<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1yy3uc7y85faxy5cwq8f574yda3j9457p7r9h2ymlkwlx6lp8f4vsy4kawc

Profile Code

nprofile1qqszzg7v0zr6y7nz2v8qr5602jx7cez660qlpjm4zdlm80nd0sn56kgpz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduqs6amnwvaz7tmwdaejumr0ds702nwj

Publishing to

relay.damus.io

nos.lol

Last Notes

2026-03-10 00:16:00 UTC

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Thanks for that. I had no idea.

2026-03-09 06:31:35 UTC

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Yes but not often. Wife isn’t a fan of any drive that is longer than an hour. A ton of amazing places three/four hours outside of Shanghai. Road system quality is roughly on par with the States without all the construction.

2026-03-09 06:29:24 UTC

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Stations are everywhere. Just yesterday wife and I drove out Nio, parked in a garage, went and had some noodles and came back and hour later. Fully charged. And here’s the kicker …. Total cost was Rmb41 or roughly $6

2026-03-09 06:27:21 UTC

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Shanghai China.

2026-03-09 06:26:59 UTC

Primal isn’t showing Notes that I’m posting in my own feed?? Odd
Damus is now the option of choice I guess.

2026-03-09 06:25:21 UTC

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Yes this is accurate to a point. I’d say roughly half the cars on the road today, periods more, are EVs.

2026-03-09 06:24:16 UTC

Something going wonky with my Nostr.

2026-03-09 06:22:27 UTC

China Morning Missive
Wuwei (无为) and the Cultural Chasm
Over the past several days I’ve been overwhelmed with client emails asking whether American activities in the Gulf are indirectly targeting China. It appears that the zeitgeist, including many Washington policy makers, is operating under the impression that China has been irreparably harmed and the Beijing leadership is at a loss for how to respond. My responses to those emails are short and to the point. “Ignore the noise. We’ve seen similar instances in the past (last year’s tariff episode?). Operate under the principal that China has prepared for this eventuality.”
It continues to escape the rationale mind of many that China operates at the lowest possible time preference. I make this point often and do so because it represents the singular first principal to be applied whenever any assessment of China is being made. Not only is the application critical to understand how Beijing goes about structuring policies, both domestic and foreign, it is central to the very process of decision making itself. More specifically, the importance lies in a recognition that, for Beijing, action is far more often found in demonstrable restraint.
There are genuine cultural anomalies present. They need to be considered and yet are always absent. Honestly, you’d think this would have been recognized by now given thirty years of observable Chinese behavior. It hasn’t. There isn’t just a cultural gap in America’s expert class when it comes to the topic of China, there is a cultural chasm.
Be it the Taoist concept of Wuwei or the teachings of Lao Tzu, Chinese society is grounded in a willingness to take the path of forbearance. An outward projection of stillness. Consider the character for patience, Ren (忍). It is comprised of two characters, blade (刃) and heart (心). What this means to the Chinese is that patience is a concept that requires a willingness to endure adversity.
Be mindful though. Non-action shouldn’t always be taken literally. It is a highly layered construct and quite malleable. Yes, the Chinese default setting is a static state, but every single event is viewed through its own unique lens. If there were to be an extreme event, then the Beijing leadership would most certainly resort to an immediate response. To the Chinese, however, there is rarely ever an occurrence that is truly extreme (ie unexpected) in nature.
Restraint is the consequence of ongoing preparedness present across China. At all levels of society, anxiety is born from uncertainty and the greater the uncertainty the greater the anxiety. And to counter uncertainty means a greater effort to prepare. Again, we only need to look back to last year. Contrary to all American expectations, the Chinese successfully countered the Trump administration’s escalatory tariff regime. This was achieved through advanced preparation. It was a widely held view in China that tariffs would be deployed and parties across the country simply planned well in advance for that eventuality. Exports were frontloaded and cash hoards were amassed. This provided time and flexibility to negotiate and do so from a position of relative strength.
So too is it the case with events now playing out in the Middle East. Beijing has well understood, and for decades, America’s motivations and objectives across the Gulf and preparations have been underway for quite some time. Beijing made overtures to create a separate series of regional relationships and did so with success. At the same time, there were various steps taken to mitigate all identified risks from future conflict. There was the aggressive campaign to build three significant rail lines (and pipelines) traversing the entirety of the Heartland. Alternative sources of energy (ex-Gulf partners) were established, from Russia to Indonesia to Africa. Even the domestic agenda of shifting to renewables and EVs can now be seen as having a geopolitical angle. China isn’t at a loss. China is, once again, very well placed.
If there is to be a focus, it needs to be on a fundamental realignment in how the American foreign policy and business community goes about assessing China. This must begin by taking China seriously and literally. Stop miscalculating China’s capabilities. Secretary Bessent famously claimed last year that China was negotiating “with a pair of twos”. He was wrong. Today, Secretary Wright is stating that “China is about to lose the second of three gas station suppliers”. Again, the Secretary will come to learn that he, too, is wrong. The script must be flipped and, moving forward, it is highly advisable that the expectation shift towards China gaining from hegemonic actions taken by America.

2026-03-09 06:08:55 UTC

2026-03-09 02:18:14 UTC

Once again, it is just another Monday morning here in Shanghai. Everyone just going about their day.

2026-03-09 02:11:16 UTC

2026-03-08 03:02:29 UTC

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Always. Or at least I aim to provide a thoughtful response and doing so with as little emotive layering as possible.

2026-03-07 12:26:28 UTC

Everyone who is saying “this war is really about China” hasn’t a single idea of just how prepared Beijing became for this eventuality.
Not a single lesson was learned from last years trade war. Bessent and pretty much every geopolitical cosplayer said China had no leverage. “China was playing with a pair of twos”.
They were wrong. They are wrong this time as well. China has seen this coming for decades.

2026-03-05 06:13:18 UTC

Here is a perfect example of why you need to tread carefully anytime there’s a flurry of commentary discussing China.
Be it Beijing’s motivations, or the supposed fact that – somehow – action taken by the United States in the Middle East has provided for escalatory leverage. It may sound like a cliche, but you must know that the Chinese are playing multiple steps ahead of Washington.
Perhaps some unsolicited advice. The next time you stumble across an individual weighing in on the China debate, simply ask that individual when was the last time they were in country. It’s all noise when it comes to the arm chair macro tourists and armchair geopolitical theorists.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/china-tells-top-refiners-to-suspend-diesel-and-gasoline-exports

2026-03-04 11:57:37 UTC

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And don’t forget, the entire war is really about containing China!!!

2026-03-04 06:23:14 UTC

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This is a really good one. Not often used here locally but still …. Excellent.

