Final

Security specialist and member of the GrapheneOS Foundation.

Posts my own and not endorsed by my employer. AI slop and Nostr DMs ignored.

Email: [email protected]
Matrix: f1nal:grapheneos.org

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npub1hxx76n82ags8jrduk0p3gqrfyqyaxnrlnynu9p5rt2vmwjq6ts3q4sg75y

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[email protected]

Profile Code

nprofile1qqstnr0dfn4w5grepk7t8sc5qp5jqzwnf3lejf7zs6p44xdhfqd9cgspz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduqs6amnwvaz7tmwdaejumr0dsr8ed5e

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relay.damus.io

nos.lol

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npub1hxx76n82ags8jrduk0p3gqrfyqyaxnrlnynu9p5rt2vmwjq6ts3q4sg75y

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Last Notes

2026-05-24 14:54:48 CEST

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A managed service doesn't equal a private or secure service and it isn't trying to say that it is. The post is saying average users (normies) will often use a managed service over running their own even if the service has problems. You could put any cloud storage in that scenario.

2026-05-20 21:08:07 CEST

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Yes. The data is the public domain LJ Speech dataset. LJ Speech uses user-submitted public domain recordings of audiobooks. LibriVox (audiobook platform) requires all recordings made for them to be in public domain.

2026-05-20 20:45:06 CEST

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We already have forward and reverse geocoding! Check location services -> Geocoder

2026-05-20 20:32:37 CEST

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That is speech to text, not text to speech. Speech to text will be worked on in the future.

2026-05-20 20:23:03 CEST

#GrapheneOS Speech Services, a high quality on-device text to speech engine built with open source models and training data is now available in the GrapheneOS App Store.
https://blossom.primal.net/d291141699f1061444044e52af6197c24c12adc6ba01c9c9a48134897b36da81.jpg

2026-05-18 23:41:26 CEST

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The hardware acceleration works fine on GrapheneOS though, GrapheneOS just doesn't include any AI assistant/generative AI. The project just agrees that should just be left to the user. People will also just be unhappy about it even if it is totally local.

2026-05-18 23:35:14 CEST

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We haven't looked into any LLM / generative AI / agentic AI in GrapheneOS since it's not a field of ours and we try and keep the services minimal. Also it would be pretty limited in coverage if it it's own API had to be made for it because then it deviates from being an Android app.
Latest work on ML is pushing our own Text to Speech engine very soon for accessibility, entirely local, open machine learning models AND training data. Users should be excited for that.
For people into running some local LLMs, the open source and local Google AI Edge Gallery app I showed you before got a lot of changes actually. Does more than just text chat now. Someone could use it or even build a fork with it's permissive licensing.
https://blossom.primal.net/e45b4087dd1254561fb8c6f57b59f69a8fa65cacc8fb590926322cc53b56623f.jpg https://blossom.primal.net/d71bfaf20ff71a456b12985379b43bfbb6c8eb62d1c0ce6da7d18fac56be046c.jpg https://blossom.primal.net/de50d230226c6fbef44517de47b16a8294c51c3ffd3de50b8a9cfad940949b91.jpg

2026-05-17 18:19:54 CEST

I have no comment on on-chain zaps. Likely won't use them or they just go sweep to the GrapheneOS Foundation.
You can use Silent Payments for me though:
sp1qqtdguesl4e507rt9m0pwfxvwxh2wf9c74pk9v4dclnf8agxe5vwq6qml9d4h6gz0vwf3dhgvznmvpu4z0gnfr33mr5wzmlcuxpqnturehvypr803

2026-05-17 13:56:51 CEST

"Google Pixel with GrapheneOS: resistant to both BFU and AFU attacks on recent models (6[a] and newer). This is the strongest protection available on any Android device."
#nevent1q…2ez7

2026-05-17 13:51:48 CEST

Another great article by Osservatorio Nessuno explaining the tech and methods behind phone unlocking tools, notably Cellebrite used by law enforcement and governments.
https://osservatorionessuno.org/blog/2026/05/demystifying-phone-unlocking-tools-a-technical-overview/

2026-05-14 03:03:26 CEST

GrapheneOS releases for Pixel 10a are mo longer experimental. Feel free to use Pixel 10a with it.

2026-05-12 20:31:37 CEST

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We currently have access to the future security patches, not major versions. There's been a lot of changes to the AOSP development that only two major feature releases are released a year. At the moment we have been making some backports based on the Beta channels of Android.

2026-05-10 19:45:34 CEST

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Unified Attestation is another anti-competitive system being pushed by multiple European companies. It will similarly lock people out from using arbitrary hardware and software. That's not a solution and is far worse than Android's much more open hardware attestation API.
https://x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2033925685568250119
Android's hardware attestation shouldn't be used to lock out users not using specific hardware or OSes. However, the fact that it permits arbitrary roots of trust and OSes at least allows services to permit more. Google could use it to permit GrapheneOS for Play Integrity if that was about security.

