nick

peer-to-peer cash security

Public Key

npub1j8d6h8mzvc8f2fvysrf09nlkmn7m2ylj32zl5na4tm5e8fd5dqysrg26k2

NIP-05 Address

Profile Code

nprofile1qqsfrkatna3xvr54ykzgp5hjelmdeld4z0eg4p06f764a6vn5k6xszgpr4mhxue69uhkummnw3ez6ur4vgh8wetvd3hhyer9wghxuet5qyw8wumn8ghj7mn0wd68ytnzd96xxmmfdejhytnnda3kjctvqydhwumn8ghj7mn0wd68yttsw43zuum9d45hxmmv9ejx2aspz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduq3vamnwvaz7tmjv4kxz7fwdehhxarj9e5kuen0qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnswf5k6ctv9ehx2aqm42lw4

Publishing to

nostr-pub.wellorder.net

nostr.bitcoiner.social

nostr-pub.semisol.dev

relay.damus.io

relay.nostr.info

relay.primal.net

Author Public Key

npub1j8d6h8mzvc8f2fvysrf09nlkmn7m2ylj32zl5na4tm5e8fd5dqysrg26k2

Show more details

Last Notes

2026-03-11 01:53:13 UTC

- reply

Currently the Frostsnap app is the only wallet that supports FROST signing, however you can import the wallet into sparrow (or many other wallets) to build PSBTs etc which can be signed within the Frostsnap app.

2026-03-11 01:50:21 UTC

- reply

The backup wouldnt fit into a regular BIP39 24 word backup. With FROST backups it is preferable to include some additional data inside that improves recovery: compatible share detection, no trusted xpub problem when recovering on multisig.

2026-03-10 07:03:11 UTC

- reply

Check out how easy it is to use multisig with Frostsnap
#nevent1q…6q4p

2026-03-10 05:30:19 UTC

- reply

Try now, I dropped the res!

2026-02-17 11:13:06 UTC

what (free) software would allow someone to make an animation like this easily and cleanly, based on an existing SVG?
https://utxo.club/frostsnap-icon.html

2026-02-17 11:06:20 UTC

- reply

false

2026-02-16 13:56:59 UTC

- reply

chrome castle DING
https://youtu.be/E6VR4NNZr1k

2026-02-16 13:48:31 UTC

- reply

This is where i post from

2026-01-15 12:23:36 UTC

- reply

My mates would probably do it if you can send sats for postage from melbourne!

2025-11-18 13:21:59 UTC

DDOS is a psyop invented by cloudflare salesmen
src: they had me larping w LOIC and slow loris in 2014
https://blossom.primal.net/6129fc461bf610e91c86ea95acf8822b6a894c4e81d84cbefa1aa652b5189230.png

2025-10-31 03:01:13 UTC

- reply

lol it's the only day of the year my parents would shut the front gate

2025-10-18 17:46:10 UTC

- reply

they're very generous in subsidizing our platform usage 😂

2025-10-16 04:54:06 UTC

- reply

Congratulations! But be careful sharing this image, the paper is rather transparent.. and QR codes have decent error correction

2025-10-13 16:24:28 UTC

- reply

mirin that uptime

2025-10-07 03:04:47 UTC

- reply

At least they don't know how to swap their lightning wallet sats for fiat

2025-10-07 03:03:21 UTC

F to pay respects to all those friends who sold for their single digit percentage "profit", those who were waiting for a "crash", and those who cashed out to consoom something they don't use anymore

2025-10-03 03:14:10 UTC

- reply

Cryptography and security are difficult for non-specialists to evaluate, which is why external audits are often seen as a source of reassurance. In practice though, the bigger risks for most people come from keeping life savings in a single-signature wallet at home, or from complex backup processes in traditional multisig setups.
Frostsnap has not yet undergone an external audit, similar to most hardware wallets at an early stage. That said, our design choices already reduce many common risks. By using advanced modern cryptography, Frostsnap enables multiple devices (your phone and signing devices) to each contribute entropy, with both sides verifying it. This makes the usual critical mistakes such as weak randomness or flawed key generation extremely difficult.
We also build exclusively in memory-safe programming languages, eliminating an entire class of vulnerabilities that have historically affected wallets written in C or C++.
Every change goes through careful peer review, and as Frostsnap adoption grows, the number of independent eyes on the code will only increase.

2025-10-01 18:17:59 UTC

Frostsnap, The Bitcoin Security Company

2025-10-01 18:15:45 UTC

Day 1,134 of sustained acceleration Approaching escape velocity
https://blossom.primal.net/c0a8d5f608a1ea63d27dc6f6d8ed8da121ab4d722990e80985811eecc84ccd31.jpg

2025-09-09 05:36:28 UTC

- reply

Frostsnap app does not use javascript.
Frostsnap firmware is pure nostd rust.