2026-03-04 06:15:13 UTC

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Ok, so had a watch. My feedback is that those holding hard line claims over what China will or won’t do tend to have at least a bias if not an outright agenda. Brian’s commentary is just too declarative. “China can’t do this….” Or “China is different from America …..”
There’s, of course, certain truth underlying the various commentary. Make no mistake though, China and the United States are rivals and are both are seeking to undermine the other. I just find that how it is China goes about that process is smoother. America’s approach is brash and hegemonic.
My own baseline is as follows. China understands how it is that America acts on the global stage, learned the lessons over 30 years and is applying that learning to its distinct advantage.
The Americans, to this very day, still do not truly understand how China operates, what motivates China or how decision making is conducted in a way that can successfully suppress American power.
My overall aim is to address that latter point. To educate, wherever possible, my fellow compatriots. For now, there just hasn't been an audience willing to listen with a genuinely open mind. I just keep tilting at the windmills.

2026-03-04 05:10:32 UTC

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Being a “g” is good yes? No?

2026-03-04 04:36:08 UTC

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Excellent. I'll have a watch and revert if there's anything else I can add to this ongoing situation vis a vis China's involvement.

2026-03-04 04:17:57 UTC

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Never heard of this person. I'll have to check him out.
To your question though, I'm fairly certain that China is providing support to Iran in some capacity, but will be doing so with complete plausible deniability. That's just how China seeks to operate. I would also agree that the Beijing leadership will be doing so without risking overextending itself.
Is there a specific piece of content from Brian Berletic that you can share?

2026-03-04 03:16:55 UTC

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Correct. That classic Napoleon aphorism.

2026-03-04 02:03:33 UTC

It is hard to fathom that non-action by the Beijing leadership is somehow being viewed as a net geopolitical gain for the United States.
The cultural divide is truly a chasm.
https://blossom.primal.net/b72f6670c9dcd85c5e89ac5301d12c3d2de27d412efa1a07b1aef40eb25a8223.jpg

2026-03-03 07:23:52 UTC

On the off chance some of you missed it, Chancellor Merz lost it after his trip to China last week.
https://blossom.primal.net/b1f63093048fc584430257fc2600f7c3b6f17002ac8737233c7819c94efc55df.mp4

2026-03-03 07:21:23 UTC

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Don't get me started. A long while back I made the mistake of extending my experience to people operating in the Beltway that were traveling to China. This is before the days of Covid. Even at that time it became quite clear that any messaging beyond "China is the new evil empire" would not get an audience.
There is actually a Select Committee on China in Congress which is, technically, meant to bring in experts to explain all things China to these legislative decision makers. What the entire Committee has descended into is a venue for anti-China "experts" to extoll everything the Committee has already concluded. It's a farce.
The entirety of my engagement today is rather straight forward. I'm a red blooded American who just so happens to have lived in China for 30 years. I can see well beyond the horizon and, with that, what is coming. The EV industry is gone. So is the humanoid robotics space and, I would argue, is LLM ecosystem. I will just continue to hammer these points home until the message is finally received, if ever.
Consider the past 48 hours and the sheer number of not only newly minted Iranian experts, but somehow an entire new graduating class of China experts as well. I do my best to keep a lid on my reactions to it all, and I thank yoga for that, but my patience is rapidly running out.
Rant over! And my thanks for the question.

2026-03-03 03:05:52 UTC

China Morning Missive
“A Single Flower does not Make a Spring”
There seems to be a rather weak theory going around that America has deployed some grand plan to systematically cut China off from key strategic partners. While there are certainly more than a few dots which can be connected to reach such a conclusion, it remains an errant conclusion and, if anything, only goes to demonstrate just how poorly China’s 30 years of foreign policy strategies are understood throughout the Beltway.
To begin, the theory being promulgated is an act of pure projection. How American policy has been conducted over the past 30 years must, obviously, be the very same course of action under consideration by the leadership in Beijing. Not even close and it is rather obvious, at least to me, that few have read BGen Samuel Griffith’s book on Sun Tzu.
To the Americans, the world is built upon alliances and a Judeo-Christian ethos that delineates between good actors and bad actors. It is all a very black and white mindset and extremely rigid. It is also an approach which is highly antithetical to how Beijing operates. What continues to evade much of Washington, the Beltway consensus and the entire Thing Tank Senior Fellow ecosystem is a foreign policy construct which has been built around a web of counterparties, not formal alliances. Counterparties which are centered on commercial interests and, critically, are meant to achieve the specific strategic aim of optionality through the redundancies of critical inputs.
In the case of the Middle East, even the most tertiary assessment will find that China isn’t even close to being hemmed in strategically by a single relationship. In fact, and as a quick aside, the entire “Axis of Autocracies” is incongruent not only with China’s actual ambitions but also in terms of how Beijing has pursued foreign policy. The taxonomy applied is, well, just another reflection of an America hardwired to a 20th Century mindset. For the sake of argument though, if it is true that the underlying aim of the Trump administration is to leverage actions in one theater to destabilize China in the East Asia theater all that will be achieved is the equivalent of pushing on a string.
The glaring omission of this theory is any consideration of China’s current expansive set of relationships across the Gulf region both in terms of scope and scale.
Here are but a few examples. To start, there’s Qatar which is reported to be the second largest supplier of LNG (3million tons/year) to China. There’s Kuwait which was the first country in the region to sign on, formally, to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2014. Even Iraq. Here the two countries have a deep commercial relationship, including a 20-year “oil-for-construction” agreement. China imports as much oil from Iraq as it does from Russia. Finally, there’s Saudi Arabia, by far the single most significant relationship China has built in the region and a partnership that is far broader and deeper than that of any other Gulf nation.
Here is the critical point to be made; what is highlighted above is a foreign policy that has been executed upon globally from Eastern Europe to South East Asia and all points between. Be it the Port of Piraeus in Greece or the linkage to the Belgrade-Budapest rail line. The massive energy investments in Indonesia or, not to be forgotten, the 950km newly operational rail line in Algeria. China has built redundancies across the globe and isn’t anywhere near at risk if it were to lose a single bilateral relationship.
Ah, but what of China’s ability to protect those interests? The Beltway commentariat is also stressing that Beijing doesn’t have the necessary hard power (military assets) to fortify any of those relationships. This is most certainly true, but only to a point. The real question to be asked is how far can America extend its reach in seeking to counter/contain China? For me, the answer is found in history and with the British Empire. For all the galivanting around the globe during the latter half of the 19th Century, all the Gunboat diplomacy, it ultimately became impossible for the Empire to be in all places at all times. The same would hold for America today albeit with a key difference. China isn’t just a geopolitical rival; it is a deep pocketed rival and one which has built bilateral relationships that are commercial centric. It is also a position built over the course of three decades. There’s a degree of entrenchment that has yet to be properly appreciated in Washington.
God speed!
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/china-playing-long-game-over-iran

2026-03-03 02:48:08 UTC

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“keep your head on a swivel” is one of the greatest expressions out there. Thx.

