3dc30gdmsptsugtuyn</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1wtx5qvewc7pd6znlvwktq03mdld05mv3h5dkzfwd3dc30gdmsptsugtuyn</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-10-21&#xA;📝 Original message:On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 9:52 AM Luke Dashjr &lt;luke at dashjr.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&#xA;&gt; On Wednesday, October 21, 2015 7:39:45 AM Christian Decker wrote:&#xA;&gt; &gt; On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 8:19 AM Luke Dashjr &lt;luke at dashjr.org&gt; wrote:&#xA;&gt; &gt; &gt; This doesn&#39;t completely close malleability (which should be documented&#xA;&gt; in&#xA;&gt; &gt; &gt; the BIP), so I&#39;m not sure it&#39;s worth the cost, especially if closing&#xA;&gt; &gt; &gt; malleability later on would need more. How about specifying flags&#xA;&gt; upfront&#xA;&gt; &gt; &gt; in the UTXO-creating transaction specifying which parts the signature&#xA;&gt; &gt; &gt; will cover? This would allow implementation of fully malleability-proof&#xA;&gt; &gt; &gt; wallets.&#xA;&gt; &gt;&#xA;&gt; &gt; As far as I see it the only remaining venues for malleability are the use&#xA;&gt; &gt; of sighash flags that are not SIGHASH_ALL, as mentioned in the BIP. Any&#xA;&gt; use&#xA;&gt; &gt; of non-sighash_all flags is already an explicit permission to modify the&#xA;&gt; &gt; transactions, by adding and removing inputs and outputs, so I don&#39;t see&#xA;&gt; how&#xA;&gt; &gt; these can be made non-malleable. Am I missing something?&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Signer malleability is still a notable concern needing consideration.&#xA;&gt; Ideally,&#xA;&gt; wallets should be trying to actively CoinJoin, bump fees on, etc any&#xA;&gt; pending&#xA;&gt; transactions in the background. These forms of malleability affect nearly&#xA;&gt; as&#xA;&gt; many real use cases as third-party malleability.&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&gt; Luke&#xA;&gt;&#xA;&#xA;How is signer malleability still a problem if we remove the signatures from&#xA;the transaction ID of the transaction and all preceding transactions? The&#xA;signer can re-sign a transaction but it won&#39;t change the transaction ID.&#xA;&#xA;It is still possible to double-spend transactions that do not have enough&#xA;fees, so just starting a new round of CoinJoin is sufficient to bump fees&#xA;for all parties that participate, and that would also result in the&#xA;double-spent low fee transaction to be discarded, resolving the state of&#xA;all coins in the first CoinJoin tx.&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151021/87444434/attachment.html&gt;</html></oembed>