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nprofile1qqszzg7v0zr6y7nz2v8qr5602jx7cez660qlpjm4zdlm80nd0sn56kgpzpmhxue69uhkummnw3ezuamfdejszrthwden5te0dehhxtnvdakqfwqjr3

Publishing to

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Last Notes

2026-03-05 07:13:18 CET

Here is a perfect example of why you need to tread carefully anytime there’s a flurry of commentary discussing China.
Be it Beijing’s motivations, or the supposed fact that – somehow – action taken by the United States in the Middle East has provided for escalatory leverage. It may sound like a cliche, but you must know that the Chinese are playing multiple steps ahead of Washington.
Perhaps some unsolicited advice. The next time you stumble across an individual weighing in on the China debate, simply ask that individual when was the last time they were in country. It’s all noise when it comes to the arm chair macro tourists and armchair geopolitical theorists.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/china-tells-top-refiners-to-suspend-diesel-and-gasoline-exports

2026-03-04 07:23:14 CET

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This is a really good one. Not often used here locally but still …. Excellent.

2026-03-04 07:15:13 CET

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Ok, so had a watch. My feedback is that those holding hard line claims over what China will or won’t do tend to have at least a bias if not an outright agenda. Brian’s commentary is just too declarative. “China can’t do this….” Or “China is different from America …..”
There’s, of course, certain truth underlying the various commentary. Make no mistake though, China and the United States are rivals and are both are seeking to undermine the other. I just find that how it is China goes about that process is smoother. America’s approach is brash and hegemonic.
My own baseline is as follows. China understands how it is that America acts on the global stage, learned the lessons over 30 years and is applying that learning to its distinct advantage.
The Americans, to this very day, still do not truly understand how China operates, what motivates China or how decision making is conducted in a way that can successfully suppress American power.
My overall aim is to address that latter point. To educate, wherever possible, my fellow compatriots. For now, there just hasn't been an audience willing to listen with a genuinely open mind. I just keep tilting at the windmills.

2026-03-04 05:36:08 CET

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Excellent. I'll have a watch and revert if there's anything else I can add to this ongoing situation vis a vis China's involvement.

2026-03-04 05:17:57 CET

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Never heard of this person. I'll have to check him out.
To your question though, I'm fairly certain that China is providing support to Iran in some capacity, but will be doing so with complete plausible deniability. That's just how China seeks to operate. I would also agree that the Beijing leadership will be doing so without risking overextending itself.
Is there a specific piece of content from Brian Berletic that you can share?

2026-03-03 08:21:23 CET

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Don't get me started. A long while back I made the mistake of extending my experience to people operating in the Beltway that were traveling to China. This is before the days of Covid. Even at that time it became quite clear that any messaging beyond "China is the new evil empire" would not get an audience.
There is actually a Select Committee on China in Congress which is, technically, meant to bring in experts to explain all things China to these legislative decision makers. What the entire Committee has descended into is a venue for anti-China "experts" to extoll everything the Committee has already concluded. It's a farce.
The entirety of my engagement today is rather straight forward. I'm a red blooded American who just so happens to have lived in China for 30 years. I can see well beyond the horizon and, with that, what is coming. The EV industry is gone. So is the humanoid robotics space and, I would argue, is LLM ecosystem. I will just continue to hammer these points home until the message is finally received, if ever.
Consider the past 48 hours and the sheer number of not only newly minted Iranian experts, but somehow an entire new graduating class of China experts as well. I do my best to keep a lid on my reactions to it all, and I thank yoga for that, but my patience is rapidly running out.
Rant over! And my thanks for the question.

2026-03-03 04:05:52 CET

China Morning Missive
“A Single Flower does not Make a Spring”
There seems to be a rather weak theory going around that America has deployed some grand plan to systematically cut China off from key strategic partners. While there are certainly more than a few dots which can be connected to reach such a conclusion, it remains an errant conclusion and, if anything, only goes to demonstrate just how poorly China’s 30 years of foreign policy strategies are understood throughout the Beltway.
To begin, the theory being promulgated is an act of pure projection. How American policy has been conducted over the past 30 years must, obviously, be the very same course of action under consideration by the leadership in Beijing. Not even close and it is rather obvious, at least to me, that few have read BGen Samuel Griffith’s book on Sun Tzu.
To the Americans, the world is built upon alliances and a Judeo-Christian ethos that delineates between good actors and bad actors. It is all a very black and white mindset and extremely rigid. It is also an approach which is highly antithetical to how Beijing operates. What continues to evade much of Washington, the Beltway consensus and the entire Thing Tank Senior Fellow ecosystem is a foreign policy construct which has been built around a web of counterparties, not formal alliances. Counterparties which are centered on commercial interests and, critically, are meant to achieve the specific strategic aim of optionality through the redundancies of critical inputs.
In the case of the Middle East, even the most tertiary assessment will find that China isn’t even close to being hemmed in strategically by a single relationship. In fact, and as a quick aside, the entire “Axis of Autocracies” is incongruent not only with China’s actual ambitions but also in terms of how Beijing has pursued foreign policy. The taxonomy applied is, well, just another reflection of an America hardwired to a 20th Century mindset. For the sake of argument though, if it is true that the underlying aim of the Trump administration is to leverage actions in one theater to destabilize China in the East Asia theater all that will be achieved is the equivalent of pushing on a string.
The glaring omission of this theory is any consideration of China’s current expansive set of relationships across the Gulf region both in terms of scope and scale.
Here are but a few examples. To start, there’s Qatar which is reported to be the second largest supplier of LNG (3million tons/year) to China. There’s Kuwait which was the first country in the region to sign on, formally, to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2014. Even Iraq. Here the two countries have a deep commercial relationship, including a 20-year “oil-for-construction” agreement. China imports as much oil from Iraq as it does from Russia. Finally, there’s Saudi Arabia, by far the single most significant relationship China has built in the region and a partnership that is far broader and deeper than that of any other Gulf nation.
Here is the critical point to be made; what is highlighted above is a foreign policy that has been executed upon globally from Eastern Europe to South East Asia and all points between. Be it the Port of Piraeus in Greece or the linkage to the Belgrade-Budapest rail line. The massive energy investments in Indonesia or, not to be forgotten, the 950km newly operational rail line in Algeria. China has built redundancies across the globe and isn’t anywhere near at risk if it were to lose a single bilateral relationship.
Ah, but what of China’s ability to protect those interests? The Beltway commentariat is also stressing that Beijing doesn’t have the necessary hard power (military assets) to fortify any of those relationships. This is most certainly true, but only to a point. The real question to be asked is how far can America extend its reach in seeking to counter/contain China? For me, the answer is found in history and with the British Empire. For all the galivanting around the globe during the latter half of the 19th Century, all the Gunboat diplomacy, it ultimately became impossible for the Empire to be in all places at all times. The same would hold for America today albeit with a key difference. China isn’t just a geopolitical rival; it is a deep pocketed rival and one which has built bilateral relationships that are commercial centric. It is also a position built over the course of three decades. There’s a degree of entrenchment that has yet to be properly appreciated in Washington.
God speed!
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/china-playing-long-game-over-iran

2026-03-02 09:47:03 CET

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Exactly, and I can't stress enough that living here in Shanghai is a zero drama experience. Can I ask, when were you last in China?

2026-03-02 09:00:30 CET

Feel the need to share the following.
"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."
This is a quote from Napoleon Bonaparte and NOT Sun Tzu.

2026-03-02 01:36:37 CET

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Correct and why it is that Beijing simply wants to maintain the status quo. Low time preference thinking is how the system operates here along with a confidence in the direction of travel.
All of the commentary centered on China making a move on Taiwan comes from Washington DC and the various think tank "Senior Fellows" all of whom are conflicted in the opinions on the topics. The headlines of "China to move on Taiwan by 2027" is meant - in my opinion - to goad Beijing into said action. It won't happen.

2026-03-02 01:23:57 CET

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I'd have to respectfully disagree. A distracted America doesn't factor in very high when it comes to the final decision.
Beijing's objective is to keep the status quo contrary to whatever it is the commentariat would lay out in terms of a rationale. Much as I shared just a few days ago, winning the peace is a prerequisite before any decision is made to take action and Beijing knows that this isn't possible at this juncture.