2026-05-10 18:04:37 CEST

Apple and Google are gradually expanding their use of hardware-based attestation. They're convincing a growing number of services to adopt it. Google's Play Integrity API and Apple's App Attest API are very similar. Apple brought it to the web via Privacy Pass, which Google intends on doing too.
Google's Play Integrity API requires hardware attestation for the strong integrity level and is gradually phasing in requiring it for the more commonly used device integrity level. Apple already has it as a requirement. Over the long term, this will increasingly lock out hardware and OS competition.
The purpose of these systems is disallowing people from using hardware and software not approved by Apple or Google. This is wrongly presented as being a security feature. Banks and government services are the main ones adopting it but Apple and Google are encouraging every service to use it.
Apple's Privacy Pass brought hardware attestation to the web to help with passing captchas on their own hardware. Many people saw that as harmless since few sites would be willing to lock out non-Apple-hardware users. Apple and Google are both likely to bring broader hardware attestation to the web.
Google's reCAPTCHA is planning an approach where they use Privacy Pass on Apple hardware, their own approach on Google Mobile Services Android devices and a QR code scanning system to require an iOS or Google certified Android device for Windows and other systems:
https://support.google.com/recaptcha/answer/16609652
Banking and government services increasingly require using a mobile app where they can use attestation to force using an Apple or Google approved device and OS. Apple's privacy pass, Google's 'cancelled' Web Environment Integrity and now reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification are bringing this to the web.
Current media coverage for reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification misunderstands it and the impact of it. They're bringing a hardware attestation requirement to Windows, desktop Linux, OpenBSD, etc. by requiring a QR scan from a certified smartphone to pass reCAPTCHA in some cases. They could expand it more.
Control over reCAPTCHA puts Google in a position where they can require having either iOS or a certified Android device to use an enormous amount of the web. Google defines certification requirements for Android which includes forcing bundling Google Chrome, etc. It's enormously anti-competitive.
Google's Play Integrity API bans using GrapheneOS despite it being far more secure than anything they permit. It also bans using any other alternative. This isn't somehow specific to an AOSP-based OS. You can't avoid this by using a mobile OS based on Linux or FreeBSD instead. You'll just be more locked out.
Google's Play Integrity API permits devices with no security patches for 10 years. The device integrity level can be bypassed via spoofing but they can detect it quite well and block it once it starts being done at scale. The strong integrity level requires leaked keys from TEEs/SEs to bypass it.
It doesn't provide a useful security feature, but it does lock out competition very well. Services requiring Apple App Attest or Google Play Integrity are primarily helping to lock in Apple and Google having a duopoly for mobile devices. Play Integrity is more relevant due to AOSP being open source.
Governments are increasingly mandating using Apple's App Attest and Google's Play Integrity for not only their own services but also commercial services. The EU is leading the charge of making these requirements for digital payments, ID, age verification, etc. Many EU government apps require them.
Instead of governments stopping Apple and Google from engaging in egregiously anti-competitive behavior, they're directly participating in locking out competition via their own services. Requiring people to have an Apple device or Google-certified Android device is anti-competition, not security.
reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification will currently work with sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS but it clearly exists to provide a way for them to start using hardware attestation on systems without it. People without an iOS or Android device will be locked out when this is required even without that.
This isn't about security or any missing functionality. GrapheneOS can be verified via hardware attestation. Google bans using GrapheneOS for Play Integrity because we don't license Google Mobile Services and conform to anti-competitive rules already found to be illegal in South Korea and elsewhere.

2026-05-10 13:21:07 CEST

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We officially announced it was Motorola Mobility, the Lenovo brand.

2026-05-10 02:40:14 CEST

This week, we patched a VPN leak in Android that was reported to Google but was ignored. Here is some coverage about that:
https://cyberinsider.com/grapheneos-fixes-android-vpn-leak-google-refused-to-patch
Here is the original vulnerability report:
https://lowlevel.fun/posts/tiny-udp-cannon-android-vpn-bypass/

2026-05-08 08:30:38 CEST

GrapheneOS isn't vulnerable to the 3 recently disclosed Linux kernel vulnerabilities named Copy Fail, Copy Fail 2 and Dirty Frag. Current Android Open Source Project SELinux policies block exploiting all 3 bugs. Standard AOSP GKI kernel configuration also has 2/3 of the vulnerable features disabled.
Attack surface reduction via fine-grained SELinux policy rules and stripping out unused kernel features via kernel configuration goes a long way to protecting against vulnerabilities. There's also seccomp-bpf for various standard sandboxes but most of the attack surface reduction is via SELinux.
AOSP uses SELinux to allowlist ioctl commands for drivers, permitted socket types, etc. in a fine-grained way. It strictly controls a lot of functionality prone to vulnerabilities including user namespaces and io_uring which aren't allowed to be used by apps or nearly any of the base OS processes.
These kinds of issues are rare and attack surface reduction is the best way to defend against them. #GrapheneOS does additional kernel attack surface reduction but in these 3 cases it's enough to have modern AOSP GKI kernel and SELinux policies. We also greatly improve generic exploit protections.
Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel are very common. However, the vast majority are memory corruption bugs rather than these memory-related logic errors. We defend against the memory corruption bugs with hardware memory tagging, zero-on-free and similar generic defenses.
Linux has a massive amount of code for the core kernel and drivers for the hardware. All of the code runs with full privileges with no isolation. In a microkernel, each of these 3 recent vulnerabilities would have been in isolated processes. Virtualization will have a major role in addressing this.
Despite these not being traditional memory corruption, a memory safe language with a better type system would definitely help. Containing low-level handling of memory to a much smaller portion of the kernel and mostly using safe abstractions for networking, device drivers, etc. would help a lot.
Linux has a relentless flood of severe memory corruption bugs being discovered. Nearly all exploit chains for Linux-based systems by commercial and government exploit developers use Linux kernel memory corruption bugs. It's a lot harder to make very portable and reliable exploits for those bugs.
A lot can be done to further reduce Linux kernel attack surface in GrapheneOS and much better generic memory corruption exploit protections can also be developed. However, it clearly needs to be replaced. Hardware-based virtualization on smartphones keeps getting better and has a major role to play.

