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Last Notes

2023-06-07 20:05:25 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-09-07
📝 Original message:Forbidding 0 satoshi outputs (I wasn't actually aware that it was possible,
is 0 satoshi inputs also allowed?) would complicate a divisibility increase
softfork (I'm working on an idea for >= 1 satoshi transactions, but now it
seems like < 1 satoshi transactions would work too).
I don't think it's a good idea to deploy this softfork.
Hampus
2017-09-07 5:41 GMT+02:00 CryptAxe via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
> After reading
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/
> 2016-January/012194.html
> I see that Adam is correct. Unfortunately this SF would make Felix's
> confidential transactions
> more complicated. The blinding and unblinding transactions would have to
> be created with
> minimal output values, and this will need to be considered when checking
> that the fee is equal
> to the total amount of input. (it would now be SUM(inputs) -
> SUM(minimalOutputs))
>
> Blinding transaction:
> Ins:
> All non-confidential inputs are valid
> Outs:
> - 0..N: (new confidential outputs)
> amount: 0
> scriptPubkey: OP_2 <0x{32-byte-hash-value}>
> witnessOut: <0x{petersen-commitment}> <0x{range-proof}>
> - last:
> amount: 0
> scriptPubkey: OP_RETURN OP_2 {blinding-fee-amount}
> Fee: Sum of the all inputs value
>
>
> However, looking at the format of the blinding transaction, and how the
> GCTXO is added to the UTXO set
> by miners, it seems that a change to the blinding scriptPubKey could
> allow for the use of 0 value
> outputs. Even with the SF proposed by this email thread.
>
> OP_RETURN could be added to the scriptPubKey during blinding. The amount
> and scriptPubKey destination of
> unblinded funds is part of the witness and the outputs of an unblinded
> transaction are unspendable, so
> why not also make them unspendable in the blind transaction? As far as I
> can tell those outputs don't need to
> be spendable, they are really just encoding data. It doesn't seem like
> anything besides the confidential base
> transaction and the fee output from the blind transaction need to be in
> the UTXO set.
>
> Is it still possible to add this data to the witness if the scriptPubKey
> is unspendable? :
>
> witnessOut: <0x{petersen-commitment}> <0x{range-proof}>
>
> I think I'm missing something obvious, someone point out why this is
> stupid please :)
>
> On 09/06/2017 06:29 PM, Adam Back wrote:
> > The pattern used by Felix Weiss' BIP for Confidential Transactions
> > depends on or is tidier with 0-value outputs.
> >
> > Adam
> >
> >
> > On 7 September 2017 at 00:54, CryptAxe via bitcoin-dev
> > <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> As long as an unspendable outputs (OP_RETURN outputs for example) with
> >> amount=0 are still allowed I don't see it being an issue for anything.
> >>
> >> On Sep 5, 2017 2:52 PM, "Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev"
> >> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>> This is not a priority, not very important either.
> >>> Right now it is possible to create 0-value outputs that are spendable
> >>> and thus stay in the utxo (potentially forever). Requiring at least 1
> >>> satoshi per output doesn't really do much against a spam attack to the
> >>> utxo, but I think it would be slightly better than the current
> >>> situation.
> >>>
> >>> Is there any reason or use case to keep allowing spendable outputs
> >>> with null amounts in them?
> >>>
> >>> If not, I'm happy to create a BIP with its code, this should be simple.
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-07 20:03:26 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-06-20
📝 Original message:I don't think it's a huge deal if the miners need to run a non-Core node
once the BIP91 deployment of Segwit2x happens. The shift will most likely
be temporary.
I agree that the "-bip148"-option should be merged, though.
2017-06-20 17:44 GMT+02:00 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
> Are we going to merge BIP91 or a -BIP148 option to core for inclusion in
> the next release or so?
>
> Because a large percentage of miners are indifferent, right now miners
> have to choose between BIP148 and Segwit2x if they want to activate Segwit.
>
>
> Should we be forcing miners to choose to run non-core code in order to
> activate a popular feature?
>
> - Erik
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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2023-06-07 20:03:26 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-06-20
📝 Original message:> Ironically, it looks like most of the segwit2x signaling miners are
> faking it (because they're not signaling segwit which it requires).
> It'll be unfortunate if some aren't faking it and start orphaning
> their own blocks because they are failing to signal segwit.
Well, they're doing some kind of "pre-signaling" in the coinbase at the
moment, because the segwit2x project is still in alpha-phase according to
the timeline. They're just showing commitment.
I'm sure they will begin signaling on version bit 4/BIP91 as well as
actually running a segwit2x node when the time comes.
> As far as prevent a chain split goes, all those things
> (148/91/segwit2x(per today)) effectively guarantee a chainsplit-- so I
> don't think that holds.
Segwit2x/BIP91/BIP148 will orphan miners that do not run a Segwit2x (or
BIP148) node, because they wouldn't have the new consensus rule of
requiring all blocks to signal for segwit.
I don't believe there would be any long lasting chainsplit though (because
of the ~80% hashrate support on segwit2x), perhaps 2-3 blocks if we get
unlucky.