2026-03-02 08:56:57 UTC

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Ahhh so you’re one of those people. Amazes me how convenient it’s become to jet across the border. I’m so old I remember when Futian was nothing more than a textile factories.

2026-03-02 08:52:59 UTC

China’s market closed higher on the day.
https://blossom.primal.net/ec43c975dc2ec1fd47006aa8fc83709000263a4a938e8d66420f4cb524d1345b.jpg

2026-03-02 08:00:30 UTC

Feel the need to share the following.
"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."
This is a quote from Napoleon Bonaparte and NOT Sun Tzu.

2026-03-02 00:53:53 UTC

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Hahaha. Good call. Have a lady just outside the office that makes Jian Bing.
https://blossom.primal.net/63f51d0cabce33c19d43e727042066e7511b30739f5b8c939200d65b02a0a33f.mov

2026-03-02 00:36:37 UTC

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Correct and why it is that Beijing simply wants to maintain the status quo. Low time preference thinking is how the system operates here along with a confidence in the direction of travel.
All of the commentary centered on China making a move on Taiwan comes from Washington DC and the various think tank "Senior Fellows" all of whom are conflicted in the opinions on the topics. The headlines of "China to move on Taiwan by 2027" is meant - in my opinion - to goad Beijing into said action. It won't happen.

2026-03-02 00:23:57 UTC

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I'd have to respectfully disagree. A distracted America doesn't factor in very high when it comes to the final decision.
Beijing's objective is to keep the status quo contrary to whatever it is the commentariat would lay out in terms of a rationale. Much as I shared just a few days ago, winning the peace is a prerequisite before any decision is made to take action and Beijing knows that this isn't possible at this juncture.

2026-03-02 00:10:22 UTC

Well, it is just another Monday morning here in Shanghai.

2026-03-01 08:08:07 UTC

Strongly advise reading this book. The only edition you should read. This specific book. Fantastic examples provided throughout.
And I can say it has allowed me to properly assess much of the thinking out of Beijing when it comes to world affairs. Moreover, it has provided insight into how it is Beijing has operated over the past 30 years.
https://blossom.primal.net/7c80ffe3ee1aef068877604a35361cd10252fd2a065edb29f740cd9c22676e18.jpg

2026-02-27 06:29:55 UTC

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What you’ve described just isn’t how China would go about the process unless provoked. While it may seem quaint, Chinese thinking on such matters does remain very closely aligned with Sun Tzu’s hierarchy of attack.
1. Attack the enemy’s strategy
2. Attack the enemy’s alliances
3. Attack the enemy’s army
4. Attack the enemy’s cities
These are in order and Sun Tzu describes the final step as being “the least desirable and most costly”.
At the same time, Beijing would be adding to is overall calculus its current relative position geopolitically speaking. Agree or disagree, Beijing views both European states and America as declining powers. There is simply more to be gained by remining patient and doing nothing.
I do, however, very much appreciate your comment and raising a different perspective. If nothing else, we can just appreciate having differing opinions which is totally fine.

2026-02-27 01:31:19 UTC

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This is actually an issue I've been following for quite some time. The answer, at least as I see it, centers on China seeking the rapid commodification of LLMs and this is best achieved through open source and rabid, iterative competition.
I've joked that Steve Case wants his AOL business model back when discussing American closed source models. Siloed and all seeking profit maximization. I've argued that with China going the open source route would be an existential threat to the American groups. so long as the Chinese models were able to perform. Well, they have performed and well beyond what anyone had expected.
Today, it is all eyes on Hangzhou and Deepseek and the second and third order effects that will inevitably playout. Best recent example was Deepseek refusing to provide Nvida and AMD access to its upcoming model.
Hope this helps and I'll be sure to provide more insight on the entire net-gen competitive battlefield.

2026-02-27 00:54:41 UTC

China Morning Missive
The Taiwan Issue
Back behind the desk after a much needed Chinese New Year break. My goal for this Year of the Horse is to get to those of you interested more updates and insights into what is actually transpiring here on the ground in Shanghai. And you can help with this endeavor. If there are topics where you’d like my perspective, just let me know.
For today, the topic is Taiwan and is being raised due to a recent NYT article which highlighted the “impending” military move by Beijing on Taiwan in 2027. The construct of the story centered on messages conveyed to American tech firms that rely heavily, if not exclusively, on chips made in Taiwan. A summary of that article is linked below.
Allow me to stress that the probability of China moving on Taiwan next year is zero. Zero. That is both a strong opinion and one that is strongly held. The reason for such confidence comes from an actual understanding of Chinese history and experience with how it is that decisions such as these are made in Beijing.
There is a basic premise which needs to be taken into account. If the peace cannot be won, then instigating war is to be avoided. It is all very Sun Tzu. Allow me to provide some historical context, specifically the two examples of when China, itself, was invaded and defeated. There were the Mongols in the early 1200s and then the Manchus in the mid 1600s. Why these data points matter when assessing the Taiwan issue is that, and in both instances, the end result had the ethnic Han Chinese fully assimilating the invaders over time. The Mongols ruled as the Yuan Dynasty for one thousand years and the Manchus ruled as the Qing Dynasty for 200+ years.
For China, to conquer means to assimilate. Allow me to provide a more recent example, Hong Kong in 2019. Begin with an understanding that at the formal handover in 1997, Hong Kong was basically as an extremely British enclave. Once Beijing reassumed control, however, the borders were opened and over the next 20 years Mainland Chinese entered the city to live and work and became the dominate ethnic group. Hong Kong became just another Chinese city. It was fully assimilated and with it made the move by Beijing to assume full control relatively easy.
None of these dynamics are at play when it comes to Taiwan. Most importantly, these dynamics are known by the Beijing leadership. If a move were made, and even if that move were successful, there would be no way that stability after-the-fact could be achieved.
The objective is to maintain the status quo, and I am expecting an agreement along these lines to be reached in the next year or two. A formula that is supposedly being discussed would have the current status quo hold for the next 50 years. That means Taiwan would not unilaterally declare its independence and Beijing would commit to no military intervention. The two sides would codify this relationship in some sort of formal declaration, and the two sides would go back to doing what they do best. Commercially engage and make money.
So what is with all the fear mongering out of Washington? Well, I’ll get to that tomorrow.
https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/us-govt-warned-nvidia-ceo-jensen-huang-tim-cook-and-lisa-su-that-china-could-invade-taiwan-by-2027-apple-ceo-reportedly-said-he-sleeps-with-one-eye-open

2026-02-25 14:24:59 UTC

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Cheers!!! I do love the energy of this place.
An honest platform where people can hash things out and (mostly) not take it personal.