2025-08-29 15:29:59 UTC

- reply

Join us live on Citadel Dispatch in ~5 hours time for our very first podcast discussing @nprofile…8fv9
Ask anything you want to learn about Frostsnap in the livechat!
https://citadeldispatch.com
#nevent1q…xd8k

2025-08-26 06:48:30 UTC

- reply

Your bitchat geohash must be very different to mine 😂

2025-08-25 11:14:38 UTC

- reply

SEMICOLON;

2025-08-25 11:08:07 UTC

SEMICOLON;

2025-08-22 12:51:06 UTC

Dudes will manage to build one binary deterministically and start describing themselves as nixpilled
DETERMINISTIC FROSTSNAP FIRMWARE BUILDS:
https://github.com/frostsnap/frostsnap/pull/277

2025-08-22 12:49:32 UTC

ANOTHER DAY ANOTHER EU REGULATION FUCKING MY SHIT UP (I HAVE ZERO TIES TO EUROPE)

2025-08-22 12:47:15 UTC

- reply

Looking to get the first batch out next month!

2025-08-21 10:21:41 UTC

Cold Storage ❄
https://blossom.primal.net/c47cebab5b3f9791ff6bbdd10196c8aea2f319a18a962bd28bb3fdef3eacea1e.png

2025-08-16 08:54:03 UTC

- reply

a true romance

2025-07-30 03:45:09 UTC

- reply

big dawg

2025-07-16 13:16:27 UTC

- reply

CLANKER

2025-07-09 15:11:31 UTC

reactivated instagram
https://blossom.primal.net/37631ed8e9b60dce822223413fb6a1ab033998f013a7f78ca06fb62dd1b12f07.png

2025-07-02 03:53:11 UTC

- reply

Yes you will be able to do remote P2P signing in the future.
Yeah you can also have a FROST key inside a script multisig.
Absolutely agree that this is prime for institutional custody, but we're building for us hardcore bitcoiners first!

2025-07-02 03:51:38 UTC

- reply

Yes! We haven't implemented it yet but the theory is there 🔥

2025-07-02 03:51:12 UTC

- reply

Yes and yes! More on these soon

2025-07-02 01:34:22 UTC

- reply

1. Currently priced in sats so depends if you mean increase in dollar term. Possibly. TBD.
2. Other HWWs can't do FROST, infinitely worse multisig experience and drawbacks.
3. No one loses bitcoin to laser and power glitching attacks. Frostsnap's security model focuses on your ability to visit T-of-N devices.
4. Yes we'll be encouraging other FROST teams to be compatible with us and our code is available to integrate with.
5. Our displays allow for onscreen device confirmation and backup entry.
6. Probably just so people stop focusing on secure elements. It's not that important in our security model and people misunderstand the security guarantees they provide.

2025-07-01 02:24:18 UTC

- reply

Good question (and yeah we need to put more out there), so the FROST multisig only has a single group public key (one xpub). And this single group public key can be reconstructed from secret shares or their images. That means that so long as you have two devices or their backups, you can find the xpub and simple derivation path -> descriptor.

2025-07-01 02:20:36 UTC

- reply

Just the Frostsnap app at the moment! We're pioneering the frontier of self-custody tech. Others will follow.
https://github.com/frostsnap/frostsnap/
Free and open source software for Windows, Android, Linux, and MacOS (soon).

2025-07-01 02:11:38 UTC

- reply

Thanks Max!

2025-07-01 01:56:52 UTC

- reply

It's me and the lads. It is free and open source. Verify:
https://github.com/frostsnap/frostsnap/

2025-07-01 01:56:06 UTC

- reply

Each device has its own seedphrase backup, we'll be showing this soon!
You can load the backup into a new device, or in a disaster scenario, combine two backups to form an xpriv that can be loaded into sparrow/bitcoin core.

2025-07-01 01:24:08 UTC

- reply

Legend, can't wait to get the devices into your hands

2025-07-01 01:23:34 UTC

- reply

Thanks Brisket!! 🧡

2025-07-01 01:22:54 UTC

- reply

Secure elements are really just secure PIN checkers that release decryption keys. When I was naive I thought the signing operations occur off the main MCU and in a secure enclave, but this is not the case with most hardware wallets. A successful PIN releases a decryption key which then passes onto the main chip to decrypt the secret key in memory.