2026-03-01 09:08:07 CET

Strongly advise reading this book. The only edition you should read. This specific book. Fantastic examples provided throughout.
And I can say it has allowed me to properly assess much of the thinking out of Beijing when it comes to world affairs. Moreover, it has provided insight into how it is Beijing has operated over the past 30 years.
https://blossom.primal.net/7c80ffe3ee1aef068877604a35361cd10252fd2a065edb29f740cd9c22676e18.jpg

2026-02-27 07:29:55 CET

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What you’ve described just isn’t how China would go about the process unless provoked. While it may seem quaint, Chinese thinking on such matters does remain very closely aligned with Sun Tzu’s hierarchy of attack.
1. Attack the enemy’s strategy
2. Attack the enemy’s alliances
3. Attack the enemy’s army
4. Attack the enemy’s cities
These are in order and Sun Tzu describes the final step as being “the least desirable and most costly”.
At the same time, Beijing would be adding to is overall calculus its current relative position geopolitically speaking. Agree or disagree, Beijing views both European states and America as declining powers. There is simply more to be gained by remining patient and doing nothing.
I do, however, very much appreciate your comment and raising a different perspective. If nothing else, we can just appreciate having differing opinions which is totally fine.

2026-02-27 02:31:19 CET

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This is actually an issue I've been following for quite some time. The answer, at least as I see it, centers on China seeking the rapid commodification of LLMs and this is best achieved through open source and rabid, iterative competition.
I've joked that Steve Case wants his AOL business model back when discussing American closed source models. Siloed and all seeking profit maximization. I've argued that with China going the open source route would be an existential threat to the American groups. so long as the Chinese models were able to perform. Well, they have performed and well beyond what anyone had expected.
Today, it is all eyes on Hangzhou and Deepseek and the second and third order effects that will inevitably playout. Best recent example was Deepseek refusing to provide Nvida and AMD access to its upcoming model.
Hope this helps and I'll be sure to provide more insight on the entire net-gen competitive battlefield.

2026-02-27 01:54:41 CET

China Morning Missive
The Taiwan Issue
Back behind the desk after a much needed Chinese New Year break. My goal for this Year of the Horse is to get to those of you interested more updates and insights into what is actually transpiring here on the ground in Shanghai. And you can help with this endeavor. If there are topics where you’d like my perspective, just let me know.
For today, the topic is Taiwan and is being raised due to a recent NYT article which highlighted the “impending” military move by Beijing on Taiwan in 2027. The construct of the story centered on messages conveyed to American tech firms that rely heavily, if not exclusively, on chips made in Taiwan. A summary of that article is linked below.
Allow me to stress that the probability of China moving on Taiwan next year is zero. Zero. That is both a strong opinion and one that is strongly held. The reason for such confidence comes from an actual understanding of Chinese history and experience with how it is that decisions such as these are made in Beijing.
There is a basic premise which needs to be taken into account. If the peace cannot be won, then instigating war is to be avoided. It is all very Sun Tzu. Allow me to provide some historical context, specifically the two examples of when China, itself, was invaded and defeated. There were the Mongols in the early 1200s and then the Manchus in the mid 1600s. Why these data points matter when assessing the Taiwan issue is that, and in both instances, the end result had the ethnic Han Chinese fully assimilating the invaders over time. The Mongols ruled as the Yuan Dynasty for one thousand years and the Manchus ruled as the Qing Dynasty for 200+ years.
For China, to conquer means to assimilate. Allow me to provide a more recent example, Hong Kong in 2019. Begin with an understanding that at the formal handover in 1997, Hong Kong was basically as an extremely British enclave. Once Beijing reassumed control, however, the borders were opened and over the next 20 years Mainland Chinese entered the city to live and work and became the dominate ethnic group. Hong Kong became just another Chinese city. It was fully assimilated and with it made the move by Beijing to assume full control relatively easy.
None of these dynamics are at play when it comes to Taiwan. Most importantly, these dynamics are known by the Beijing leadership. If a move were made, and even if that move were successful, there would be no way that stability after-the-fact could be achieved.
The objective is to maintain the status quo, and I am expecting an agreement along these lines to be reached in the next year or two. A formula that is supposedly being discussed would have the current status quo hold for the next 50 years. That means Taiwan would not unilaterally declare its independence and Beijing would commit to no military intervention. The two sides would codify this relationship in some sort of formal declaration, and the two sides would go back to doing what they do best. Commercially engage and make money.
So what is with all the fear mongering out of Washington? Well, I’ll get to that tomorrow.
https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/us-govt-warned-nvidia-ceo-jensen-huang-tim-cook-and-lisa-su-that-china-could-invade-taiwan-by-2027-apple-ceo-reportedly-said-he-sleeps-with-one-eye-open

2026-02-25 15:24:59 CET

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Cheers!!! I do love the energy of this place.
An honest platform where people can hash things out and (mostly) not take it personal.

2026-02-25 12:09:25 CET

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@npub1sjc…jx9d

2026-02-25 05:44:20 CET

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Been meaning to reply to your note above, but have been running all over during Chinese New Year.
I totally get it, the Gell-Mann reaction to what I wrote. Too quick with my commentary and did not, whatsoever, mean OpenClaw was an AI model or LLM. What I was aiming to convey was the point that open source systems, agents in this instance, are being commodified by the Chinese with PIcoClaw used as the example.
Really to appreciate you making the point though and do so any time you think I'm completely out of my wheel house on a given subject.

2026-02-23 11:36:13 CET

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I went straight to gin

2026-02-22 12:56:37 CET

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Last I looked, not very much.

2026-02-16 09:37:33 CET

And if there wasn’t enough going on in the entire AI space, we just had Qwen 3.5 officially dropped.
China - be it good or bad - is the accelerant here. If US markets are on shaky ground over the effects from a small number of siloed closed source players in Silicon Valley, just wait until PicoClaw, Seedance and, now, Qwen permeates the business media.
https://blossom.primal.net/44645ce8e409d70896817bc09843ad9f7180a46149ad9a677c2889a7fac1e145.jpg

2026-02-16 05:45:36 CET

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Oh yeah!! Lunar New Year eve is a truly special day. So much food is being prepared at the moment.
Have a great time @nprofile…945w
https://blossom.primal.net/bdfef2df4fbfd13645ed8a083ce802b4619186c0cfc2b4b4b4d1c1c0c900bbd7.mov

2026-02-16 04:19:38 CET

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Suspect it doesn’t matter given that the Chinese have already moved ahead with PicoClaw. The speed of that going down had me literally laugh out loud.

2026-02-12 09:21:38 CET

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Am just getting started @nprofile…qk8j Had to break down the entire essay into roughly 12 parts so there is a great deal more to follow. Solved for the “long post” issue so will send out one new installment over the next week or so.
Any questions you might have or feedback would be greatly appreciated.

2026-02-06 10:12:36 CET

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Hey man. Have a great Chinese New Year.

2026-02-03 10:13:27 CET

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So you are unable to access the linked Reads document??? Had struggled for the past day getting the thing uploaded.

2026-02-03 05:18:53 CET

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@npub1sjc…jx9d first installment of the essay mentioned is finally uploaded onto Reads.
Now that I’ve worked out all the kinks will upload additional installments in sequence over the next week.
Any questions, feedback or areas of disagreement do let me know. Thx.

2026-02-03 05:12:51 CET

This is a test. Seem to be having issues with relays.