2026-05-05 21:01:49 CEST

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For the future, yes.
Work currently is being done on Messaging, Contacts (to be completely redone from their AOSP base) and Gallery (fork)

2026-05-05 20:48:57 CEST

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Update with a fix for this is now live in Alpha.

2026-05-05 20:47:17 CEST

#GrapheneOS version 2026050400 released.
This update implements a fix for a UDP VPN leak that Google did not choose to fix, support for lock screen widgets, and the latest security patch level.
• full 2026-05-01 security patch level
• disable registerQuicConnectionClosePayload optimization to fix VPN leak
• Sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer: add shim for BluetoothAdapter ACTION_REQUEST_ENABLE
• apply active Dynamic Code Loading restrictions for Java inside isolated processes
• add app API for checking Dynamic Code Loading restriction states
• fully enable lockscreen widget support by default to avoid the swipe gesture being missing for the Pixel 10a and the whole feature being missing for the emulator
• enable standard secure NFC mode by default which can be changed via Settings > Connected devices > Connection preferences > NFC > Require device unlock for NFC (note this only disables card emulation while locked rather than all uses of NFC)
• backport upstream fix for getBubblePackageForLogging() crash
• kernel (6.1): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 6.1.170
• kernel (6.6): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 6.6.130
• kernel (6.12): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision
• hardened_malloc: fix slightly non-uniform distribute of random u16 values used for randomizing slot selection, slab allocation quarantining and free slab quarantining
• hardened_malloc: improve the robustness of disabling memory tagging against theoretical issues by making it fork-safe and adding more synchronization to avoid technically undefined parallel reads of the memory tagging state
• hardened_malloc: improve handling of out-of-memory edge cases
• hardened_malloc: improve sized deallocation hardening
• libpng: backport fix for CVE-2026-33636
• App Store: update to version 36
• Vanadium: update to version 147.0.7727.111.0
• Vanadium: update to version 148.0.7778.49.0
• Vanadium: update to version 148.0.7778.60.0
• Vanadium: update to version 148.0.7778.60.1
• Vanadium: update to version 148.0.7778.96.0
• adevtool: add update-gservices-flag command for fetching gservices flags
All of the Android 16 security patches from the current June 2026, July 2026, August 2026, September 2026, October 2026 and November 2026 Android Security Bulletins are included in the 2026050401 security preview release. List of additional fixed CVEs:
• Critical: CVE-2026-0039, CVE-2026-0040, CVE-2026-0041, CVE-2026-0042, CVE-2026-0043, CVE-2026-0044, CVE-2026-0051, CVE-2026-0052, CVE-2026-0080, CVE-2026-0097, CVE-2026-21352, CVE-2026-21353, CVE-2026-27280, CVE-2026-28590, CVE-2026-28591
• High: CVE-2025-22424, CVE-2025-22426, CVE-2025-48600, CVE-2025-48612, CVE-2026-0008, CVE-2026-0016, CVE-2026-0036, CVE-2026-0048, CVE-2026-0050, CVE-2026-0053, CVE-2026-0054, CVE-2026-0055, CVE-2026-0056, CVE-2026-0059, CVE-2026-0060, CVE-2026-0061, CVE-2026-0062, CVE-2026-0063, CVE-2026-0065, CVE-2026-0067, CVE-2026-0070, CVE-2026-0074, CVE-2026-0075, CVE-2026-0076, CVE-2026-0077, CVE-2026-0078, CVE-2026-0079, CVE-2026-0084, CVE-2026-0085, CVE-2026-0086, CVE-2026-0087, CVE-2026-0088, CVE-2026-0089, CVE-2026-0091, CVE-2026-0093, CVE-2026-0094, CVE-2026-0095, CVE-2026-0096, CVE-2026-0098, CVE-2026-0099, CVE-2026-0100, CVE-2026-28572, CVE-2026-28574, CVE-2026-28577, CVE-2026-28578, CVE-2026-28580, CVE-2026-28581, CVE-2026-28582, CVE-2026-28583, CVE-2026-28585, CVE-2026-28586, CVE-2026-28588, CVE-2026-28594, CVE-2026-28596, CVE-2026-28602
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026050400

2026-05-05 00:40:26 CEST

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Yes
https://blossom.primal.net/6199a1ae40f65eb21fe666516b3a33939c93b39e6c581836f8e49acb76b96646.jpg

2026-05-04 21:57:32 CEST

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We are releasing an update today to fix this leak.