2025-07-01 01:20:29 UTC

- reply

Frostsnap's security model primarily focus on the ability for you, or an attacker, to visit T-of-N devices.
The Frontier model does not have a secure element. However we do encrypt the secret stored on the device using a decryption key held in the phone's secure element. This means you need to unlock your phone to sign or access anything useful, so by extension, protecting the device secret behind the phone's secure element.
Now you may be wondering about recovery, what if you lose the phone and its decryption key? If that happens you can take a new phone to visit T-of-N devices, reconstructing the decryption key! Now you're ready to go signing again!

2025-06-30 18:00:59 UTC

- reply

We've been working towards this vision for self-custody for several years now, and this is where it starts.
We're thrilled for you to join and support us as we pioneer the Frontier of peer-to-peer cash security together.
See you on the Frontier 🫡
#nevent1q…r9zh

2025-06-30 17:45:43 UTC

- reply

Not within our wallet yet, but it is (/soon will be) possible to use Frostsnap as a signer of PSBTs within more complex scripts built by other wallets.

2025-06-30 16:04:03 UTC

- reply

Any spending limited device policies we build in the future will be enacted by the phone and the device. It sure is magic, and we know how to do it securely 🪄

2025-06-30 16:02:05 UTC

- reply

No device needed to receive, address verification on a device screen is optional.

2025-06-30 05:31:28 UTC

- reply

+1 yt-dlp simply undefeated, most alternatives are just a yt-dlp wrapper.
Ask ai for the command flags when unsure.

2025-06-24 14:21:07 UTC

- reply

Most won't but it'll surely add delay/disadvantage

2025-06-24 12:52:54 UTC

- reply

It's still an incredible place to live or visit, though understandably impossible to believe from the outside! As a visitor you can roughly expect hassle of authoritarianism that's generally on par with being a visitor to the USA.

2025-06-24 12:22:30 UTC

- reply

We're going to have to do USB airdrops into highschools like they do for north korea
- VPN subscription & censorship evasion guides
- pirated minecraft
- all 1247 videos of my archived youtube likes
#nevent1q…cm5m

2025-06-24 12:18:42 UTC

Australia's 'esafety' commissioner now wants to ban youtube for under16s!
This country is already fucked in the technology race

2025-06-24 11:35:49 UTC

sir a second political slopaganda post has hit the extended family groupchat

2025-06-22 15:45:14 UTC

WHERE IS ZHOU TONGED

2025-06-22 15:44:18 UTC

- reply

So many low effort ones on twitter, straight up copy pasted tweets or article/podcast summaries that are the entire work just sliced up to repackage as their own

2025-06-22 15:41:44 UTC

Information freedom doesn't absolve copy pasta engagement farmers from being leeches

2025-06-18 05:31:01 UTC

- reply

IM GE N(UH)

2025-06-18 05:30:11 UTC

Making voice recordings and "I AM GOING TO" is 2.5 syllables in australian english

2025-06-10 13:44:18 UTC

- reply

Today I made a tor onion chat

2025-06-10 13:43:19 UTC

satsale + frostsnap logos came to me in a dream
https://blossom.primal.net/bf2e3d91f6e9a0a0df5d71365f636ae78724f182beec9e26b47a992c8b64c736.png
https://blossom.primal.net/15101d25c4531d06a1536e1ae62755836ac8ec8ecd6b68217e762b63e097999b.png

2025-06-10 12:49:49 UTC

- reply

short, barely audible, nice beep

2025-06-10 12:49:12 UTC

a casio watch alarm beeps from deep within my closet every night at 10:46pm for ~4 years

2025-05-28 15:51:38 UTC

proof of work for feedback or suggestions increases their value by 100x

2025-05-10 05:30:55 UTC

- reply

Looks great, any reptiles?

2025-05-09 05:41:46 UTC

once again im pissed off at the domain name situation

2025-05-08 17:03:47 UTC

https://blossom.primal.net/9b476c273cab4d5685544bae06d5904e97442e479661715ba1ce96f51ee78895.png

2025-05-08 09:20:00 UTC

- reply

Not your first time around the bloch 😎

2025-05-07 13:48:12 UTC

- reply

Has been great discussing this - got me thinking deeply and I found a bug in one of our cryptography libraries while exploring valid secp256k1 points! I haven't looked into knots really, semi dismissed it a while ago when i first saw this nuts counting system was supported(?)
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Tonal_Bitcoin

2025-05-07 13:40:30 UTC

- reply

some light reading on block template construction
https://blossom.primal.net/429fa8533ee7368f9e69e2f29e467890a778390ea89a78c6eba8a6b9cce7a5e4.png
#nevent1q…0q9x