2026-01-26 03:10:35 CET

China Morning Missive
Speculative Folly
Yet another top Chinese general is purged, and, once again, the speculation is rampant. Claims are made and conclusions drawn and the attention quickly moves to what this will mean for the reign of Xi Jinping. There is talk of a coup. There is talk of a removal from office by “the Elders”. It is all a fugazi and, more importantly, a distraction from events underway that do matter, that do have significance.
In terms of the Xi rumors, this would make for the seventh or eighth episode (I’ve lost count honestly) of how events in Beijing are expected to bring down this “Emperor for Life”. And that doesn’t count all the rumors of ill health. Then again, all the speculation is to be expected in a world driven by social media engagement farming. There may be, possibly, importance connected to this latest development, but it has taken away from actual events from the past week that do have real-world implications.
Firstly, this past week provided an initial view into the strategic aims of China’s latest Five-Year plan. State Grid, China’s largest power transmitter and grid operator, announced a 40% increase in CAPX out to 2030. A commitment of Rmb4trillion (US$570billion). There’s been ample commentary of late of the massive gap between China’s ability to produce energy versus that of the United States. This announced investment demonstrates that energy, broadly speaking, will remain a top priority over the next five years and, with it, a further widening in the gap.
Then there was the announcement that the Shanghai Futures Exchange will begin trading LNG contracts denominated in RMB as soon as February. Beijing has spent the past decade making inroads into the adoption of RMB for pricing across the entire commodity complex. This move would indicate there now being greater willingness among counterparties to accept RMB payment terms. The Qataris would be the most obvious group given the construct of the current bilateral trade relationship. What will need to monitor is if Australian suppliers, delivering one-third of China’s LNG imports, will accept RMB as well.
The reason why Australia needs attention goes to another development from this past week. BHP announced that it would be accepting price concessions on iron ore exports to China after a lengthy period of stalled negotiations. And this deal comes just a few months after BHP agreed to accept 30% of iron ore purchases contracted in RMB.
Finally, there are the reports of the growing gold reserves held by Poland. How this connects with China goes to how it is the bilateral trade relationship is managed. Poland settles just over a third of its annual trade with China in RMB. It does run a trade deficit with China but taking into account the role played by the Shanghai International Gold Exchange in final settlement, it is reasonable to conclude that a portion of the rising gold reserves by Poland is attributed to RMB surpluses being net final-settled with gold.
These are the development that matter and is also a demonstration, once again, of China operating on a very low time preference. The most impactful events occur on the margins and are, almost always, overlooked and absent from geoeconomic analysis. It has always been a game of inches and will remain a game of inches.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/china-top-general-ousted-xi-220640693.html

2026-01-24 17:12:49 CET

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My issue remains though. Have long form content to share here but Nostr Reads still doesn’t have the adoption. I’m about to really test that theory though over the next two weeks.

2026-01-24 17:00:04 CET

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Finally bailed on LinkedIn six months ago. Algo there had also become very suppressive. Glad I’m gone.

2026-01-24 16:32:26 CET

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Oh, I avoid that place like the plague. Nostr has been home for coming up on two years. Or is it three??

2026-01-24 16:21:07 CET

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Maybe. But I found too many people who are real people operating at a border line base layer.

2026-01-24 16:19:34 CET

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I pray to God you are right.

2026-01-24 16:06:21 CET

Fuck me. Just jumped on Twitter for the first time in two year. Had a look around…..
If that is a representation of America today, well, I’m calling it. GAME OVER.
Nothing but vitriol.
Zero empathy.
Zero introspection.

2026-01-21 02:10:13 CET

China Morning Missive
Moving Parts
Please accept my apologies for having not sent through any morning updates from Shanghai over the past week. It has been a hectic period for all of us. In addition, I have been finalizing a rather in-depth essay on the path to rivalry between China and the United States. A tome really. Will see about where best to upload it on Nostr.
For now, however, please find below the initial section of that essay’s introduction. It ties nicely into recent comment from Canadian PM Carney
Introduction
The veil has fallen. America has discarded the charade that its primacy was held to account by the very international rules-based order it built 80 years ago. This realpolitik dichotomy has been known throughout most of the world and for quite some time. What actually transpired over the past several weeks is a realization – a loss of naïveté – among the American populace and the citizenry of post-1945 allied nations that America would act as it saw fit in the pursuit of self-interest and will do so, whenever necessary, fully unencumbered.
America has deployed uber-primacy and the raw projection of power from the very moment the Cold War ended and the unipolar world commenced. These actions are just no longer concealed by diplomatic subterfuge. From the Iraq War to the Global Financial Crisis policy responses and myriad other instances, the very “international rules” forced upon others has always been deemed inconvenient by Washington and, thusly, ignored when those “rules” conflicted with self-interest.
Throughout the unipolar moment, the non-American allied world was acutely aware of American intentions. Those nation-states accepted, with reticence, the power bestowed upon this hegemon. China, and Russia for that matter, also accepted that the world was to be dominated by a single superpower. Both nations, however, knew their world histories and in 1997 began planning for that inevitable day when America’s reach would finally exceed its grasp.
That day has long since arrived and there is now a broad agreement that a realignment in the world order is underway. The only debate present is found in the international relations community and its zealous quest for labels: Multipolarity, G2, the Global South and even, more recently, the Core Five. Amongst them are the ubiquitous and overly simplistic comparisons made to the Cold War. For those seeking historical comparisons, there’s arguably far more compelling evidence to measure current events against the backdrop of those occurring in and around 1904. No matter one’s outlook or perspective, the only real conclusion which can be drawn is that the present moment is a unique point of departure from the previous century. History has not ended.
And yet, there remains an obsession over labels and constructs, an exercise – importantly to be stressed – which is Western led and Western promoted. China eschews such framing. Where others find comfort in taxonomy and historical comparisons, Beijing views such exercises, while providing some value, as unnecessarily restrictive and, ultimately, misguided. And then there’s the fact that China is the “Middle Kingdom”. An important cultural point of reference as it is a defining element for understanding Beijing’s view of the world and how it goes about engaging with all sovereign actors.
(More to follow)
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carney-davos-speech-9.7052725

2026-01-16 02:14:00 CET

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Socrates would agree …..

2026-01-14 16:13:13 CET

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Oh. This person. Lei on China.
First to your question. I have no idea what the actual population figure is. There are just a ton of Chinese people that’s all I know.
I would question how she is taking into account the sheer number of Chinese from the Mainland who have emigrated over the past 70 years. It’s a lot and they are all over the world. In every single country.
But again, I have no idea.
What I do know is this. She has come out over the past couple of years with YT videos making some wild claims all of which have been completely wrong. She’s all about the algo. All about engagement farming. If it works for her, then awesome.

2026-01-14 15:06:22 CET

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My good man. Cannot see what it is you are referencing to the question posed.

2026-01-14 14:17:05 CET

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Basically, they can’t believe that a single unexpected expense could push someone over into destitution. China has an informal support system, the extended family. No matter how bad things might get it would never land into that bad of a place.

2026-01-14 14:04:35 CET

For the past month the Chinese have been discussing, actually have been shocked by, the state of the American middle class.
They call it the “kill line”.
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DS3Z_lXEgiG/?igsh=MTU3OHJqd3JuN2hk

2026-01-14 11:04:03 CET

Well, one thing is for certain. The American actions over Venezuela have resulted in a wide variety - and multitude - of publicly expressed opinions over China and Taiwan.
For whatever it’s worth, keep in mind that the truth is always found somewhere in the middle. Statements of the more definitive nature don’t tend to age well.

2026-01-14 02:08:17 CET

China Morning Missive
IPOs as a Strategic Lever
Capital formation in China is back with a vengeance and is being strategically deployed for the expressed purpose of countering America’s technological dominance.
Over the past two months the pace of IPOs has been frenetic both in Hong Kong and on the upstart STAR Market here in Shanghai. While western business media has covered a handful of highly publicized chip makers going public, what has been missed is how Beijing is accelerating the use of the primary market to funnel capital towards key industries of geopolitical significance.
Before commenting on the strategic nature underlying the renewal of Chinese IPOs, it is well worth noting that the move wouldn’t have been possible had Chinese retail investors not turned decidedly “risk on”. There has been a palpable shift in sentiment over the past year, and while Chinese households do remain cautious over the near-term economic prospects there has been a recognition of a vast improvement directionally.
That said, the primary driver of retail investor demand is a genuine excitement over Chinese tech/AI companies demonstrating an ability to not just match their American rivals, but – in more than a few cases – out innovate. DeepSeek, it is now clear, wasn’t a “moment”, it was an insurgent declaration of intent and ability.
What resulted was a solid 2025 for equity returns and performance has continued to deliver so far this year. In fact, volumes of late have been at or near record highs. It does need to be mentioned, however, that Chinese investors are limited when it comes to available alternatives to allocate capital. With property still viewed as toxic and limited upside to fixed income then meant a shift back to equities was expected. At the same time, Chinese retail investors are the tail which wags the dog and they’ve a ton of idle capital sitting on the sidelines.
What all of this has meant is an opportunity for Beijing to strategically direct growing end investor demand. With all approvals to list tightly controlled by the CSRC, China’s securities regulator, the decision was made to prioritize those companies building capabilities and critical infrastructure that could best ameliorate the containment threat posed by America. The uniqueness of the policy, however, went even farther. The IPO process favors companies that are at an earlier stage of development, even loss-making and, additionally, approvals to list are also widespread with a far greater number of such companies greenlit to IPO and a stark departure from previous periods.
Take but a few examples from just last week; GPU maker Iluvatar CoreX and Edge Medical which manufactures surgical robotics. These companies raised $473million and $154million respectively and, currently, trade with market capitalization of around $6.0billioin and $3.0billion. Small in size by just about any measure, but forward leaning industrial players and, once again, only a small sample set of the multitude of the types of companies now going public.
The concept of “market cap” doesn’t even register as a priority KPI here in China and directing capital is an activity solely meant to optimally deliver on both market and political objectives. This isn’t a new concept, but the leveraging of IPOs is.
There will, ultimately, be a considerable destruction of capital as an outcome of this IPO policy, as was evident with the solar and EV industries. The policy, however, will also deliver an array of world leading companies as well, again as is evident with the solar and EV industries.
https://m.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/china-ai-chipmaking-stocks-extend-rally-as-ipo-boom-boosts-sentiment-4440684?ampMode=1