2026-05-04 21:54:32 CEST

The #GrapheneOS Gallery app is going to be replaced with a fork of ReFra. Here is how the app looks. It is far more complete and full of features than the original AOSP Gallery. I am sure you will like it.
https://blossom.primal.net/fff593a72e79f93448fe238f510479c1c15c8772515102b7a7870e5cf196684a.jpg
https://blossom.primal.net/52abbf4c8bfd07350448fbc3b728029b19369a754f2db2ec1e980d1093ac163c.jpg

2026-05-04 21:25:02 CEST

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Reading the post, it looks like this leak was reported upstream into AOSP and was just ignored by them outright. What a mess.
We'll look into producing a fix for this ourselves and forward to the right people since they won't. If the researchers themselves also sent these things to us we could work on fixing them sooner.
Fortunately a native app needs to go out of their way to be designed to do this and certainly no app beyond this PoC is doing it right now.

2026-04-26 02:29:05 CEST

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It is very real! Put a link to one race in my comment above. Also @bitcoin_racing on (not) nostr.
https://blossom.primal.net/6f1316eb1d59db7a80ec5a34af08272788d0979354c523099307f75d930bd8eb.jpg

2026-04-26 02:09:58 CEST

Bitcoin Racing x GrapheneOS.
https://blossom.primal.net/5c77c5f8925a228a4ab52a973ae5aa75c9b5fb3cb2a68b2c4765ab406022e25b.png

2026-04-18 09:47:07 CEST

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Not right now. The system apps handle many OS/app intents, like camera, contact management, webview and file management.

2026-04-18 09:44:42 CEST

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GrapheneOS doesn't persistently store notifications unless users explicitly enable notification history. For users enabling notification history, it's a 24 hour log that's cleared as soon as the feature is disabled again. This is the standard Android Open Source Project approach.
#nevent1q…mu5c

2026-04-15 21:18:45 CEST

Privacy and security on computing devices need to become far stronger to protect people from pervasive violations of their rights. Users have their privacy pervasively violated by corporations, criminals and governments. There are endless privacy and security weaknesses in software with exploits of those happening on a large scale. Operating systems, browsers and other apps need to do a much better job protecting users. Enormous progress is needed on both privacy and security.
#GrapheneOS provides a massive upgrade for privacy and security over the standard Android Open Source Project. GrapheneOS is nowhere near good enough and we have an enormous amount of work to do improving both. Our work is an ongoing process and doesn't have an end point. Privacy and security heavily involve competition between attackers and defenders. Most defenders are making little progress and falling increasingly far behind.
Attackers continue improving their exploits of privacy and security weaknesses. Commercial exploit tools are increasingly widely deployed for broad attacks. Software has a very high density of privacy and security vulnerabilities. LLMs are accelerating both vulnerability discovery and exploit development. For most computing devices, defense is increasingly far behind offense. iOS and GrapheneOS are exceptional cases not representative of degrading privacy and security across computing devices.
Growing numbers of internet connected devices are incorporated into botnets. This harms the privacy and security of the internet as a whole through heavily pushing it towards centralization behind services such as Cloudflare. Insecure devices without security patches harm the internet as a whole. It isn't only embedded devices but also desktops, mobile devices and servers being used as part of these botnets. It isn't only people with these insecure devices who are harmed. It can get much worse.
We're building GrapheneOS to protect everyone's privacy and security. It's aimed at widespread adoption and is highly usable. It's compatible with the vast majority of Android apps. It has major privacy benefits for every user including stopping a lot of data collection by apps and services with a better permission model increasingly addressing being coerced to grant access. GrapheneOS has many users with little technical knowledge and isn't hard to install or use.
We're continuing to work on improving privacy, security, usability and app compatibility for all of our users. Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, per-app Sensors toggle, VPN leak protection and many other features we provde are very important privacy protections. We're building alternatives to the Camera, Microphone and other permissions too. Our major improvements to exploit protections are there to protect user privacy. Privacy depends on security and that's why we heavily work on security too.
Contrary to what's often claimed, GrapheneOS is far more usable and requires far less sacrifice compared to other alternatives. Providing far better protection against sophisticated exploits isn't at the expense of that. Our opt-in sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer combines privacy and high usability. We're gradually making replacements for more Google services apps rely on. Location services, network-based location, geocoding and more has already been replaced and much more is coming.

2026-04-10 18:17:55 CEST

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We are replacing the Gallery app and this will have that kind of UI.

2026-04-09 23:56:33 CEST

The alignment on the app drawer is fixed now.
https://blossom.primal.net/708e1d9d1933708aebdc37d1e6752f7298f35b75df4f62bfc355104d0640fdd8.jpg

2026-04-06 23:42:29 CEST

We need more apps with widgets. Can't make my home screen look good...

2026-04-06 14:55:09 CEST

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It's an AOSP distribution like Android, but I guess for sake of where this is posted I can see why this is separate. Great to see so many people using it.

2026-04-06 14:52:12 CEST

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Where have you seen this? We have the build instructions here at https://grapheneos.org/build

2026-04-06 12:17:04 CEST

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Use what you want, but I really can't recommend Telegram in general when it comes to stuff like this.

2026-04-05 23:06:57 CEST

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As far as I know it's not released there. Additionally not every app on F-Droid is reproducible. For the most part F-Droid are simply compiling apps from source and signing it with their own keys.

2026-04-05 15:16:25 CEST

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The source code does not match the compiled binary they distribute. There is only blank example code with the bot IDs empty, while the compiled binary had it configured.

2026-04-05 13:26:29 CEST

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Use the Telegram official app if you use Telegram. You're using Telegram anyway. There's not really a "hardened" alternative I recommend like Molly for Signal.