2025-05-07 04:21:14 UTC

- reply

Yeah not sure i am convinced of the reasons in that issue to **not** filter these, but i am thinking there may be value to the fact that this filter could be created at any time in the future, clear out a large chunk of the UTXO set after they have wasted their sats. Depends if how bad you consider the spam, is it about utxoset bloat or want to filter their existence in blocks

2025-05-06 20:20:30 UTC

̶b̶l̶o̶c̶k̶ ̶t̶e̶m̶p̶l̶a̶t̶e̶ ̶c̶o̶n̶s̶t̶r̶u̶c̶t̶i̶o̶n̶
applied square packing theory

2025-05-06 20:07:43 UTC

- reply

complaining about spam manifests spam
https://blossom.primal.net/1fdf9f43495cda131b7fbf3f84ddc4b73fa02ffc123fabe09a6ced75159b8bb3.png #nevent1q…90gm

2025-05-06 20:07:22 UTC

- reply

ahhh shit here we go again

2025-05-06 19:51:50 UTC

- reply

But many addresses are a hash of the public key, so we cannot validate the public keys when transactions are paying money to them. For these addresses it is impossible to filter based on public key until it is revealed, at time of spending, which requires them to be real and not spam!
Though I haven't thought about this wrt P2TR, and was somewhat surprised to see point validity isn't enforced:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/24106
I think id rather the spammers use invalid secp points! A nice broom to have up the sleeve? Can easily patch into a node to sweep out all the invalid ones from the utxoset.
It is super easy to generate these "fake" secp256k1 points which are valid:
02b33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33f
```rust
use rand::{RngCore, thread_rng};
use secp256kfun::{
Point, hex,
marker::{NonZero, Public},
};
fn main() {
let mut rng = thread_rng();
let hex_str = "b33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33fb33f";
let hex_bytes = hex::decode(hex_str).expect("invalid hex string");
loop {
let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 64];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut random_bytes);
let my_point_bytes = {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 33];
bytes[0] = 0x02; // start with 02
let hex_len = hex_bytes.len().min(32);
bytes[1..1 + hex_len].copy_from_slice(&hex_bytes[0..hex_len]);
// fill the rest with random bytes
if hex_len < 32 {
bytes[1 + hex_len..33].copy_from_slice(&random_bytes[0..32 - hex_len]);
}
bytes
};
let point = Point::<_, Public, NonZero>::from_bytes(my_point_bytes);
match point {
Some(valid_point) => {
println!("Random valid point: {:?}", valid_point);
}
None => {
eprintln!("Invalid point from bytes: {}", hex::encode(&my_point_bytes));
}
}
}
}
```

2025-05-06 18:58:03 UTC

- reply

Ah im an idiot i accidentally added an additional character at the front of the top one, it passes if you include it (11wizSAYSbuyXbt9d8JV8ytm5q69NaCfJ).
As do all these
"1WizSAYSbuyXbt9d8JV8ytm5q663tk94u",
"1WizSAYSbuyXbt9d8JV8ytm5q69PymsLb",
"1WizSAYSbuyXbt9d8JV8ytm5q69PymsLb",
And these (your npub padded by 1s)
"1Npub1w78wrepa4wz5odvqLq1112PjcmD",
"1HfeL834gv3282grjeg5cw2e6311CxBVx",
"1Eqszny2ms2jovtt111czzzzzzzywryfu"
Huge respect for posting code 🔥
Mine can be found here
https://utxo.club/base58.js

2025-05-06 17:39:33 UTC

- reply

AHH completely out of control now 🥲

2025-05-06 17:19:26 UTC

- reply

mixed gender sauna? (bras + kets)

2025-05-06 17:03:16 UTC

- reply

Yeah! Anywhere along the transmission from wallet to sender, can be clipboard malware (most common) where you copy an address and the malware pastes in a similar but different address, or browser malware which substitutes addresses within web requests (after you hit withdraw on an exchange), or malicious QR code scanner, or intercepted during unencrypted message transmission like you say.
Software wallet is indeed a domain you control, can verify signatures etc. The other stages are less in your control.

2025-05-06 16:39:06 UTC

- reply

Not so much, though we've received a lot of feedback during our demos. It's easy to notice when someone is confused, often means we need to redesign something!
We've had so much to work with based on our own experiences as bitcoin users, but we're almost getting to the point where we have exhausted+resolved our personal painpoints. Much more user testing coming soon!

2025-05-06 16:34:15 UTC

- reply

now this is zontent

2025-05-06 16:32:46 UTC

- reply

Or are you referring to something else? Is there an occurrence of public keys which arent valid secp256k1 points?

