<oembed><type>rich</type><version>1.0</version><author_name>npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2</author_name><author_url>https://nostr.ae/npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2</author_url><provider_name>njump</provider_name><provider_url>https://nostr.ae</provider_url><html>📅 Original date posted:2015-08-21&#xA;📝 Original message:On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 01:48:23AM -0400, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev wrote:&#xA;&gt; If this is widely deployed + enabled, what is the impact to current wallets&#xA;&gt; in use?&#xA;&#xA;See my comment on the recently-opened issue, reproduced below. In short,&#xA;not all that much, especially if we adopt my suggestion of having the&#xA;Core implementation accept and respond to bloom filter requests from&#xA;non-upgraded clients regardless of whether or not NODE_BLOOM was set&#xA;until some fixed upgrade deadline in the future.&#xA;&#xA;&#xA;    Note that since the last time NODE_BLOOM was proposed, the landcape for&#xA;    (lite-)SPV clients has changed significantly in a few key ways:&#xA;&#xA;    1) @mikehearn&#39;s [Cartographer](https://github.com/mikehearn/httpseed)&#xA;    seed protocol has been created and deployed in production to allow&#xA;    (lite-)SPV clients to find nodes supporting arbitrary service bits,&#xA;    notable NODE_GETUTXOs.&#xA;&#xA;    2) Bloom filter usage has declined significantly, as lite-SPV clients&#xA;    are moving towards using centralized, trusted, servers run by the wallet&#xA;    authors. For instance&#xA;    [Mycelium](https://github.com/mycelium-com/wallet),&#xA;    [GreenBits](https://github.com/greenaddress/GreenBits),&#xA;    [AirBitz](https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3etohn/whats_wrong_with_breadwallet/ctirou5),&#xA;    and [Electrum](https://electrum.org/#home) all fall in this category.&#xA;&#xA;    3) Bloom filters [have been found](http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/763) to&#xA;    have severe privacy issues, offering essentially no privacy at all.&#xA;    Under many threat models a small number of trusted servers pose less&#xA;    privacy security risk than connecting to random, sybil-attackable, peers&#xA;    using unencrypted connections and giving those peers very accurate&#xA;    wallet contents information.&#xA;&#xA;    4) Finally, Bloom filters still have [unsolved DoS attack&#xA;    issues](https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3hjak7/the_hard_work_of_core_devs_not_xt_makes_bitcoin/cu9xntf?context=3),&#xA;    that will get significantly worse under upcoming blocksize increase&#xA;    proposals.&#xA;&#xA;    Re: service bit identifier, I&#39;d just pick 1&lt;&lt;3&#xA;&#xA;    -https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/6578#issuecomment-133226943&#xA;&#xA;-- &#xA;&#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@petertodd.org&#xA;00000000000000000402fe6fb9ad613c93e12bddfc6ec02a2bd92f002050594d&#xA;-------------- next part --------------&#xA;A non-text attachment was scrubbed...&#xA;Name: signature.asc&#xA;Type: application/pgp-signature&#xA;Size: 650 bytes&#xA;Desc: Digital signature&#xA;URL: &lt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150820/18343e42/attachment.sig&gt;</html></oembed>