2026-04-05 12:39:57 CEST

(updated post) The Nekogram telegram client contains code that grabs your Telegram ID and phone number to send to their own bots, also some other OSINT bots mentioned. They admitted to it in their channel (@NekoUpdates) and are insulting users in the comments. Assume your number and user can be correlated at a worst case. Keep away from third party clients.
https://github.com/Nekogram/Nekogram/issues/336
https://github.com/RomashkaTea/nekogram-proof-of-logging

2026-03-27 21:39:05 CET

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We are an AOSP distribution because of all the security properties it already comes with like the mandatory sandboxing of apps, permission controls, file-based disk encryption, verified boot and more. It compliments what we want out of GrapheneOS. It's an entirely reproducible free and open source project. We don't want to make an operating system using the traditional desktop Linux OS stack which sets us back on all of these things.
There's a lot of things we are against when it comes to big companies like Google but we aren't forcing people to see black and white. A lot of things of AOSP and Pixels we like, but we don't want Google to be the only company producing those things either. We don't call ourselves a degoogling project because people can use what they want on GrapheneOS. Influencing you to create an opposition is politician behavior.

2026-03-27 08:32:13 CET

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The CIA could definitely hire anyone from any country they wanted to lol. Devs aren't able to commit their own code to our repos regardless and it must be peer reviewed through PRs anyone can see.

2026-03-26 09:11:57 CET

BTW, we don't have to pay you in fiat.
#nevent1q…tgwe

2026-03-25 22:32:07 CET

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More things like Messaging, Keyboard, Gallery, Dialer, the prebuilt apps. Terminal is something we can look at as well but there's a lot of user experience improvements we want to make with the everyday apps.

2026-03-25 20:38:40 CET

We are hiring Android app software engineers to develop and take ownership of maintaining new #GrapheneOS default applications. This is a fully remote, worldwide position.
If you have experience in Kotlin, Jetpack Compose and shipping production Android applications with commitment to security and privacy principles, come help fruit the next chapters of GrapheneOS.
Apply:
https://grapheneos.org/hiring#android-apps-software-engineer

2026-03-21 15:07:00 CET

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Those are for project account pages. There is no project page for GrapheneOS. I'm just one guy.
Updating GrapheneOS can be done via Settings app but it is usually done seamlessly and in the background. You'll receive a notification once it's installed requesting to restart. For most people it restarts on its own overnight.

2026-03-21 00:06:36 CET

Pixel 10a users can now try out our experimental release of #GrapheneOS. Help us fix any potential regressions for a stable release!
#nevent1q…jppy

2026-03-20 21:57:36 CET

#GrapheneOS version 2026032000 released. This release introduces experimental support for the Pixel 10a.
- add experimental Pixel 10a support
- Launcher: change app drawer search bar to cancelling search when the back action is invoked instead of the query becoming empty
- backport SELinux policy for CameraX extensions property used by the Pixel Camera HAL from Android 16 QPR3
- hardened_malloc: multiple small optimizations to improve performance
- kernel (6.1): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 6.1.166
- kernel (6.6): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 6.6.127
- kernel (6.12): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 6.12.76
- Vanadium: update to version 146.0.7680.153.0
- adevtool: add support for keeping only certain unpacked images to help with constrained storage
- switch to cross-device gmscompat_lib key for 10th gen Pixels
- Auditor: update to version 91
All of the Android 16 security patches from the current April 2026, May 2026, June 2026, July 2026 and August 2026 Android Security Bulletins are included in the 2026032001 security preview release.
List of additional fixed CVEs:
Critical: CVE-2026-0039, CVE-2026-0040, CVE-2026-0041, CVE-2026-0042, CVE-2026-0043, CVE-2026-0044, CVE-2026-0049, CVE-2026-0052, CVE-2026-0073, CVE-2026-0080
High: CVE-2025-22424, CVE-2025-22426, CVE-2025-48600, CVE-2025-48612, CVE-2026-0016, CVE-2026-0036, CVE-2026-0048, CVE-2026-0050, CVE-2026-0053, CVE-2026-0054, CVE-2026-0055, CVE-2026-0056, CVE-2026-0059, CVE-2026-0060, CVE-2026-0061, CVE-2026-0062, CVE-2026-0063, CVE-2026-0065, CVE-2026-0067, CVE-2026-0070, CVE-2026-0074, CVE-2026-0075, CVE-2026-0076, CVE-2026-0077, CVE-2026-0078, CVE-2026-0079
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026032000

2026-03-20 21:47:30 CET

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This is not LineageOS but MicroG's distribution of it. A confusing name.

2026-03-20 19:58:19 CET

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We're yet to see this implemented in AOSP. We won't be adding sideloading restrictions.

2026-03-20 13:26:16 CET

GrapheneOS will remain usable by anyone around the world without requiring personal information, identification or an account. GrapheneOS and our online services will remain available internationally. If GrapheneOS devices can't be sold in a region due to their regulations, so be it.