2025-05-06 16:31:07 UTC

- reply

What math?
Does this address pass your validation?
11wizSAYSbuyXbt9d8JV8ytm5q69NaCfJ
How about this one?
1wizSAYSbuyXbt9d8JV8ytm5acqq2TorC

2025-05-06 16:26:40 UTC

- reply

Software wallets are typically not the attack vector! See what i said above re verifying address against sender's view and clipboard malware

2025-05-06 16:01:11 UTC

- reply

Anything special about them? Most workflows don't guide the user with respect to the what and why afaik

2025-05-06 15:33:20 UTC

- reply

Another tricky one is is geographic distribution of multisignature keys, there's little personal security gained if you keep a quorum of keys in one location!
I've designed a workflow to encourage geographic separation of each device alongside their respective backup, but it's still rough around the edges.. Some users may want to sit down and create all their backups at once, but then there's risk that they mix them up or get lazy and never distribute them into separate locations.

2025-05-06 15:29:02 UTC

- reply

One that has been on my mind lately is verifying addresses on a hardware wallet when receiving funds.
It's rather ugly (big string of characters), so we chunk the address up and highlight some chunks at random.
It's also unintuitive, best practice is not to simply check that the address you're giving out from your software wallet matches the address derived on your hardware wallet. Since it could be intercepted and replaced during transmission (this is where most attacks are, clipboard malware).
Rather, you want to check that the **sender** sees the same address as displayed on your hardware wallet. Making the workflow and describing this is rather tricky, it all depends on who you're receiving from - is it an in-person transaction (compare visually)? is it over DMs (ask can you see the address chunks)? Is it a withdrawal from an exchange (compare against confirmation email, if provided)?
https://blossom.primal.net/190c972a8b02d30ba71c8102172cf758a63580eaedfefe7d09159ab2dc10a12a.png
https://blossom.primal.net/5fc2c7b07d8a64a03ba3e73c9dd2bf757198cbcb2ccff77cd7d99d7cdc1b4ca2.png
https://blossom.primal.net/4eb069af72195fafee16c0a1d31437f31c413b48a9b6ba7b5ea636e1536ee611.png

2025-05-06 15:16:26 UTC

There are so many incredible developer opportunities in the bitcoin & nostr ecosystem, but i know several devs (looking for work) that are lacking the curiosity and creative drive

2025-05-06 15:11:48 UTC

Designing bitcoin tools for a general audience people is insanely challenging

2025-05-02 07:18:22 UTC

- reply

BTCPay Server is fantastic, though I have things I don't like about it so much: size & bloat, language (C#), installation mess. These differences lead me to creating a lightweight payment processor a few years ago - SatSale (also not sufficient for our current needs).
For us, we really wanted some custom features and I like having absolute control over the system:
- Minimum order quantities (doesn't make sense to buy a single Frostsnap device).
- Avoid PHP platforms (vulnerabilities galore)
- Promo codes with custom rules and application
- Database design (for customer privacy)
- Shipping cost
- Eventually fiat integration
You can probably achieve many of these with BTCPay, I haven't looked in a while (and perhaps should have).
A diversion from building the product itself yes, but I'm really happy with its current state and do not regret it since it should be sufficient for a few years at minimum. Maybe I'll open source it at some point, but would require serious manual adaptation for other products.

2025-04-30 13:25:32 UTC

writing a document in legalese is giving me brain damage, back to code review

2025-04-25 09:54:20 UTC

- reply

rsync to different directory https://blossom.primal.net/0f4bf4a30a3ba47c74d02c479c79adbe5b5930c2f4dcc5967f99981d792cd7cf.png

2025-04-25 09:45:17 UTC

- reply

I could probably just rsync over ssh straight up, but git pulling acts as some reasonable version management making sure i don't publish some half-finished version

2025-04-25 09:36:33 UTC

- reply

rsyncing only the important files to /var/www/ , can't be that guy that leaks .env 😅

2025-04-25 09:26:59 UTC

deploying with ssh git pull and rsync
no slop required
steady lads

2025-04-23 00:46:57 UTC

Enjoying this boomer rock rally because it gives me another angle to yap about hard money onto deaf ears

2025-04-18 04:16:42 UTC

https://m.primal.net/QUYB.png

2025-04-17 21:06:23 UTC

I could smash these remaining tasks out in a day and not rely on any 3rd party service 🤔
Already built:
- website
- checkout api
- order database
Currently leaning on 3rd party service for:
- payment invoice generation
- payment checking
- email receipts (we dont send other info)
This 3rd party service is having uptime issues, and missing features like receive to taproot. Also unknown risks with customer emails...

2025-04-17 20:59:18 UTC

Might accidentally make an entire end-to-end ecommerce platform for purposes of customer privacy and checkout uptime...