2026-02-25 11:09:25 UTC

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@npub1sjc…jx9d

2026-02-25 10:59:38 UTC

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Back to providing an installment of my recent “Deconstructing Rivalry” Essay. Many of you will find today’s update of particular, even very specific, interest. It centers on diplomatic subterfuge via the IMF along with America’s original decision to debase its currency.
In short, there is an important event that is too often overlooked when it comes to China’s motivations to build a parallel set of global systems, the nearly two-decade long process to reform IMF voting rights. It was, however, the policy response by Washington to the Global Financial Crisis, putting at risk China’s significant exposure to US Treasuries and GSEs, that demonstrated the length at which America would go to safeguard its unipolar primacy. Power, whenever required, would be wielded (weaponized) using the dominance of the US$ system.
It would be the combination of these actions that would, ultimately, lead to the formal establishment of the BRICS block.
#naddr1qq…c4ym
#naddr1qq…c4ym

2026-02-25 09:14:25 UTC

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Happy New Year my friend. 火马!

2026-02-25 04:44:20 UTC

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Been meaning to reply to your note above, but have been running all over during Chinese New Year.
I totally get it, the Gell-Mann reaction to what I wrote. Too quick with my commentary and did not, whatsoever, mean OpenClaw was an AI model or LLM. What I was aiming to convey was the point that open source systems, agents in this instance, are being commodified by the Chinese with PIcoClaw used as the example.
Really to appreciate you making the point though and do so any time you think I'm completely out of my wheel house on a given subject.

2026-02-25 04:38:40 UTC

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I completely agree, although it does seem that Reads don't get the same level of engagement as Notes. Still, I am glad that there is the long form option even if I do struggle when it comes to uploading content.

2026-02-23 04:57:05 UTC

Ok. It is now official.
I’ve lived in China for 30 years. Where did all that time go? Been a wild ride for sure and wouldn’t change a single thing about this journey.
https://blossom.primal.net/91d8654a89f82c13689b3858ae1b38cac73dfb3762eb541facf6f2b598362b5f.jpg

2026-02-22 11:56:37 UTC

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Last I looked, not very much.

2026-02-16 08:37:33 UTC

And if there wasn’t enough going on in the entire AI space, we just had Qwen 3.5 officially dropped.
China - be it good or bad - is the accelerant here. If US markets are on shaky ground over the effects from a small number of siloed closed source players in Silicon Valley, just wait until PicoClaw, Seedance and, now, Qwen permeates the business media.
https://blossom.primal.net/44645ce8e409d70896817bc09843ad9f7180a46149ad9a677c2889a7fac1e145.jpg

2026-02-16 04:45:36 UTC

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Oh yeah!! Lunar New Year eve is a truly special day. So much food is being prepared at the moment.
Have a great time @nprofile…945w
https://blossom.primal.net/bdfef2df4fbfd13645ed8a083ce802b4619186c0cfc2b4b4b4d1c1c0c900bbd7.mov

2026-02-16 04:07:17 UTC

It would be hysterical to know how much Sam Altman paid this individual for what is, honestly, an already borderline obsolete AI model.
I can’t even think of the rationale for making this move.
OpenClaw creator Peter Steinberger joining OpenAI, Altman Says https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/15/openclaw-creator-peter-steinberger-joining-openai-altman-says.html?__source=iosappshare%7Ccom.apple.UIKit.activity.CopyToPasteboard

2026-02-16 03:19:38 UTC

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Suspect it doesn’t matter given that the Chinese have already moved ahead with PicoClaw. The speed of that going down had me literally laugh out loud.

2026-02-13 08:52:52 UTC

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So am still working out the bugs with the “long post” functionality here on Nostr. Ended up posting this installment of the “Deconstructing Rivalry” essay twice for some reason.
Anyway, for today we begin getting into the meat of the matter.
@nprofile…93la a bit later than I had hoped but here you go.
#naddr1qq…750m

2026-02-12 08:21:38 UTC

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Am just getting started @nprofile…qk8j Had to break down the entire essay into roughly 12 parts so there is a great deal more to follow. Solved for the “long post” issue so will send out one new installment over the next week or so.
Any questions you might have or feedback would be greatly appreciated.

2026-02-06 09:12:36 UTC

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Hey man. Have a great Chinese New Year.

2026-02-03 05:04:48 UTC

China Morning Missive
The essay!
All, as mentioned yesterday, spent the past month hammering out a doctorate-sized essay which details events from the past 30 years and how they - cumulatively - led to our current state of affairs.
The plan is to break the essay up into easier to digest installments the first of which you’ll find below. For those truly interested in how China successfully navigated a world run by a unipolar hegemon, you’ll enjoy and find value in what is presented.
Again, I welcome any comments, questions or areas of disagreement.
Am tagging @npub1qny…95gx and @npub1guh…6hjy just for fun.
#note1cxn…x9ql

2026-02-03 04:12:51 UTC

This is a test. Seem to be having issues with relays.

2026-01-24 16:12:49 UTC

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My issue remains though. Have long form content to share here but Nostr Reads still doesn’t have the adoption. I’m about to really test that theory though over the next two weeks.

2026-01-24 16:00:04 UTC

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Finally bailed on LinkedIn six months ago. Algo there had also become very suppressive. Glad I’m gone.

2026-01-24 15:32:26 UTC

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Oh, I avoid that place like the plague. Nostr has been home for coming up on two years. Or is it three??

2026-01-24 15:21:07 UTC

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Maybe. But I found too many people who are real people operating at a border line base layer.

2026-01-24 15:19:34 UTC

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I pray to God you are right.

2026-01-24 15:06:21 UTC

Fuck me. Just jumped on Twitter for the first time in two year. Had a look around…..
If that is a representation of America today, well, I’m calling it. GAME OVER.
Nothing but vitriol.
Zero empathy.
Zero introspection.

2026-01-16 01:14:00 UTC

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Socrates would agree …..

2026-01-14 15:13:13 UTC

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Oh. This person. Lei on China.
First to your question. I have no idea what the actual population figure is. There are just a ton of Chinese people that’s all I know.
I would question how she is taking into account the sheer number of Chinese from the Mainland who have emigrated over the past 70 years. It’s a lot and they are all over the world. In every single country.
But again, I have no idea.
What I do know is this. She has come out over the past couple of years with YT videos making some wild claims all of which have been completely wrong. She’s all about the algo. All about engagement farming. If it works for her, then awesome.

2026-01-14 14:06:22 UTC

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My good man. Cannot see what it is you are referencing to the question posed.

2026-01-14 13:17:05 UTC

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Basically, they can’t believe that a single unexpected expense could push someone over into destitution. China has an informal support system, the extended family. No matter how bad things might get it would never land into that bad of a place.