2026-03-07 18:24:39 CET

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McDonalds when they are requiring strict device integrity and OS enforcement they can be 100.00% sure that I like burgers
https://blossom.primal.net/784ae564927621a16743a487ef2fff4407b727e3680e824545691ecbed48abab.jpg

2026-03-07 18:21:52 CET

The official microG OS project (https://lineage.microg.org) leaked their private keys for logging into their servers and signing releases:
https://github.com/lineageos4microg/l4m-wiki/wiki/December-2025-security-issues
We make our official builds on local machines. Our signing machine's keys aren't ever on any storage unencrypted.
Our roadmap for improving security of verifying updates is based on taking advantage of the reproducible builds. We plan to have multiple official build locations and a configurable signoff verification system in the update clients also usable with third party signoff providers.
We don't have faith in any available commercial HSM products being more secure than keeping keys encrypted at rest on the primary local build machine. Instead, we're planning to develop software for using the secure element on #GrapheneOS phones as an HSM for signing our releases.

2026-03-07 03:19:35 CET

Proton on the news, again!? So let's bring it back!
#nevent1q…tkkc

2026-03-06 00:29:26 CET

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No future devices based on current ones looking at as targets appear to be that small. Closest is the Motorola Signature which is 6.8, assuming the next gen successor is the same size as the Signature. The razr ultra is a little slimmer but 7 inches, but folds.

2026-03-06 00:25:35 CET

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The device / OS pair is certified. It has some requirements that if the OEM follows them they are able to be certified. For example, Google services available, many as privileged components. While we have sandboxed Google Play that is still not sufficient. Some users don't have a play services implementation at all.
So while some OEMs make awfully changed Android releases, ours is left in the dirt there. We don't try for Google certifications.

2026-03-06 00:20:00 CET

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Imagine it is too late. Will be using the Qualcomm SOC secure element. OpenTitan also isn't built for Android (Titan M2 is based off of this), so there would have to be someone willing to manufacture secure elements and support the Android APIs, etc.
Regardless this article is seriously great news.

2026-03-05 09:40:53 CET

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I'm far from a bitcoiner... Strongly dislike maxi groupthink. That post is about funds being moved out of bitcoin and into monero. My following list is mostly devs or xmr. Not sure how praising an availability of a service to offload received funds into xmr is giving up ideals... unless the ideal was being bitcoin only or something? I think people can use what they want.
A ton of privacy features for on-chain bitcoin like Silent Payments are just under adopted (most are just users of one wallet that is on a smartphone) that recieving LN and ramping out into Monero is a much more likely outcome. You're likely to get an LN or XMR address to send/receive to a merchant than a SP address today. Hope it changes.
Nostr users are there because it is almost entirely centred around Lightning. The best clients for it are too. Monero oriented clients are often weird forks or too new to recommend anywhere for my taste. I'm pretty strict on keeping away from software that is new or experimental.
I do want to see improvements on more wallets adopting SPs (big fan of Sparrow) and Nostr clients outside of bitcoinery though

2026-03-05 09:08:26 CET

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Obviously they'd avoid using a different currency to transact as much as possible.

2026-03-05 09:05:06 CET

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This comment, but I'm mostly talking about recieving funds online. A monero user wouldn't store any funds in Lightning, they simply swap what they recieve into Monero or swap out to make a transaction immediately.
If I had problems with swap services or Spark knowing too much I'd roll funds out to other wallets. This is including both the LN or XMR side. For a long time I off-ramped zaps into other LN wallets or swapped them already.

2026-03-04 22:30:26 CET

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It gets people to gateway into Monero far easier. A lot of concepts people are familiar with in cryptocurrency spaces do not exist or matter in Monero either due to a different climate or technical differences.
You definitely have to be a more technically inclined and aware person to use XMR (this can also be considered a merit) so I think having swaps to/from assets with greater mini economies greatly decreases the entry barrier.

2026-03-04 22:26:41 CET

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XMR can be difficult to receive for new users. Having a lightning address to receive funds that can be swapped is significant. Lightning is very popular amongst smaller purchases and online stores. I buy a fair amount of living resources using ZEUS.
I mention Nostr specifically since Nostr is almost entirely oriented around Lightning. Nostr clients oriented around other assets are often lesser maintained and more risky. These clients are a security haunted houses to begin with. Better to have some sort of LN address to receive and then swap for people into that imo.

2026-03-04 22:19:41 CET

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Yes. Swapping opening up access to a lot of vendors in both teams to make private purchases with one another.
Especially helpful at this current moment since on-chain BTC privacy features like Silent Payments are seldom adopted except for Cake Wallet and partially in Sparrow Wallet. SP to XMR swap far less likely to be than XMR/LNBTC as of right now.

2026-03-04 21:36:08 CET

Lightning support in Cake Wallet should be huge for XMR nostr users
https://blossom.primal.net/d93fa65cb5fc9f0ed35c9a1371fd3be9273c7693b1912e76072ee6296eaab767.jpg

2026-03-04 21:25:20 CET

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...you can argue that Windows was already full of sketchy bloatware without the OEMs bundling bullshit too. it's really sad to see what has been going on with Windows in recent times.

2026-03-04 21:22:14 CET

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If you mean modified as in installed another OS, barely any in this case. They're all non-Google certified operating systems so Play Integrity hardware attestation can force apps not to work on LineageOS, CalyxOS etc.

2026-03-04 21:20:52 CET

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Thanks!