2026-01-12 02:20:16 CET

China Morning Missive
Software is useless without the hardware to run it
As anecdotes go, this is perhaps one that should be duly noted. Moreover, I highly recommend for those interested in an assessment of the ongoing and ever intensifying competition between China and America over the future of technological advances to give this article a read.
Basically, what we have here is a reporter from PCMag who attended last week’s Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas. The highlighted summary quote from the article reads “It was hard to ignore the pull of what was emerging from Shenzhen.” The author then went on to detail a host of areas where it was increasingly clear that China wasn’t just matching the United States in terms of innovation but that it was increasingly hard to ignore the numerous areas where Chinese companies have unquestionably taken the lead.
Now, the author did have a rather specific focus, consumer solutions for energy storage and solar generation. The comments made on the advances in sodium-ion battery technology, versus today’s ubiquitous lithium standard, were of particular interest. The author did, however, look to extrapolate his specific area of interest farther afield.
What stood out, however, was the comparison of the vastly different nation-state policies, although not all that unexpected. Washington, under the Trump administration, was curtailing aggressively support to all categories within the vertically integrated complex of next-gen power solutions. Beijing, to quote the author, “was doubling down” as was supported by the datapoint of there being a cumulative 650 gigawatts of solar capacity installed nation-wide (I believe this to be an underreported datapoint though).
It isn’t that the comments here or those in the linked article represent some sort of tectonic shift in the present state of the geopolitical rivalry. At issue is the increasingly obvious direction of travel. Then there is the issue of competitive primacy.
Yes, there can be no question that America has a lead, I’d even say a material lead, in advanced chips. But chips are, essentially, just software and will have no commercial value without the requisite hardware. Beyond datacenters, the manufacturing of real-world hardware requires production capabilities, and this is where China dominates and does so at tremendous scale. There is no better example than the rapid global expansion of Chinese EVs. You should expect the very same with humanoid robotics over the next five years, if not sooner.
Bear in mind as well that China is entering the first year of its fifteenth five-year plan. This then means an even greater concentration of energies to further dominate the global hardware arena.
https://www.pcmag.com/opinions/china-energy-solar-power-innovations-ces-2026

2026-01-10 08:08:17 CET

How to change the path of what increasingly looks to be an inevitable repeat of ancient (and modern as well) history?
It is a question I struggle with each and every day.
https://blossom.primal.net/203f455512c4e70aaad78209d04caea69fe1fa4c06af562dbca50bacf31972bc.jpg

2026-01-09 03:27:35 CET

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Let me put it this way. The end of the international rules-based order was recognized by China, and Russia for that matter, going all the way back to 1996 and openly laid bare with the formal Joint Declaration on a “Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order”. Events were set in motions literally decades before Xi and Putin came into power.
Over that ensuing three decade period China systematically began to build a series of moats with rare earths but one of dozens if not hundreds of examples. That said, the real competitive moat created was that of ownership over the global base of manufacturing. History shows that a hegemon that willingly reduces its domestic base of production will, at some future point, no longer be the hegemon.
I have argued for quite some time that it has been American corporate culpability (which continues to this very day) was the driver of outsourcing production to China and that Beijing policy makers were very much open to assisting in that very process. Without an American production base, the leverage in this all important bilateral relationship will be owned by China.

2026-01-09 02:02:04 CET

China Morning Missive
You’ll have to accept my apologies. In my note the other day I made the claim that in response to American action over Venezuela, Beijing would do nothing and sit idly by awaiting the expected, and dire, second and third order effects of said action. With that outlook a very amateur mistake on my part, as it pertains to China, was made.
Not a mistake, mind you, in terms of the original outlook. It remains the case that Beijing will “do noting” in direct response. You’ll notice here, however, that there’s a vital distinction this time around with the inclusion of the world “direct” and that is what should have been expected and, we now know, was carried out.
Shortly after the weekend’s Latin American activities, China announced that it would be targeting Japan with a series of rare earth export controls. To the uninitiated, the two events would look to have very little connective tissue. There’s been an ongoing, and increasingly heated, exchange between the two Asian nations over the issue of Taiwan. Any decision by Beijing to scale up the fight shouldn’t be seen as a surprising development and the same, too, in deciding to deploy rare earth export controls.
What hasn’t been asked, however, is why would Beijing take such action now?
This latest episode of regional saber rattling began back last November and only now is the decision to apply leverage made. If we look back to the events of 2010 when China and Japan were also entangled in a territorial dispute, Beijing had first used rare earth export controls as a point of pressure and did so almost immediately. I would argue that the difference, today, comes down to a material shift in geopolitical dynamics over the past 15 years.
The gamesmanship here is for this move to act as an application of indirect pressure on America. It might even be a not-to-subtle signal as well.
As is readily known, access to rare earths remains an issue for America and, while there is a delicate truce currently in place, China has various vested interest in Venezuela that are now threatened. Placing export controls on Japan might very well be an artfully telegraphed message to Washington. Beijing will be seeking some form of negotiated settlement over a host of Venezuelan related issues and the move on Japan could indicate that rare earth access remains firmly on the table.
It could also be far simpler. The act of escalation would require at least some level of attention out of Washington and attention is in very short supply at the moment. The art of forced distraction on a rival is an often applied tactic by China. Whatever the case might be, it is, at least from my vantage point, clear that the placement of export controls on Japan is an indirect response to events from this past weekend. Furthermore, albeit depending on how events transpire over the coming weeks and months, additional indirect pressure applied by China should be expected.
Finally, and keeping in mind China’s ever present strategic aim of embedding optionality throughout all decision making, the direct pressure on Japan serves to meet the objective of driving Prime Minister Takaichi from power. An objective I do believe that Beijing views as distinctly possible before the end of this year.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-curbs-rare-earth-exports-japanese-companies-after-dual-use-ban-wsj-reports-2026-01-08/

2026-01-08 05:39:51 CET

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Long overdue for the producers to go on strike. And yet we aren’t even close.
If individuals are unwilling, as just the most obvious example, to leave Twitter and move to Nostr for fear of forgoing their audience and engagement, well, that tells you all you need to know of the current state of affairs.

2026-01-08 03:24:40 CET

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Actually, the sound of my own voice is one of my favorite attributes.

2026-01-08 02:57:18 CET

China Morning Missive
If rare earth minerals, and China’s stranglehold over the refinery process, was the topic of 2025, you should all expect to see at some point a similar heated discussion over LiDAR. This critical technology used in everything from EVs to weapon systems (you know, all that hyped up precision targeting) is dominated by Chinese players and now, with the latest application, robotics, the subject looks to be finally gaining the attention of various American interested parties.
The reason for bringing this topic up today is in relation to the news that Nvidia has selected a Chinese company – Hesai Technology – to provide LiDAR sensors to its recently announced autonomous driving platform. A rather sharp shift from the American conventional wisdom (ie Elon Musk) which viewed LiDAR as a luxury and which favored a camera-centric system for autonomous driving.
Hesai is currently the single largest supplier of LiDAR sensors globally and is a company I’m fairly certain virtually no one has ever heard of. It is also a company which has been uniquely responsible for obliterating the cost to manufacture. From sensors priced in the thousands of US dollars, Hesai built an in-house production facility and is now selling sensors at just US$500.
Not only is the company now beginning to shift focus towards the robotics industry, but it is also in the process of doubling its manufacturing capacity with the stated aim of reducing the price point to US$200. A well-worn tactic among Chinese companies over the past three decades: Build a competitive product and then scale production aggressively to price out the competition. Just think back on the entire solar panel industry and, I would highlight, the example of Sunnova and with it the limitations laid bare of an American industrial policy.
Dozens of American industries are reliant on LiDAR systems and while it isn’t all that clear the degree of sourcing from China given both cost and availability of supply it would be reasonable to conclude that there is an industrial dependence. Then there is the “national security threat”. Even the most minimal reliance on Chinese LiDAR would be looked upon as concerning. It is, after all, Chinese tech and Washington has made it quite clear that Chinese tech is to be avoided at all costs.
For myself, the actual issue isn’t about LiDAR or rare earth minerals for that matter. I’ve stressed for the lonest time that China produces everything and America produces nothing. Perhaps a gross exaggeration, but the point still holds. For the foreseeable future there is little that can change this dynamic. The leverage in the geopolitical relationship is owned by China and, it is now increasingly clear, both sides understand this to be true.
https://amp.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/3338909/nvidia-chooses-chinas-hesai-lidar-sensors-hyperion-autonomous-driving-platform

2026-01-07 01:45:28 CET

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https://blossom.primal.net/b793c53cf886a87889bbd23f16d61bb1a8e6ba5faab4586a19e54abdc8fb76fa.jpg

2026-01-06 07:44:12 CET

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That is a very good question. For the purposes of liquidity, I would estimate that $500billion on the top end and $350billion on the lower end.
The one downside from shifting aggressively out of sovereign bonds into the various BRI investments would be a reduction in liquidity, so I’d expect the target would be the upper end of $500billion.
Thanks for engaging though. Much appreciated.