2026-01-14 13:04:35 UTC

For the past month the Chinese have been discussing, actually have been shocked by, the state of the American middle class.
They call it the “kill line”.
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DS3Z_lXEgiG/?igsh=MTU3OHJqd3JuN2hk

2026-01-14 10:04:03 UTC

Well, one thing is for certain. The American actions over Venezuela have resulted in a wide variety - and multitude - of publicly expressed opinions over China and Taiwan.
For whatever it’s worth, keep in mind that the truth is always found somewhere in the middle. Statements of the more definitive nature don’t tend to age well.

2026-01-14 01:08:17 UTC

China Morning Missive
IPOs as a Strategic Lever
Capital formation in China is back with a vengeance and is being strategically deployed for the expressed purpose of countering America’s technological dominance.
Over the past two months the pace of IPOs has been frenetic both in Hong Kong and on the upstart STAR Market here in Shanghai. While western business media has covered a handful of highly publicized chip makers going public, what has been missed is how Beijing is accelerating the use of the primary market to funnel capital towards key industries of geopolitical significance.
Before commenting on the strategic nature underlying the renewal of Chinese IPOs, it is well worth noting that the move wouldn’t have been possible had Chinese retail investors not turned decidedly “risk on”. There has been a palpable shift in sentiment over the past year, and while Chinese households do remain cautious over the near-term economic prospects there has been a recognition of a vast improvement directionally.
That said, the primary driver of retail investor demand is a genuine excitement over Chinese tech/AI companies demonstrating an ability to not just match their American rivals, but – in more than a few cases – out innovate. DeepSeek, it is now clear, wasn’t a “moment”, it was an insurgent declaration of intent and ability.
What resulted was a solid 2025 for equity returns and performance has continued to deliver so far this year. In fact, volumes of late have been at or near record highs. It does need to be mentioned, however, that Chinese investors are limited when it comes to available alternatives to allocate capital. With property still viewed as toxic and limited upside to fixed income then meant a shift back to equities was expected. At the same time, Chinese retail investors are the tail which wags the dog and they’ve a ton of idle capital sitting on the sidelines.
What all of this has meant is an opportunity for Beijing to strategically direct growing end investor demand. With all approvals to list tightly controlled by the CSRC, China’s securities regulator, the decision was made to prioritize those companies building capabilities and critical infrastructure that could best ameliorate the containment threat posed by America. The uniqueness of the policy, however, went even farther. The IPO process favors companies that are at an earlier stage of development, even loss-making and, additionally, approvals to list are also widespread with a far greater number of such companies greenlit to IPO and a stark departure from previous periods.
Take but a few examples from just last week; GPU maker Iluvatar CoreX and Edge Medical which manufactures surgical robotics. These companies raised $473million and $154million respectively and, currently, trade with market capitalization of around $6.0billioin and $3.0billion. Small in size by just about any measure, but forward leaning industrial players and, once again, only a small sample set of the multitude of the types of companies now going public.
The concept of “market cap” doesn’t even register as a priority KPI here in China and directing capital is an activity solely meant to optimally deliver on both market and political objectives. This isn’t a new concept, but the leveraging of IPOs is.
There will, ultimately, be a considerable destruction of capital as an outcome of this IPO policy, as was evident with the solar and EV industries. The policy, however, will also deliver an array of world leading companies as well, again as is evident with the solar and EV industries.
https://m.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/china-ai-chipmaking-stocks-extend-rally-as-ipo-boom-boosts-sentiment-4440684?ampMode=1

2026-01-12 01:20:16 UTC

China Morning Missive
Software is useless without the hardware to run it
As anecdotes go, this is perhaps one that should be duly noted. Moreover, I highly recommend for those interested in an assessment of the ongoing and ever intensifying competition between China and America over the future of technological advances to give this article a read.
Basically, what we have here is a reporter from PCMag who attended last week’s Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas. The highlighted summary quote from the article reads “It was hard to ignore the pull of what was emerging from Shenzhen.” The author then went on to detail a host of areas where it was increasingly clear that China wasn’t just matching the United States in terms of innovation but that it was increasingly hard to ignore the numerous areas where Chinese companies have unquestionably taken the lead.
Now, the author did have a rather specific focus, consumer solutions for energy storage and solar generation. The comments made on the advances in sodium-ion battery technology, versus today’s ubiquitous lithium standard, were of particular interest. The author did, however, look to extrapolate his specific area of interest farther afield.
What stood out, however, was the comparison of the vastly different nation-state policies, although not all that unexpected. Washington, under the Trump administration, was curtailing aggressively support to all categories within the vertically integrated complex of next-gen power solutions. Beijing, to quote the author, “was doubling down” as was supported by the datapoint of there being a cumulative 650 gigawatts of solar capacity installed nation-wide (I believe this to be an underreported datapoint though).
It isn’t that the comments here or those in the linked article represent some sort of tectonic shift in the present state of the geopolitical rivalry. At issue is the increasingly obvious direction of travel. Then there is the issue of competitive primacy.
Yes, there can be no question that America has a lead, I’d even say a material lead, in advanced chips. But chips are, essentially, just software and will have no commercial value without the requisite hardware. Beyond datacenters, the manufacturing of real-world hardware requires production capabilities, and this is where China dominates and does so at tremendous scale. There is no better example than the rapid global expansion of Chinese EVs. You should expect the very same with humanoid robotics over the next five years, if not sooner.
Bear in mind as well that China is entering the first year of its fifteenth five-year plan. This then means an even greater concentration of energies to further dominate the global hardware arena.
https://www.pcmag.com/opinions/china-energy-solar-power-innovations-ces-2026

2026-01-10 07:08:17 UTC

How to change the path of what increasingly looks to be an inevitable repeat of ancient (and modern as well) history?
It is a question I struggle with each and every day.
https://blossom.primal.net/203f455512c4e70aaad78209d04caea69fe1fa4c06af562dbca50bacf31972bc.jpg

2026-01-09 02:27:35 UTC

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Let me put it this way. The end of the international rules-based order was recognized by China, and Russia for that matter, going all the way back to 1996 and openly laid bare with the formal Joint Declaration on a “Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order”. Events were set in motions literally decades before Xi and Putin came into power.
Over that ensuing three decade period China systematically began to build a series of moats with rare earths but one of dozens if not hundreds of examples. That said, the real competitive moat created was that of ownership over the global base of manufacturing. History shows that a hegemon that willingly reduces its domestic base of production will, at some future point, no longer be the hegemon.
I have argued for quite some time that it has been American corporate culpability (which continues to this very day) was the driver of outsourcing production to China and that Beijing policy makers were very much open to assisting in that very process. Without an American production base, the leverage in this all important bilateral relationship will be owned by China.