2026-03-04 21:20:24 CET

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There's nothing to mitigate in the first place. It has nothing to do with GrapheneOS or smartphones. Every Windows laptop vendor has bundled sketchy bloatware in the past and many still do in the present. Security research targets are encouraged, feel free to find something, anything, in these devices that you think are off. Use a non-Motorola device if you want to choose based on pure vibes or you don't like them for any other reason. If you're an OEM, contact us and work with us.
If you really have to get to the details then Superfish is not installed by the firmware but was bundled operating system software and was trivially discovered. Obviously, there's no such thing that will happen here or GrapheneOS, it would be caught by our (very) vigilant users and I know I put the rep on the line saying that.
>now these assholes control the bootloader, the baseband
The bootloader is a standard littlekernel-based Android bootloader. The baseband is Qualcomm's, part of their SoC. Our device requirements on the site state explicitly radios must be isolated and that sensitive data cannot be accessed at the bootloader (working verified boot, zeroing memory left over from the OS, etc.), we are very conscious about that and received bounties for discovering and patching security deficiencies in bootloaders targeting Pixels that were exploited in the wild.
We'll be having involvement in the driver and firmware side of things. Working to improve their security posture and harden their stock OS and firmware is part of the partnership.

2026-03-03 21:56:10 CET

New update of #GrapheneOS with this month's full security patch level. With the security preview release, all of the Android 16 security patches from the current March 2026, April 2026, May 2026, June 2026, July 2026 and August 2026 Android Security Bulletins are here too.
#nevent1q…jy3v

2026-03-03 21:47:51 CET

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What we need more than funding is development resources really. It would be nice to make major improvements to GrapheneOS before devices come out, especially the usability front so we have an even better experience for the tons of new users who would arrive. Motorola could try help us with this (GrapheneOS obviously will remain free and open source).
We are hiring a few new devs for this too.

2026-03-03 08:42:05 CET

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This is what we will be working towards, yes. If we can get devices to come with GrapheneOS that's a plus.

2026-03-03 07:43:01 CET

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The upcoming devices' Qualcomm processors have secure elements. They work fine to meet our functionality requirements. Not like Titan M2 in Pixels but still better than most.

2026-03-03 07:40:42 CET

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As a non-profit we do not take funding with strings attached.
We advise Motorola on what they need for their next devices and in return we can get a device supporting GrapheneOS. We'll be working to also provide lower level hardening for them. They'll also work to introduce some features to their stock OS. We are using partnership to get help with their partner access to see sources to better prepare ourselves for porting to major versions.
We will be working on GrapheneOS for Motorola and it will be the exact same as Pixels in that regard, we distribute updates, etc.
The other contents of the announcements are other, unrelated topics.

2026-03-03 05:52:00 CET

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You will have devices to install GrapheneOS onto, hopefully we can have a device able to come with GrapheneOS as well. The former is much more important.

2026-03-03 05:50:56 CET

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You will have devices to install GrapheneOS onto. Hopefully we can have a device able to come with GrapheneOS as well. The former is much more important.

2026-03-02 23:48:32 CET

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Devices will be worked for 2027. Motorola and us will announce further progressions with the partnership in the future.

2026-03-02 23:40:39 CET

With Motorola, there will be at least one officially supported flagship device to run GrapheneOS around 2027, but once we have one we should be able to add the other flagship variants too and we will work to broaden our device support where possible.
If you want examples of Motorola devices that have been close to meeting GrapheneOS requirements so far, then the latest Motorola Signature, Motorola razr fold and razr ultra are some. You can expect possible successors to these devices to have support.
Through this partnership we also hope to see some security improvements provided in #GrapheneOS implemented into the Motorola stock operating system. We want OEMs to improve their security practices across the board.
GrapheneOS for Motorola devices, like on Pixels, will be developed by us, with updates distributed by us. You will not be missing any features either.
#nevent1q…wxlv

2026-03-02 20:46:33 CET

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We are absolutely open to more OEM partners providing they can produce the devices we need. They'd need to be very committed to helping us as we will have our time occupied working with Motorola as well.

2026-03-02 19:02:06 CET

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The Signature is their leading flagship device outside of their foldables. We were held back from supporting this device because Qualcomm didn't have production memory tagging security features yet. With the next generation processors we have been told they absolutely will.
This could hopefully open up support for more devices down the line too with Qualcomm adopting everything we need now.

2026-03-02 18:57:16 CET

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Unfortunately GrapheneOS will not be a Google certified operating system. We are still continuing taking actions to try and stop these anticompetitive practices from Google. We also hope additional partnerships with major brands can create pressure to support GrapheneOS.
We hope to work with Motorola to provide some GrapheneOS features to their stock operating system too.

2026-03-02 18:52:29 CET

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We aim to have officially supported devices by 2027.

2026-03-02 18:50:32 CET

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Thank you!

2026-03-02 16:33:46 CET

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Signature is about 3.3XMR on retail right now but everyone knows prices fluctuate and offers come around. Also that device itself is still pretty new with a 7 year update commitment.

2026-03-02 16:33:07 CET

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It will initially be Motorola's flagship devices but could trickle down to other devices in the future. If you want an idea of their flagships look at the Motorola Signature (2026) and Motorola Razr Fold (2026) for the current generation ones not quite meeting our requirements yet. It will be upcoming devices similar to these.

2026-03-02 16:16:32 CET

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Completely unrelated but I see it discussed, it was Gold Apollo who were actually the manufacturers of the pagers that exploded in the pager attack. This isn't to shift blame to them since an extremely resourceful and capable agency like Mossad are obviously able to purchase a product in bulk, tamper bombs into them and redistribute without the original manufacturer's awareness. It could really have been any brand, any model.