2026-01-06 06:54:47 CET

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Right there with you. All of the content I present regarding China comes from the perspective of a fully Red Blooded American. “this is what we are up against!”
It infuriates me to no end that China is out competing the United States. That isn’t the natural way of the world, not by a long shot. The average American needs to be fully unshackled and allowed to do what we do best. Build. Compete. Win.
It is that simple.

2026-01-06 03:19:18 CET

China Morning Missive
During the holiday break there was a news item that was very poorly covered and yet provided indicative clarity to a decade’s long key geopolitical shift. China announced that its official holdings of American debt had not only declined yet again in the month of November, but had reached a level not seen since 2008.
In terms of the data points, the country stated that it held a total of $688brillion worth of US treasuries. That is a 48% decline from the 2013 peak of $1.32trillion. Furthermore, of China’s total FX reserves, the relative position of US sovereign debt has also been cut in half and is now just 20% of China’s total FX reserves.
There has certainly been commentary and coverage over this downtrend in the past, but there has been little, dare I say no, critical analysis into the explicit strategy underlying, what is, a very deliberate move made by Beijing.
Consider the following. As an historical pattern, the main driver of China’s foreign currency reserves, in total, was its annual trade surplus. At the time of peak exposure to US sovereign debt in 2013, which just so happened to correspond with total peak FX reserves I should add ($3.8trillion), China’s trade surplus was $260billion. By 2021 the trade surplus had more than doubled reaching $676billion. And for 2025? It will surpass $1.0trillion as I am rather certain you’ve already read in the business media. You had a massive influx of foreign currency over the past decade, and yet total reserves held in a tight range of between $3.0trillion and $3.2trillion.
Where, then, did the excess funds from a rapidly accelerating trade surplus go? Not into US Treasuries, that’s for sure.
To some extent, the trade surpluses remained on the balance sheets of the exporters and in their onshore (and offshore) bank accounts as there was no longer the direct requirement to repatriate and/or convert into the local currency. That would, maybe, account for a fifth to a quarter of the trade surplus leaving hundreds of billions unaccounted for.
The answer lies, primarily, in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which, you will not be surprised to find, was formally launched in 2013. US dollar funding was directed into an aggressive global infrastructure investment program. Ports in Greece and Peru. Rail lines in Hungary and Serbia. A massive sector wide investment into Indonesia. The list goes on and on.
You see, Beijing policy makers were the first to truly comprehend that to address a large and growing debt obligation, Washington had no other option than to continue with a debasement of the currency. With this knowledge, China not only made the decision to de-risk its direct USD exposure but to go even farther and learn from the lesson and de-risk from as much sovereign “paper” as possible and, instead, reallocate excess reserves into hard assets.
Data is difficult to source, but what is out there has China’s total cumulative BRI investment since 2013 at around $1.3trillion. I’d take the over on that though. Either way, that is a significant redirected flow of funds away from American sovereign debt and a truly debilitating loss of a (not so) marginal buyer. One final point to make: China also “officially” purchased a total of 1,226 tons of gold between 2013 and 2024. Here, again, I would be taking the over. No question though. China has been exiting the entire sovereign paper market for over a decade, artfully executed I might add, and there is little doubt that this trend will continue.
https://amp.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3337010/china-cuts-us-treasury-holdings-lowest-level-2008-amid-debt-ceiling-fears

2026-01-05 08:05:56 CET

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That is a fantastic idea.

2026-01-05 01:33:00 CET

China Morning Missive
New Year and it is time to return with my periodic updates on all things China.
Perhaps apropos of current events, but with America’s adventurism into Venezuela it didn’t come as a surprise to anyone that the Chinese leadership has responded in a deeply negative way, albeit conveyed with diplomatic flair.
Above all else, there is the Great Game 2.0 at play here as China maintains certain key assets in the South American country and there was even an elevation of the bilateral relationship to what was termed an “all weather partnership” whatever that might mean. China remains the largest creditor of Venezuela (not a surprise) and is also the single largest buyer of the country’s oil exports (again, no surprise). That said, it’s estimate are that only 5% of China’s overall annual oil imports come from Venezuela.
Here’s the real question though: What is it that China will do in the immediate future? The answer is absolutely nothing. Yes, there will be bellicosity and some periodic saber rattling, that is just how China operates. In terms of any meaningful actions, though …. expect Beijing to sit idly by and do nothing. Classic (misattributed) Sun Tzu quote, “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.”
The primary reason for this “non-action” approach is that it plays to Beijing’s favor. There are numerous occasions from the past where America has acted quickly with military might and in doing so quickly found itself mired in a quagmire and, ultimately, exited the theater. In each of these past occasions those activities resulted in a sidelined, distracted and, ultimately, humbled hegemon.
China simply needs to tap into that ample reserve of low time preference energy and wait for the inevitable. Doing nothing whenever it is that America acts in haste has always found China coming out the other side far stronger in term of diplomatic relationships.
I would just add here that China will also aggressively leverage this latest American move as further evidence of the abjectly uselessness of the “international rules-based order”. Granted, this will be done deep in the background. There should even be the expectation of a willing audience throughout Latin America.
https://amp.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3338689/venezuela-crisis-how-trumps-donroe-doctrine-could-challenge-chinas-latin-america-ties

2026-01-03 15:15:39 CET

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Shocked to see this here. I’ve been hammering this point for years, although more as a solution to the China and America rivalry as opposed to it already agreed to. Think we are still not there yet.
https://blossom.primal.net/899d911912f3a1e0dc689b131e9e44b7a1da8d1bb84db57ab2886fa65f463f96.jpg

2025-12-31 19:53:04 CET

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You know, you and I could have an honest chat offline at some point. I’d enjoy that and do think you’d find it of some value. Just an idea.

2025-12-31 17:07:43 CET

It’s official. 2026 in China.
Be well all. Find peace and the goal for the New Year is to be happy for all successes be they yours or be they others.
https://blossom.primal.net/2400dbeb4f84aefc36db39087d6b15784c48a998c97161659f09fef405cf5a94.mov

2025-12-31 16:05:11 CET

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Yeah. Just posted and didn’t show up.

2025-12-31 16:02:18 CET

An hour to go till the New Year from here in Shanghai and, come one, just received this via WeChat. Who says Chinese don’t have a sense of humor.
https://blossom.primal.net/6ff6a7e01801c0a1da435753a23aa807202463e295aabda08d9cd2b9a79774c7.jpg

2025-12-31 15:15:47 CET

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Ok, but all I’ll add is that the truth always lies somewhere in the middle. Respect your perspective even if I don’t wholly agree. Peace my friend.

2025-12-31 15:00:41 CET

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You should really make a trip to China on 2026.

2025-12-22 02:32:22 CET

Have a great end to the year all. Peace love and time with friends and family.
Going offline but will be back in the New Year with even more China. commentary.
Just. Keep. Breathing.

2025-12-13 03:36:16 CET

Welcome to the world of Chinese negotiations President Trump!!
Rule #1 Never claim that a deal is concluded until an actual deal is concluded.
Rule # 2 Chinese deal are NEVER actually concluded.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp34442z25ko.amp

2025-12-10 10:20:28 CET

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Very well put and far more succinctly done. Thx.