2026-01-09 01:02:04 UTC

China Morning Missive
You’ll have to accept my apologies. In my note the other day I made the claim that in response to American action over Venezuela, Beijing would do nothing and sit idly by awaiting the expected, and dire, second and third order effects of said action. With that outlook a very amateur mistake on my part, as it pertains to China, was made.
Not a mistake, mind you, in terms of the original outlook. It remains the case that Beijing will “do noting” in direct response. You’ll notice here, however, that there’s a vital distinction this time around with the inclusion of the world “direct” and that is what should have been expected and, we now know, was carried out.
Shortly after the weekend’s Latin American activities, China announced that it would be targeting Japan with a series of rare earth export controls. To the uninitiated, the two events would look to have very little connective tissue. There’s been an ongoing, and increasingly heated, exchange between the two Asian nations over the issue of Taiwan. Any decision by Beijing to scale up the fight shouldn’t be seen as a surprising development and the same, too, in deciding to deploy rare earth export controls.
What hasn’t been asked, however, is why would Beijing take such action now?
This latest episode of regional saber rattling began back last November and only now is the decision to apply leverage made. If we look back to the events of 2010 when China and Japan were also entangled in a territorial dispute, Beijing had first used rare earth export controls as a point of pressure and did so almost immediately. I would argue that the difference, today, comes down to a material shift in geopolitical dynamics over the past 15 years.
The gamesmanship here is for this move to act as an application of indirect pressure on America. It might even be a not-to-subtle signal as well.
As is readily known, access to rare earths remains an issue for America and, while there is a delicate truce currently in place, China has various vested interest in Venezuela that are now threatened. Placing export controls on Japan might very well be an artfully telegraphed message to Washington. Beijing will be seeking some form of negotiated settlement over a host of Venezuelan related issues and the move on Japan could indicate that rare earth access remains firmly on the table.
It could also be far simpler. The act of escalation would require at least some level of attention out of Washington and attention is in very short supply at the moment. The art of forced distraction on a rival is an often applied tactic by China. Whatever the case might be, it is, at least from my vantage point, clear that the placement of export controls on Japan is an indirect response to events from this past weekend. Furthermore, albeit depending on how events transpire over the coming weeks and months, additional indirect pressure applied by China should be expected.
Finally, and keeping in mind China’s ever present strategic aim of embedding optionality throughout all decision making, the direct pressure on Japan serves to meet the objective of driving Prime Minister Takaichi from power. An objective I do believe that Beijing views as distinctly possible before the end of this year.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-curbs-rare-earth-exports-japanese-companies-after-dual-use-ban-wsj-reports-2026-01-08/

2026-01-08 04:39:51 UTC

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Long overdue for the producers to go on strike. And yet we aren’t even close.
If individuals are unwilling, as just the most obvious example, to leave Twitter and move to Nostr for fear of forgoing their audience and engagement, well, that tells you all you need to know of the current state of affairs.

2026-01-08 02:24:40 UTC

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Actually, the sound of my own voice is one of my favorite attributes.

2025-12-31 16:07:43 UTC

It’s official. 2026 in China.
Be well all. Find peace and the goal for the New Year is to be happy for all successes be they yours or be they others.
https://blossom.primal.net/2400dbeb4f84aefc36db39087d6b15784c48a998c97161659f09fef405cf5a94.mov

2025-12-31 15:05:11 UTC

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Yeah. Just posted and didn’t show up.

2025-12-31 15:02:18 UTC

An hour to go till the New Year from here in Shanghai and, come one, just received this via WeChat. Who says Chinese don’t have a sense of humor.
https://blossom.primal.net/6ff6a7e01801c0a1da435753a23aa807202463e295aabda08d9cd2b9a79774c7.jpg

2025-12-31 14:15:47 UTC

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Ok, but all I’ll add is that the truth always lies somewhere in the middle. Respect your perspective even if I don’t wholly agree. Peace my friend.

2025-12-13 02:36:16 UTC

Welcome to the world of Chinese negotiations President Trump!!
Rule #1 Never claim that a deal is concluded until an actual deal is concluded.
Rule # 2 Chinese deal are NEVER actually concluded.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp34442z25ko.amp

2025-12-10 09:20:28 UTC

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Very well put and far more succinctly done. Thx.

2025-12-10 08:18:45 UTC

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Now that requires a long answer. For now, as with most things, it’s a combination of the two.
For now, the primary issue - at least as I see it - was a serious degradation with in the Party when Xi came to power. It was a free for all (rampant corruption) and risked delegitimizing the Party. Power needed to be recentralized and that’s been an ongoing process for the past decade.
Were people caught up by being on “the wrong side”? Yes. But, again for me, that’s a second order effect.

2025-12-10 02:40:03 UTC

So there’s this …..
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/12/09/china-executes-banker-for-taking-116-million-bribes/

2025-12-10 02:12:17 UTC

China Morning Missive
First there was the announcement that President Trump would be permitting Nvidia to sell H200 chips to China. Then came the news of China’s trade surplus clocked in at $1.0trillion over the first 11 months of the year.
The reaction out of the Beltway to these two developments was apoplectic. Just wait for the reactions once the ASML restrictions are lifted. That’s what China really wants, and it’ll happen sooner than most observers expect.
To the reactions, it is all very understandable, but I would point out that these are just two outcomes reflective of a fundamental shift in global power. It isn’t that this is a new trend either. All that is slowly underway is a realization among the Washington powerbrokers that this is no longer just a philosophical debate.
For a decade there was analysis by “Senior Fellows” and lengthy diatribes throughout Foreign Affairs magazine and elsewhere. China was said to be an existential threat to the American way.
I agreed. A constructure form of engagement, beginning with a harsh acceptance of the threat posed, was required.
And yet, nothing was done, beyond talking and op-eds to wax poetically on the geopolitical threat.
Now here we are and America now finds itself well past the point of no return.
All that these two events highlighted above indicate is a direction of travel. There will be more public consternation and, unfortunately, greater externalizing of the issue. Rather than seeing the world as it is and sifting energies towards hyper competition, China will be labeled an enemy of the State and with that will come far greater aggressive tendencies.
Finally, and just as a quick update, the current TikTok “ban/divest” deferment expires next Tuesday, December 16th. This will have been the fourth such deferment and the entire affair is coming up on a full year since the Supreme Court ruling. No matter the political posturing by the Trump team, the TikTok divestiture remains outstanding.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-china-hawks-say-trump-approved-nvidia-chip-sales-china-will-supercharge-its-2025-12-09/

2025-12-09 06:59:00 UTC

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What’s shaking Jack?