2026-03-02 16:09:25 CET

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Because they are talking about pagers, I am assuming this is about Motorola Solutions (the US telecoms and security company) which is an entirely separate company with different owners.
We're working with the subsidiary of Lenovo called Motorola Mobility. Motorola Solutions has no involvement or connection to us or our partnership. They have a shared heritage and name since both were created out of the original Motorola company which were split apart over a decade ago. Think of it like an HMD/Nokia situation where another company is using a famous historic phone brand.
We have not contacted anyone at Motorola Solutions. They don't produce smart phones so I don't think there would be much to discuss anyways.

2026-03-02 13:37:31 CET

An important announcement from us at the #GrapheneOS project:
#nevent1q…lea5

2026-03-02 12:58:45 CET

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Yes it is true.
Motorola split apart over a decade ago so there are two major companies with similar branding now. We are working with the Lenovo company who has the historic smartphone brand. It shouldn't be confused with Motorola Solutions, the security and communications equipment manufacturer.

2026-03-02 06:13:20 CET

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As announced it will be their next-generation smartphone.

2026-03-02 06:03:29 CET

We are happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. Together, we will collaborate on new future devices that meet our stringent privacy and security standards.
https://motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-2026/
#GrapheneOS

2026-02-27 19:36:23 CET

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Like WiFi calling, you can also send and receive texts over WiFi if your network provider supports it. This is expected behaviour.
Airplane Mode disables the cellular radio and works as it should, mobile network features outside of the cell network is a separate thing.

2026-02-21 16:07:18 CET

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They will be announcing it, not us ☝️

2026-02-21 12:11:01 CET

This March we hope to officially announce our OEM partner whose future devices shall work to support GrapheneOS.

2026-02-14 06:42:28 CET

Our latest #GrapheneOS release adds a sandboxed Google Play toggle for extending RCS compatibility in Google Messages to the rest of the carriers supporting it by granting ICC authentication access to sandboxed Play services. T-Mobile is the main one requiring it.
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026021200

2026-02-07 10:09:33 CET

This update implements cross-SIM calling support (making calls using a SIM via the mobile data provided by another SIM similarly to Wi-Fi calling) and the security preview variant applies security patches previewed for upstream Android in August of 2026!
#nevent1q…fgu8

2026-02-04 20:43:58 CET

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>What are you currently identifying as Graphene's weak spots?
From a security standpoint, the Linux kernel is a liability. Most patches are upstream Linux kernel security bugs. It's a large attack surface. Android distributions also don't patch the kernel completely unlike us where we push the latest GKI per update. Our Linux hardening work can be made redundant if it was replaced with a something more designed for security like a microkernel.
From a user experience, the default apps aren't great with exception to our own apps like Vanadium, Camera etc. These are AOSP apps. New apps made in Kotlin with the modern Material 3 Expressive UIs are needed. Would also need the same licensing as AOSP does.
>What about the underlying reliance on proprietary hardware?
Always will be a thing for any device you are using. You can't guarantee designs match the product nor are you TSMC making your own processors with billion dollar manufacturing plants. Even the "free" "open" devices the FSF like to promote aren't truly open, they just have entirely proprietary hardware with embedded firmware so they do not allow the user to update in the OS. Linux-Libre blocked alerts for CPU vulns like Meltdown and Spectre (can be exploited remotely) and the distros don't usually deliver microcode to patch that either.
>How do you perceive the future and how can we contribute to funding it?
We are still continuing the partnership with our OEM. We hope to have devices by the next year as their 2026 Qualcomm devices missed deploying ARMv9 security features (iirc, would need to check with another team member). The OEM should make a formal announcement in the not so late future.
A lot of usability and accessibility improvements are on the way, and it would be nice to have better default apps in time for more supported devices in 2027. We are trying to hire devs and want to expand.
Funding wise we still rely on donations, but fortunately we get regular donations and are well resourced. People and talent is important.

2026-02-04 20:19:57 CET

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>Have you looked into the blocking of app trackers?
We choose to leave people into using a VPN that blocks these or a DNS app like RethinkDNS which actually allows adding a VPN to it.
DNS filtering makes users stand out from other users with the same VPN (or no VPN) unless it's provided as a standard VPN feature which most users have activated. It's why we recommend using VPN provider DNS filtering.
Most data collection is also connected through the same domains as the actual service, so you can't actually block them. If a service did not, they could easily choose to. We believe it would be bad to give users a false sense of privacy in that way when features like Storage Scopes actually do that. If you go to Exodus' page for Facebook Lite they would say it had 0 trackers, but you still wouldn't use Facebook.

2026-02-04 20:04:03 CET

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BTW Vanadium now uses a JIT interpreter so WASM works without JIT now. Briefly checking your app it appears to work with JIT disabled for me.

2026-02-01 16:57:41 CET

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Not my npub anymore! But see the Project Account mastodon bridge reply.

2026-02-01 15:43:43 CET

[email protected]
#nevent1q…gw72

2026-02-01 15:06:19 CET

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If you were curious, I have been using Minibits ecash for recieving and then offramping to Phoenix Wallet. Phoenix provides an incredibly quick and easy set up. Just works. Hoping to combine both with using ZEUS.