2025-12-10 09:18:45 CET

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Now that requires a long answer. For now, as with most things, it’s a combination of the two.
For now, the primary issue - at least as I see it - was a serious degradation with in the Party when Xi came to power. It was a free for all (rampant corruption) and risked delegitimizing the Party. Power needed to be recentralized and that’s been an ongoing process for the past decade.
Were people caught up by being on “the wrong side”? Yes. But, again for me, that’s a second order effect.

2025-12-10 03:40:03 CET

So there’s this …..
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/12/09/china-executes-banker-for-taking-116-million-bribes/

2025-12-10 03:12:17 CET

China Morning Missive
First there was the announcement that President Trump would be permitting Nvidia to sell H200 chips to China. Then came the news of China’s trade surplus clocked in at $1.0trillion over the first 11 months of the year.
The reaction out of the Beltway to these two developments was apoplectic. Just wait for the reactions once the ASML restrictions are lifted. That’s what China really wants, and it’ll happen sooner than most observers expect.
To the reactions, it is all very understandable, but I would point out that these are just two outcomes reflective of a fundamental shift in global power. It isn’t that this is a new trend either. All that is slowly underway is a realization among the Washington powerbrokers that this is no longer just a philosophical debate.
For a decade there was analysis by “Senior Fellows” and lengthy diatribes throughout Foreign Affairs magazine and elsewhere. China was said to be an existential threat to the American way.
I agreed. A constructure form of engagement, beginning with a harsh acceptance of the threat posed, was required.
And yet, nothing was done, beyond talking and op-eds to wax poetically on the geopolitical threat.
Now here we are and America now finds itself well past the point of no return.
All that these two events highlighted above indicate is a direction of travel. There will be more public consternation and, unfortunately, greater externalizing of the issue. Rather than seeing the world as it is and sifting energies towards hyper competition, China will be labeled an enemy of the State and with that will come far greater aggressive tendencies.
Finally, and just as a quick update, the current TikTok “ban/divest” deferment expires next Tuesday, December 16th. This will have been the fourth such deferment and the entire affair is coming up on a full year since the Supreme Court ruling. No matter the political posturing by the Trump team, the TikTok divestiture remains outstanding.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-china-hawks-say-trump-approved-nvidia-chip-sales-china-will-supercharge-its-2025-12-09/

2025-12-09 07:59:00 CET

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What’s shaking Jack?

2025-12-09 06:37:36 CET

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Oh. You have to push back otherwise the Chinese will run over you at every turn. The needle which needs to be threaded is doing so without being a complete dick about it. Where the line is drawn is what you seek to find.
It’s something l’ve personally come to truly enjoy and the Chinese are now surprised at just how well I can maneuver. A constant dance.

2025-12-09 06:13:50 CET

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Correct. The level of entitlement among those US workers even surprised me. Combine that with the reams of regulation required to be addressed and TSMC is a canary in a coal mine.
What foreign company would want to deal with any of those obstacles and, as a result, lose money in the process.

2025-12-09 05:01:13 CET

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Well, let me start by saying I’m not the most objective observer in asking such questions.
China, for myself, is great and I encourage everyone to travel here to see the place for themselves. An extended stay, like for an MBA, would be a great option. If they aren’t all that well versed with China would suggest Shanghai as the location. A very good East-West combination.

2025-12-09 04:33:06 CET

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Not entirely sure what you mean @nprofile…cmdm What are you looking for exactly?

2025-12-09 04:31:47 CET

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It’s been a complete train wreck and first became known as to me back in the summer. I knew the entire TSMC experiment was doomed the moment a class action lawsuit was filed.
https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/chipmaking-giant-tsmc-hit-with-class-action-lawsuit-in-the-u-s-for-bias-racism-and-unsafe-conditions-over-30-plaintiffs-have-accused-the-company-of-illegal-practices-at-arizona-fab

2025-12-09 03:24:38 CET

China Morning Missive
Slowly, ever so slowly, the realities of altering global supply chain dependencies are beginning to breach the public zeitgeist. The American “can do” spirit is running up against some very hard truths. Both in terms of the literal limitations of physics and that of obstacles from an overly ossified system.
For the first time, these very issues are raised and addressed in a rather detailed expose from the New York Times.
Before continuing it needs to be stressed that high end chips, and TSMC in particular, were considered atop all priorities when it came to the renewed focus on reshoring. Two birds, one stone went the thinking. America would have access to domestically made chips and the supposed China threat to Taiwan would be taken off the game board.
Put very bluntly, America wanted high-end chips and wanted TSMC.
What is now becoming increasingly clear is that boundless ambitions are running head long into a wall of limited capabilities. Dare I even suggest that this would be the first time America leadership (both corporate and political) is waking up to this new reality.
The entire TSMC Arizona plant example is emblematic of just how complicated the entire reshoring thesis is in terms of actual execution. Furthermore, this TSMC example can be fully extrapolated to just about every other dependency now facing the hegemon.
While America most certainly has the money, not capital mind you just money, to throw at the various problems, it lacks the physical inputs required to address those issues. It is also a game of relativity meaning that China built a supply chain fortress over three decades and continues to improve upon its position. To play catch up, America will need to run at twice the speed and that’s were problem number two comes into play.
As addressed in this NYT’s piece, the primary issues are that of regulations and labor. Suffocating under the weight of the former and scrambling to source the latter. Neither of these obstacles can be easily overcome in the short run. Taiwan TSMC shows the real-world implications of having to navigate these issues and the same will be required of all foreign groups planning to build production facilities in the United States.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions and, it would seem, all of these global groups which have committed billions in investment to America are well on their way to a nightmarish end.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/04/business/tsmc-phoenix-fab.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share

2025-12-05 09:52:15 CET

A sign of times to come. While not all that popular in the US, I’d still expect RedNote to get the “under national security concerns” approach and with it be banned.
Even more likely, if not an outright certainty, once the TikTok deal is finally concluded. Whenever that might be.
Taiwan bans Chinese social media app RedNote for one year on fraud risks https://www.cnbc.com/2025/12/05/taiwan-bans-chinese-social-media-app-xiaohongshu-for-one-year-on-fraud-risks.html?__source=iosappshare%7Ccom.apple.UIKit.activity.CopyToPasteboard

2025-12-02 11:03:08 CET

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It is a daily challenge. That’s for sure.

2025-12-02 00:25:12 CET

They all bend the knee eventually.
Interesting timing too.
BRB. Need to grab some tinfoil.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-01/vanguard-relents-on-crypto-etfs-will-allow-them-on-its-platform

2025-12-01 01:48:44 CET

China Morning Missive
With the announcement of the “Genisis Mission”, the Trump administration has made dominating the AI ecosystem a national priority. While there have certainly been a host of differing opinions on possible ulterior motives, from a geopolitical standpoint the decision makes perfect sense. So too, however, could this move end up directly impacting – inadvertently – a diaspora of Silicon Valley companies.
Over the past month there’s been increased media coverage of how American startups are fully leveraging the Chinese open-sourced AI models. After all, that is sort of the point of having access to open-source software. Take what’s already available and then iterate and improve upon that original source code.
The issue is the point of origination of that that source code; China.
Any time a competing Chinese software solution, or hardware offering for that matter, gains ground on all available American alternatives, Washington policy wonks step in on the grounds of “national security”. Not to say that such concerns aren’t warranted, rather that the issue here is the wide spread in usage (and, now, dependency) on Chinese AI models.
Rhetorically speaking, is there anyone who thinks the American government will permit home grown platforms build on Chinese source code?
Much as the NBC article highlights, “while models from American companies continue to set the pace of progress at the frontier of AI capabilities, many Chinese systems are cheaper to access, more customizable and have become sufficiently capable for many uses over the past year.”
It is the use of the word “customizable” which should stand out to all readers. It goes to the primary – I would say existential – issue facing the entire American AI theater. The dogmatic pursuit of closed source architecture, the building of silos (competitive moats), remains the greatest threat to America’s position.
Basically, you have five large dogs all chasing after a single bone. The likelihood is that the dogs will attack each other viciously long before catching the bone. You see this in the perversion of all incentives, mainly in the rapid acceleration of CAPX spending.
What this then leaves is the Chinese AI scalers to just continue moving forward building better software and directing all efforts to addressing the issue of compute.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/rcna242430