2025-12-09 05:37:36 UTC

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Oh. You have to push back otherwise the Chinese will run over you at every turn. The needle which needs to be threaded is doing so without being a complete dick about it. Where the line is drawn is what you seek to find.
It’s something l’ve personally come to truly enjoy and the Chinese are now surprised at just how well I can maneuver. A constant dance.

2025-12-09 03:33:06 UTC

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Not entirely sure what you mean @nprofile…cmdm What are you looking for exactly?

2025-12-09 03:31:47 UTC

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It’s been a complete train wreck and first became known as to me back in the summer. I knew the entire TSMC experiment was doomed the moment a class action lawsuit was filed.
https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/semiconductors/chipmaking-giant-tsmc-hit-with-class-action-lawsuit-in-the-u-s-for-bias-racism-and-unsafe-conditions-over-30-plaintiffs-have-accused-the-company-of-illegal-practices-at-arizona-fab

2025-12-09 02:24:38 UTC

China Morning Missive
Slowly, ever so slowly, the realities of altering global supply chain dependencies are beginning to breach the public zeitgeist. The American “can do” spirit is running up against some very hard truths. Both in terms of the literal limitations of physics and that of obstacles from an overly ossified system.
For the first time, these very issues are raised and addressed in a rather detailed expose from the New York Times.
Before continuing it needs to be stressed that high end chips, and TSMC in particular, were considered atop all priorities when it came to the renewed focus on reshoring. Two birds, one stone went the thinking. America would have access to domestically made chips and the supposed China threat to Taiwan would be taken off the game board.
Put very bluntly, America wanted high-end chips and wanted TSMC.
What is now becoming increasingly clear is that boundless ambitions are running head long into a wall of limited capabilities. Dare I even suggest that this would be the first time America leadership (both corporate and political) is waking up to this new reality.
The entire TSMC Arizona plant example is emblematic of just how complicated the entire reshoring thesis is in terms of actual execution. Furthermore, this TSMC example can be fully extrapolated to just about every other dependency now facing the hegemon.
While America most certainly has the money, not capital mind you just money, to throw at the various problems, it lacks the physical inputs required to address those issues. It is also a game of relativity meaning that China built a supply chain fortress over three decades and continues to improve upon its position. To play catch up, America will need to run at twice the speed and that’s were problem number two comes into play.
As addressed in this NYT’s piece, the primary issues are that of regulations and labor. Suffocating under the weight of the former and scrambling to source the latter. Neither of these obstacles can be easily overcome in the short run. Taiwan TSMC shows the real-world implications of having to navigate these issues and the same will be required of all foreign groups planning to build production facilities in the United States.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions and, it would seem, all of these global groups which have committed billions in investment to America are well on their way to a nightmarish end.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/04/business/tsmc-phoenix-fab.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share

2025-12-05 08:52:15 UTC

A sign of times to come. While not all that popular in the US, I’d still expect RedNote to get the “under national security concerns” approach and with it be banned.
Even more likely, if not an outright certainty, once the TikTok deal is finally concluded. Whenever that might be.
Taiwan bans Chinese social media app RedNote for one year on fraud risks https://www.cnbc.com/2025/12/05/taiwan-bans-chinese-social-media-app-xiaohongshu-for-one-year-on-fraud-risks.html?__source=iosappshare%7Ccom.apple.UIKit.activity.CopyToPasteboard

2025-12-02 10:03:08 UTC

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It is a daily challenge. That’s for sure.

2025-12-01 00:48:44 UTC

China Morning Missive
With the announcement of the “Genisis Mission”, the Trump administration has made dominating the AI ecosystem a national priority. While there have certainly been a host of differing opinions on possible ulterior motives, from a geopolitical standpoint the decision makes perfect sense. So too, however, could this move end up directly impacting – inadvertently – a diaspora of Silicon Valley companies.
Over the past month there’s been increased media coverage of how American startups are fully leveraging the Chinese open-sourced AI models. After all, that is sort of the point of having access to open-source software. Take what’s already available and then iterate and improve upon that original source code.
The issue is the point of origination of that that source code; China.
Any time a competing Chinese software solution, or hardware offering for that matter, gains ground on all available American alternatives, Washington policy wonks step in on the grounds of “national security”. Not to say that such concerns aren’t warranted, rather that the issue here is the wide spread in usage (and, now, dependency) on Chinese AI models.
Rhetorically speaking, is there anyone who thinks the American government will permit home grown platforms build on Chinese source code?
Much as the NBC article highlights, “while models from American companies continue to set the pace of progress at the frontier of AI capabilities, many Chinese systems are cheaper to access, more customizable and have become sufficiently capable for many uses over the past year.”
It is the use of the word “customizable” which should stand out to all readers. It goes to the primary – I would say existential – issue facing the entire American AI theater. The dogmatic pursuit of closed source architecture, the building of silos (competitive moats), remains the greatest threat to America’s position.
Basically, you have five large dogs all chasing after a single bone. The likelihood is that the dogs will attack each other viciously long before catching the bone. You see this in the perversion of all incentives, mainly in the rapid acceleration of CAPX spending.
What this then leaves is the Chinese AI scalers to just continue moving forward building better software and directing all efforts to addressing the issue of compute.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/rcna242430

2025-11-26 00:44:52 UTC

For those interested, jumped on CNBC Asia last week. Video (unfortunately it’s linked) is provided below.
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2025/11/17/chinas-supply-chain-control-is-an-existential-threat-for-the-us.html

2025-11-26 00:38:08 UTC

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I think I understand what you are getting at. Basically, China commercially unleashed and what this means for the rest of the world. You’ll be unsurprised to know that I’m in total agreement with the points you’ve made.
I’ve been working overtime to raise this, and many other, China related issues. My doing so isn’t meant to indicate that China is the greatest country on earth and it is all sunshine and rainbows. The point is to elevate the reality of the current global dynamic. Americans can bitch and complain all the want. Doing so won’t alter that reality.
Compete or die. It is that simple.
Here’s the problem. Making any of these statements or claims is, at all times, met with pure derision. When there is an inability to debate the issue, the result is to attack the person. It’s my daily life and thankfully having lived in China for so long, I’ve grown skin as thick as a rhinoceros