Hampus
2017-06-20 23:49 GMT+02:00 Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 3:44 PM, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Because a large percentage of miners are indifferent, right now miners
> have
> > to choose between BIP148 and Segwit2x if they want to activate Segwit.
>
> Miners can simply continuing signaling segwit, which will leave them
> at least soft-fork compatible with BIP148 and BIP91 (and god knows
> what "segwit2x" is since they keep changing the actual definition and
> do not have a specification; but last I saw the near-term behavior the
> same as BIP91 but with a radically reduced activation window, so the
> story would be the same there in the near term).
>
> Ironically, it looks like most of the segwit2x signaling miners are
> faking it (because they're not signaling segwit which it requires).
> It'll be unfortunate if some aren't faking it and start orphaning
> their own blocks because they are failing to signal segwit.
>
> I don't think the rejection of segwit2x from Bitcoin's developers
> could be any more resolute than what we've already seen:
> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Segwit_support
>
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > I think it is very naïve to assume that any shift would be temporary.
> > We have a hard enough time getting miners to proactively upgrade to
> > recent versions of the reference bitcoin daemon. If miners interpret
> > the situation as being forced to run non-reference software in order
> > to prevent a chain split because a lack of support from Bitcoin Core,
> > that could be a one-way street.
>
> I think this is somewhat naive and sounds a lot like the repeat of the
> previously debunked "XT" and "Classic" hysteria.
>
> There is a reason that segwit2x is pretty much unanimously rejected by
> the technical community. And just like with XT/Classic/Unlimited
> you'll continue to see a strong correlation with people who are
> unwilling and unable to keep updating the software at an acceptable
> level of quality-- esp. because the very founding on their fork is
> predicated on discarding those properties.
>
> If miners want to go off and create an altcoin-- welp, thats something
> they can always do, and nothing about that will force anyone to go
> along with it.
>
> As far as prevent a chain split goes, all those things
> (148/91/segwit2x(per today)) effectively guarantee a chainsplit-- so I
> don't think that holds.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-07 20:01:19 CEST

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📅 Original date posted:2017-05-19
📝 Original message:AFAICT, re-enabling these old OP-codes would require a hardfork.
If we had SegWit enabled, we could via a soft fork allocate new OP-codes
for the same functionality (by introducing a new version of Script).
I believe the Elements alpha project has been experimenting with
re-enabling old OP-codes: https://elementsproject.org/elements/opcodes/
2017-05-19 8:07 GMT+02:00 Mark Boldyrev via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
> Back in 2010, there was a bug found in Core which allowed
> denial-of-service attacks due to the software crashing on some machines
> while executing a script - see CVE-2010-537.
> I believe the removed ("disabled") opcodes should be re-introduced along
> with a standardized behavior definition.
> For example, when execution of an opcode results in an arithmetic error,
> such as OP_DIV with a zero divisor, the script should exit and fail.
> The string splice opcodes should also check their arguments for
> correctness, etc.
>
> These opcodes would enhance the flexibility of scripts and allow
> sophisticated native smart contracts to be created.
>
> _______________________________________________
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> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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2023-06-07 19:54:46 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2016-12-10
📝 Original message:> While disk space requirements might not be a big problem, block
propagation time is
Is block propagation time really still a problem? Compact blocks and FIBRE
should help here.
> Bitcoin, because its fundamental design, can scale by using offchain
solutions.
I agree.
However, I believe that on-chain scaling will be needed regardless of which
off-chain solution gains popularity.
2016-12-10 11:44 GMT+01:00 s7r via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
> t. khan via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > BIP Proposal - Managing Bitcoin’s block size the same way we do
> > difficulty (aka Block75)
> >
> > The every two-week adjustment of difficulty has proven to be a
> > reasonably effective and predictable way of managing how quickly blocks
> > are mined. Bitcoin needs a reasonably effective and predictable way of
> > managing the maximum block size.
> >
> > It’s clear at this point that human beings should not be involved in the
> > determination of max block size, just as they’re not involved in
> > deciding the difficulty.
> >
> > Instead of setting an arbitrary max block size (1MB, 2MB, 8MB, etc.) or
> > passing the decision to miners/pool operators, the max block size should
> > be adjusted every two weeks (2016 blocks) using a system similar to how
> > difficulty is calculated.
> >
> > Put another way: let’s stop thinking about what the max block size
> > should be and start thinking about how full we want the average block to
> > be regardless of size. Over the last year, we’ve had averages of 75% or
> > higher, so aiming for 75% full seems reasonable, hence naming this
> > concept ‘Block75’.
> >
> > The target capacity over 2016 blocks would be 75%. If the last 2016
> > blocks are more than 75% full, add the difference to the max block size.
> > Like this:
> >
> > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE = 1000000
> > TARGET_CAPACITY = 750000
> > AVERAGE_OVER_CAP = average block size of last 2016 blocks minus
> > TARGET_CAPACITY
> >
> > To check if a block is valid, ≤ (MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE + AVERAGE_OVER_CAP)
> >
> > For example, if the last 2016 blocks are 85% full (average block is 850
> > KB), add 10% to the max block size. The new max block size would be
> > 1,100 KB until the next 2016 blocks are mined, then reset and
> > recalculate. The 1,000,000 byte limit that exists currently would
> > remain, but would effectively be the minimum max block size.