2025-11-26 04:29:19 CET

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Here’s a good demonstration of time as measured by “China speed”.
I threw this Note up a week ago. Today, Lingguang has surged in adoption. 2mil downloads in a single week. It is the talk of the town. Attempting to link below a video as an update and to provide an intro of what, exactly, Alibaba is aiming with this new app.
https://youtu.be/ocjhUqO428Q?si=y4Q4Or9tuQwTi2jU
#nevent1q…n84w

2025-11-26 02:14:23 CET

China Morning Missive
My new obsession is the concept of myopia. The more I continue to compare and contrast the bilateral rivalry between America and China the more you’ll see the pure definition of myopia come into play; “a lack of foresight or discernment; a narrow view of something.”
Not all that dissimilar to the contrast in how each country goes about building and executing overall geopolitical policy, one having a low time preference and the other having a high time preference.
The perfect example of this was put on display yesterday with all the headlines discussing how Google “leap frogged” OpenAI in the LLM race. In all the media coverage, there wasn’t any attempt to even introduce the role of China into the competitive theater.
Just consider that it hasn’t even been a year since Deepseek first burst into the spotlight. Since then, the likes of QWEN, Kimi K2 , GLM and a host of others have entered the competitive field, iterated quickly and have continued to produce increasingly improved platforms.
The fact that a growing number of Silicon Valley players are openly admitting to using Chinese AI models at the base layer for development should tell you everything.
Again, Deepseek first came to market in January of this year.
What is presented here is but a single example of China’s continued dominance across the entire “future tech” space. The drive is relentless. To think of where China will be in a year’s time, especially when compared to American competitors, should frighten all American commercial interest. For now, however, myopia reigns. The entirety of focus is domestic.
It is as though the entire American strategy is to simply ignore the problem and wish for it to go away.
https://www.axios.com/2025/11/25/google-gemini-openai-chatgpt-anthropic-claude

2025-11-26 01:44:52 CET

For those interested, jumped on CNBC Asia last week. Video (unfortunately it’s linked) is provided below.
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2025/11/17/chinas-supply-chain-control-is-an-existential-threat-for-the-us.html

2025-11-26 01:38:08 CET

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I think I understand what you are getting at. Basically, China commercially unleashed and what this means for the rest of the world. You’ll be unsurprised to know that I’m in total agreement with the points you’ve made.
I’ve been working overtime to raise this, and many other, China related issues. My doing so isn’t meant to indicate that China is the greatest country on earth and it is all sunshine and rainbows. The point is to elevate the reality of the current global dynamic. Americans can bitch and complain all the want. Doing so won’t alter that reality.
Compete or die. It is that simple.
Here’s the problem. Making any of these statements or claims is, at all times, met with pure derision. When there is an inability to debate the issue, the result is to attack the person. It’s my daily life and thankfully having lived in China for so long, I’ve grown skin as thick as a rhinoceros

2025-11-25 09:43:12 CET

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Yes, labor unions is one key factor, but it goes beyond just the employment angle. Over regulation in general acts as a significant headwind against any material renewal of manufacturing (at scale) in the United States.
If you are interested, my favorite example has been the ongoing class action lawsuit against TSMC and its Arizona chip plant. The lawsuit raised various issues including employee discrimination, a hostile work environment and safety concerns.
This is a foreign investment project having near full support in both Washington and among business interest. Still, TSMC has found itself wrapped up in unhelpful legal challenges. The overly litigious nature of America is typically highlighted as the primary reason why foreign businesses refrain from making large investments.
Have a read of the article below. The fact that the case hasn’t yet been thrown out by any judge indicates, at least to me, that foreign business will continue to tread carefully. The Trump team may very well continue to focus on large, headline numbers of committed investment from foreign investors. How much of that investment actually lands, well, that is a separate issue altogether.
https://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/former-tsmc-employees-speak-out-about-discrimination-hostile-work-environment-at-phoenix-chip-plant

2025-11-25 03:44:55 CET

China Morning Missive (Part II)
Couldn’t let this one go as it hits directly on a host of issues I’ve been attempting to raise albeit with very little success.
Mentioned in a note yesterday that China had already won the robotics race no matter the urgency stressed by Marc Andressen for American policy to prioritize resources. Well, now we have just out a very detailed piece from the Wall Street Journal which aligns with many of the points made in various Notes here over the past several months.
Reducing the dynamic to its most simply form, the American AI titans want to create “God in a box”. The Chinese AI titans want to build deeper/wider economic moats. The latter has already achieved a massive lead on the former.
Here are some choice outtakes from the article.
“At one of China’s biggest ports, shipping containers whiz about on self-driving trucks with virtually no workers in sight, while the port’s scheduling is run by AI.”
I’ve been to the world’s largest port, Yangshan, here in Shanghai. The entire operation is automated. The crane, the trucks, all of it.
“It could further enable the spread of “dark factories,” with operations so automated that work happens around the clock with the lights dimmed.”
The concept of “dark factories” is rapidly expanding. No workers, 24-hour a day operations and facilities where there is no need for lighting.
“China installed 295,000 industrial robots last year, nearly nine times as many as the U.S. and more than the rest of the world combined, according to the International Federation of Robotics.”
The ability to scale remains a top comparative advantage throughout China. No need for any additional commentary here. The quote above speaks for itself.
“One risk is that AI could destroy more factory jobs than China expects, leaving it with too many unemployed workers.”
This one made me laugh. So much for all the Peter Zeihan and the others claiming that China posed no long-term geopolitical threat given the demographic timebomb.
So it is rather clear that the industrial robotics industry is now dominated by China. Now the focus turns to humanoid robotics. The evidence here, however, strongly suggests that there is no race. The only outstanding variable is timing. How quickly will we all see China rolling out these sorts or robots at scale? Based on my experience, I’d say before the end of 2027.
https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/ai-robots-china-manufacturing-89ae1b42?st=anYykK&reflink=article_copyURL_share

2025-11-25 02:59:54 CET

China Morning Missive
For those of you keeping score at home, the TikTok deal is still outstanding. I would also make mention that the latest enforcement delay made by Trump expires on December 16th. It’s been nearly a full year since the Supreme Court ruled on the issue forcing either a ban or a divestiture.
The reason for raising this point is due to the headlines reporting on a call between Xi and Trump yesterday and, pending on the readout, a top priority was Taiwan. You may also recall my hammering of the point that the quid pro quo is TikTok for Taiwan. For all of the (numerous) claims by the Trump team that a deal to acquire the social media platform has been agreed to, it remains outstanding. Trump will be under increased pressure come mid-December. Any further delay will come with a political cost.
Taiwan has increasingly become a focus in the macro-tourist circles. No surprise given that there’s been a weeklong diplomatic flareup over Taiwan between Japan and China. The rhetoric has been pretty heated, but I’ve seen this movie many times before. China will just continue to be verbally belligerent and wait until there’s a new government in Tokyo. Considering recent political events, that would probably arrive in less than a year.
Still, the longer the Trump team chooses to remain silent on the issue of Taiwan the more difficult the entire situation will become. The idea, in my opinion, was for the two sides to play for time. That was the objective of the meeting last month in Busan. Japan’s Prime Minister just threw a spanner in the works and, in doing so, has Trump catching strays.
In the end though, it remains a very simple calculus. TikTok will receive final “approval” from Beijing the minute Trump publicly addresses the Taiwan issue.
https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2025/11/24/trump-xi-call-trade-taiwan-ukraine.html

2025-11-24 14:56:13 CET

Watching all the Bitcoin hate surface this past week, and the names of those individuals included in the dog pile, has been so very telling.
There was a deep down level of Schadenfreude that had been percolating just below the surface ….. and then burst out in menacing glee.
Aren’t we all supposed to be rooting for one another regardless of one’s asset class of choice? Such an unnecessary scarcity mindset.

2025-11-24 07:32:45 CET

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Appreciate that!!