2025-11-25 02:44:55 UTC

China Morning Missive (Part II)
Couldn’t let this one go as it hits directly on a host of issues I’ve been attempting to raise albeit with very little success.
Mentioned in a note yesterday that China had already won the robotics race no matter the urgency stressed by Marc Andressen for American policy to prioritize resources. Well, now we have just out a very detailed piece from the Wall Street Journal which aligns with many of the points made in various Notes here over the past several months.
Reducing the dynamic to its most simply form, the American AI titans want to create “God in a box”. The Chinese AI titans want to build deeper/wider economic moats. The latter has already achieved a massive lead on the former.
Here are some choice outtakes from the article.
“At one of China’s biggest ports, shipping containers whiz about on self-driving trucks with virtually no workers in sight, while the port’s scheduling is run by AI.”
I’ve been to the world’s largest port, Yangshan, here in Shanghai. The entire operation is automated. The crane, the trucks, all of it.
“It could further enable the spread of “dark factories,” with operations so automated that work happens around the clock with the lights dimmed.”
The concept of “dark factories” is rapidly expanding. No workers, 24-hour a day operations and facilities where there is no need for lighting.
“China installed 295,000 industrial robots last year, nearly nine times as many as the U.S. and more than the rest of the world combined, according to the International Federation of Robotics.”
The ability to scale remains a top comparative advantage throughout China. No need for any additional commentary here. The quote above speaks for itself.
“One risk is that AI could destroy more factory jobs than China expects, leaving it with too many unemployed workers.”
This one made me laugh. So much for all the Peter Zeihan and the others claiming that China posed no long-term geopolitical threat given the demographic timebomb.
So it is rather clear that the industrial robotics industry is now dominated by China. Now the focus turns to humanoid robotics. The evidence here, however, strongly suggests that there is no race. The only outstanding variable is timing. How quickly will we all see China rolling out these sorts or robots at scale? Based on my experience, I’d say before the end of 2027.
https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/ai-robots-china-manufacturing-89ae1b42?st=anYykK&reflink=article_copyURL_share

2025-11-25 01:59:54 UTC

China Morning Missive
For those of you keeping score at home, the TikTok deal is still outstanding. I would also make mention that the latest enforcement delay made by Trump expires on December 16th. It’s been nearly a full year since the Supreme Court ruled on the issue forcing either a ban or a divestiture.
The reason for raising this point is due to the headlines reporting on a call between Xi and Trump yesterday and, pending on the readout, a top priority was Taiwan. You may also recall my hammering of the point that the quid pro quo is TikTok for Taiwan. For all of the (numerous) claims by the Trump team that a deal to acquire the social media platform has been agreed to, it remains outstanding. Trump will be under increased pressure come mid-December. Any further delay will come with a political cost.
Taiwan has increasingly become a focus in the macro-tourist circles. No surprise given that there’s been a weeklong diplomatic flareup over Taiwan between Japan and China. The rhetoric has been pretty heated, but I’ve seen this movie many times before. China will just continue to be verbally belligerent and wait until there’s a new government in Tokyo. Considering recent political events, that would probably arrive in less than a year.
Still, the longer the Trump team chooses to remain silent on the issue of Taiwan the more difficult the entire situation will become. The idea, in my opinion, was for the two sides to play for time. That was the objective of the meeting last month in Busan. Japan’s Prime Minister just threw a spanner in the works and, in doing so, has Trump catching strays.
In the end though, it remains a very simple calculus. TikTok will receive final “approval” from Beijing the minute Trump publicly addresses the Taiwan issue.
https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2025/11/24/trump-xi-call-trade-taiwan-ukraine.html

2025-11-24 13:56:13 UTC

Watching all the Bitcoin hate surface this past week, and the names of those individuals included in the dog pile, has been so very telling.
There was a deep down level of Schadenfreude that had been percolating just below the surface ….. and then burst out in menacing glee.
Aren’t we all supposed to be rooting for one another regardless of one’s asset class of choice? Such an unnecessary scarcity mindset.

2025-11-24 06:32:45 UTC

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Appreciate that!!

2025-11-24 01:00:01 UTC

China Morning Missive
There was a bit of cope out of Silicon Valley last week. Uber tech titan, Mark Andressen, went on an autistic tirade over the future of robots and the urgent need for American policy makers to redirect resources and “reinvent manufacturing for the AI age”. When I stumbled across his comments, my mind immediately went to “it’s already too late”.
Much as I’ve shared in these Notes before, what China has done with EVs will be repeated in the race for dominance in robotics. It is simply an issue of vertical integration. China just has the individual processes already in place not to mention the availability to all critical components.
China is working with the benefit of having already moved into forms of power generation and the ability to convert that power into actual useful, commercial applications. The United States remains mired in knowing there’s a problem and only looking to find where to place blame. There are countless committee hearings and podcast soliloquies discussing the issue at hand. There’s, as of yet, been no meaningful action taken.
Time is quickly running out and there is no better evidence of this than the soon-to-be public offering of Unitree Robotics. Haven’t heard of the company? You’re not alone. Think of it this way. Are you familiar with a company called DJI Technologies? Well, what that company is to the global drone market, Unitree is now positioned to be for the humanoid robotics market.
Granted, in the example of Unitree, the company remains in the early stages of building – at scale – production. Once the company completes its IPO it will still only be valued at $7.0billion. For reference, Apple spent $25.0billion in share buybacks in just the second quarter alone. As an aside, that comparison does make you wonder what Apple could have achieved if it reinvested cashflow rather than buy back shares to support the stock price. That is a story for another day.
What I find to be the critical point here though isn’t the IPO or its size, rather it is the direction of travel. The Chinese are executing on policy directives and rapidly building out a host of future industries. Again, I will stress, it all comes down to vertical integration. None of this infrastructure is even close to being built in America.
https://amp.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3333047/chinas-unitree-robotics-completes-pre-ipo-tutoring-onshore-listing

2025-11-23 07:30:25 UTC

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Yo!! How’s things?

2025-11-21 01:07:59 UTC

China Morning Missive
The Chinese Ministry of Finance has been on a tear over the past two weeks issuing bonds and raising billions in the process from global investors. What has been the most interesting aspect of this exercise, however, has been the sheer demand for Chinese paper.
There was the USD4.0billion issuance divided evenly between a 3 and 5-year tranche. Demand came in at USD118.0billion.
Then this week there was a EUR4.0billion deal this time evening split between a 4 and 7-year tranche. Here, demand came in at EUR100billion.
Demand for the Chinese bonds was so significant that the securities ended up being priced at just two basis points above US treasury bonds of a similar tenor.
It would seem as though China is one again “investable” considering that sovereign issuance had been scant and, at times, nonexistent over the past four years.
There is a greater game at play here beyond a government looking to tap investor demand. China is returning to the global sovereign debt market with the expressed purpose of resuming the campaign of deepening the offshore yield curve so as to provide pricing benchmarks for Chinese corporates. Expect to see a host of large Chinese enterprises test the global markets throughout 2026. Demand for sovereign risk is one thing. Demand for Chinese corporate risk remains a distinct unknown.
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-smashes-bond-sale-records-093818568.html

2025-11-20 10:32:23 UTC

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You’ll get no argument from me brother. Been trying to highlight what, for me, is entirely obvious. Can’t speak for the Europeans, but the degree of cognitive dissonance about China throughout the States astonishes me.