> >
> > Another two weeks goes by, the last 2016 blocks are again 85% full, but
> > now that means they average 935 KB out of the 1,100 KB max block size.
> > This is 93.5% of the 1,000,000 byte limit, so 18.5% would be added to
> > that to make the new max block size of 1,185 KB.
> >
> > Another two weeks passes. This time, the average block is 1,050 KB. The
> > new max block size is calculated to 1,300 KB (as blocks were 105% full,
> > minus the 75% capacity target, so 30% added to max block size).
> >
> > Repeat every 2016 blocks, forever.
> >
> > If Block75 had been applied at the difficulty adjustment on November
> > 18th, the max block size would have been 1,080KB, as the average block
> > during that period was 83% full, so 8% is added to the 1,000KB limit.
> > The current size, after the December 2nd adjustment would be 1,150K.
> >
> > Block75 would allow the max block size to grow (or shrink) in response
> > to transaction volume, and does so predictably, reasonably quickly, and
> > in a method that prevents wild swings in block size or transaction fees.
> > It attempts to keep blocks at 75% total capacity over each two week
> > period, the same way difficulty tries to keep blocks mined every ten
> > minutes. It also keeps blocks as small as possible.
> >
> > Thoughts?
> >
> > -t.k.
> >
>
> I like the idea. It is good wrt growing the max. block size
> automatically without human action, but the main problem (or question)
> is not how to grow this number, it is what number can the network
> handle, considering both miners and users. While disk space requirements
> might not be a big problem, block propagation time is. The time required
> for a block to propagate in the network (or at least to all the miners)
> is directly dependent of its size. If blocks take too much time to
> propagate in the network, the orphan rate will increase in unpredictable
> ways. For example if the internet speed in China is worse than in
> Europe, and miners in China have more than 50% of the hashing power,
> blocks mined by European miners might get orphaned.
>
> The system as described can also be gamed, by filling the network with
> transactions. Miners have the monetary interest to include as many
> transactions as possible in a block in order to collect the fees.
> Regardless how you think about it, there has to be a maximum block size
> that the network will allow as a consensus rule. Increasing it
> dynamically based on transaction volume will reach a point where the
> number got big enough that it broke things. Bitcoin, because its
> fundamental design, can scale by using offchain solutions.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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2023-06-07 19:54:41 CEST

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📅 Original date posted:2016-12-04
📝 Original message:> Also how about making timestamp 8 bytes? 2106 is coming up soon :)
AFAICT this was fixed in this commit:
https://github.com/jl2012/bitcoin/commit/fa80b48bb4237b110ceffe11edc14c8130672cd2#diff-499d7ee7998a27095063ed7b4dd7c119R200
2016-12-04 21:00 GMT+01:00 adiabat via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
> Interesting stuff! I have some comments, mostly about the header.
>
> The header of forcenet is mostly described in Luke’s BIP, but I have made
>> some amendments as I implemented it. The format is (size in parentheses;
>> little endian):
>>
>> Height (4), BIP9 signalling field (4), hardfork signalling field (3),
>> merge-mining hard fork signalling field (1), prev hash (32), timestamp (4),
>> nonce1 (4), nonce2 (4), nonce3 (compactSize + variable), Hash TMR (32),
>> Hash WMR (32), total tx size (8) , total tx weight (8), total sigops (8),
>> number of tx (4), merkle branches leading to header C (compactSize + 32 bit
>> hashes)
>>
>
> First, I'd really rather not have variable length fields in the header.
> It's so much nicer to just have a fixed size.
>
> Is having both TMR and WMR really needed? As segwit would be required
> with this header type, and the WMR covers a superset of the data that the
> TMR does, couldn't you get rid of the TMR? The only disadvantage I can see
> is that light clients may want a merkle proof of a transaction without
> having to download the witnesses for that transaction. This seems pretty
> minor, especially as once they're convinced of block inclusion they can
> discard the witness data, and also the tradeoff is that light clients will
> have to download and store and extra 32 bytes per block, likely offsetting
> any savings from omitting witness data.
>
> The other question is that there's a bit that's redundant: height is also
> committed to in the coinbase tx via bip 34 (speaking of which, if there's a
> hard-fork, how about reverting bip 34 and committing to the height with
> coinbase tx nlocktime instead?)
>
> Total size / weight / number of txs also feels pretty redundant. Not a
> lot of space but it's hard to come up with a use for them. Number of tx
> could be useful if you want to send all the leaves of a merkle tree, but
> you could also do that by committing to the depth of the merkle tree in the
> header, which is 1 byte.
>
> Also how about making timestamp 8 bytes? 2106 is coming up soon :)
>
> Maybe this is too nit-picky; maybe it's better to put lots of stuff in for
> testing the forcenet and then take out all the stuff that wasn't used or
> had issues as it progresses.
>
> Thanks and looking forward to trying out forcenet!
>
> -Tadge
>
> _______________________________________________
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>
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