2025-11-24 02:00:01 CET

China Morning Missive
There was a bit of cope out of Silicon Valley last week. Uber tech titan, Mark Andressen, went on an autistic tirade over the future of robots and the urgent need for American policy makers to redirect resources and “reinvent manufacturing for the AI age”. When I stumbled across his comments, my mind immediately went to “it’s already too late”.
Much as I’ve shared in these Notes before, what China has done with EVs will be repeated in the race for dominance in robotics. It is simply an issue of vertical integration. China just has the individual processes already in place not to mention the availability to all critical components.
China is working with the benefit of having already moved into forms of power generation and the ability to convert that power into actual useful, commercial applications. The United States remains mired in knowing there’s a problem and only looking to find where to place blame. There are countless committee hearings and podcast soliloquies discussing the issue at hand. There’s, as of yet, been no meaningful action taken.
Time is quickly running out and there is no better evidence of this than the soon-to-be public offering of Unitree Robotics. Haven’t heard of the company? You’re not alone. Think of it this way. Are you familiar with a company called DJI Technologies? Well, what that company is to the global drone market, Unitree is now positioned to be for the humanoid robotics market.
Granted, in the example of Unitree, the company remains in the early stages of building – at scale – production. Once the company completes its IPO it will still only be valued at $7.0billion. For reference, Apple spent $25.0billion in share buybacks in just the second quarter alone. As an aside, that comparison does make you wonder what Apple could have achieved if it reinvested cashflow rather than buy back shares to support the stock price. That is a story for another day.
What I find to be the critical point here though isn’t the IPO or its size, rather it is the direction of travel. The Chinese are executing on policy directives and rapidly building out a host of future industries. Again, I will stress, it all comes down to vertical integration. None of this infrastructure is even close to being built in America.
https://amp.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3333047/chinas-unitree-robotics-completes-pre-ipo-tutoring-onshore-listing

2025-11-23 08:30:25 CET

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Yo!! How’s things?

2025-11-21 02:07:59 CET

China Morning Missive
The Chinese Ministry of Finance has been on a tear over the past two weeks issuing bonds and raising billions in the process from global investors. What has been the most interesting aspect of this exercise, however, has been the sheer demand for Chinese paper.
There was the USD4.0billion issuance divided evenly between a 3 and 5-year tranche. Demand came in at USD118.0billion.
Then this week there was a EUR4.0billion deal this time evening split between a 4 and 7-year tranche. Here, demand came in at EUR100billion.
Demand for the Chinese bonds was so significant that the securities ended up being priced at just two basis points above US treasury bonds of a similar tenor.
It would seem as though China is one again “investable” considering that sovereign issuance had been scant and, at times, nonexistent over the past four years.
There is a greater game at play here beyond a government looking to tap investor demand. China is returning to the global sovereign debt market with the expressed purpose of resuming the campaign of deepening the offshore yield curve so as to provide pricing benchmarks for Chinese corporates. Expect to see a host of large Chinese enterprises test the global markets throughout 2026. Demand for sovereign risk is one thing. Demand for Chinese corporate risk remains a distinct unknown.
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-smashes-bond-sale-records-093818568.html

2025-11-20 15:51:29 CET

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Well allow me to start by saying “WOW”. Not sure where that came from @nprofile…65s4
Appreciate the zaps, of course, but I appreciate all who solely read and gain whatever value from my ramblings about China.
#nevent1q…62uu

2025-11-20 11:32:23 CET

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You’ll get no argument from me brother. Been trying to highlight what, for me, is entirely obvious. Can’t speak for the Europeans, but the degree of cognitive dissonance about China throughout the States astonishes me.

2025-11-20 04:08:43 CET

China Morning Missive
Once again, we have an event which takes place all with the intended purpose of containing China. And once again, we have a failed attempt.
Honestly, I’m somewhat surprised at the speed of the outcome. It was just a month back when the Dutch government announced that it had taken effective control over the Chinese owned technology group Nexperia. Yesterday, that decision was fully overturned.
The rationale for seizing the company was deemed “highly exceptional” and was done given “valid reasons to doubt sound management at Nexperia under the leadership of former CEO Zhang Xuezheng.” What does that even mean? Doesn’t matter. Everyone knew that the move was made in conjunction with the US government to apply pressure on China’s ambitions to build advanced chips.
I’m sure that, on paper, the move would have made considerable sense. On paper. What clearly wasn’t taken into account though were the second and third order effects of making such a move.
While Nexperia does have a sizable operational footprint within the EU, the actual end product (chips) is manufactured in Dongguan, China. In response, Chinese authorities placed a full export ban on all Nexperia chips.
Almost immediately, the global auto industry, the largest end customer for these chips, reacted. From BMW to Honda, the industry warned that production would go offline without access to the Nexperia chips.
Pressure then mounted and, in the end, the Dutch government was left with no other choice but to rescind its previous “highly exceptional” decision.
This is but a single example of the unforced errors being constantly made by the Americans and Europeans. Decisions are made all with the aim of containing China, but at each and every turn there’s never any forethought into how China can respond. There just continues to be a belief that unilateral action can be taken without running the risk of repercussions.
It has been years now that this way of thinking has permeated Western strategic thinking and, yet, there has been ample evidence that – when provoked – China doesn’t just retaliate, it does so in a way that is truly impactful.
What this example also demonstrates is the depth and breadth of China’s institutional bandwidth. Over the past 18 months there have been a host of geopolitical flare-ups all requiring the attention of China’s leadership. At every turn, there’s not only been an immediate response, but a very well-crafted response as well. Each situation was then adroitly navigated with outcomes heavily favoring the Chinese.
I’ll just once again make the following statement. It is well past time that the Americans and Europeans refrain from underestimating China’s capabilities. The leverage is now firmly in the hands of Beijing. There just isn’t anymore debate on this subject.
https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/dutch-government-suspends-state-intervention-chipmaker-nexperia-statement-2025-11-19/

2025-11-19 01:38:22 CET

Everyday there is a new development in the Chinese AI space. Can’t hardly keep track.
Now it’s a Chatbot from Alibaba and from just a bit of use it is impressive. Already up on the App Store.
https://blossom.primal.net/c6490b5c17bca4814e3dd57260134c35450de0414e33a3b21ba7d215e6bdceea.jpg

2025-11-17 01:51:24 CET

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That’s one way to think about it. I’m more inclined to see this as “wanting to believe what they want to believe.” Pure cognitive dissonance.

2025-11-17 01:23:35 CET

China Morning Missive
Nothing like coming into the office first thing on a Monday morning to find news of SecTres Bessent saying that the rare earth issue “should hopefully be completed by Thanksgiving.” Wasn’t the entire idea of the Trump-Xi meeting to finalize the issue? And on that note, what is going on with TikTok? There’s another item which hasn’t been fully finalized.
Even though the current headlines a dominated by a growing conflict between China and Japan over comments made on Taiwan and there’s also the reporting of the Chinese economy under continued pressure, the main event remains the Battle of Two Titans, China v. America.
Honestly, someone in Washington needs to hire me to teach a class in China Negotiations 101. All of what is transpiring is a known quantity if you understand how it is the Chinese operate. When they have leverage (and they very much do), they press their advantage up until the real point of conflict.
I would also add that rare earths, while important, is a symptom of a far larger problem facing America. A problem known by the Beijing leadership and a problem which will continue to be leveraged.
The real issue is an acute dependency throughout America on the supply of all sorts of intermediate goods. No one in the States is talking about it and it is the same dynamic at play as with rare earths but goes to just about every single corner of American industry.
Intermediate goods are the critical inputs required across all industries to manufacture finished goods. So long as you are missing one or two small parts that go into a manufacturing process then you are unable to complete that process. This, again, is the primary issue with rare earths. They are a component, and intermediate good, required in a much larger manufacturing process. Without access then the process itself has zero value.
Again, this very dynamic carries across just about every industry. American manufactures remain dependent on a host of inputs, intermediate goods, sourced from China.
One perfect example of this would be drones. In fact, I would expect this to be one of the next major issues to arise between China and America. You’ll see all sorts of reporting on companies likes Anduril or Skydio. Both are tasked with building out America’s capacity to manufacture drones. Both, however, would have at least some degree of dependency on China for the sourcing of needed inputs. China, however, placed a global export control on critical parts for the entire drone industry. This move was made explicitly in response to the American government banning all domestic sale of DJI Technology products.
I must stress; this is just one example. There are hundreds of other American companies still at critical risk to China’s supply chain. Mitigating the risk will take years and Beijing negotiators are fully aware of the issue.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-rare-earths-deal-will-hopefully-be-done-by-thanksgiving-bessent-says-2025-11-16/

2025-11-14 10:18:24 CET

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Thank you. Much appreciated.

2025-11-14 10:17:55 CET

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While I realize this chart makes the rounds on social media all the time, it also doesn’t represent an appropriate comparison.
A sharp and distinct differences in the structure of the American and Chinese corporate financing models greatly reduces the applicability of this comparison. China is heavily, almost exclusively, reliant on bank loans for all financing needs. Both short and long term. America is more reliant on capital markets. This difference corrupts the M2 comparison made. @nprofile…mc4m
#nevent1q…02wy