<unnamed>

Public Key

npub10zyxjrelgpp85qc93pnt8e4yx0jsxm27sn9lsypkhlrttjpmjktqkqsg9a

Profile Code

nprofile1qqs83zrfpul5qsn6qvzcse4nu6jr8egrd40gfjlczqmtl344eqaet9spz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduqs6amnwvaz7tmwdaejumr0dsr8v72n

Publishing to

relay.snort.social

relay.damus.io

nos.lol

Last Notes

2023-06-07 15:38:58 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-06-19
📝 Original message:I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these
measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.
In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a
similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much
lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)
and the fraud frequency is also much lower.
0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms
i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.
while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means
excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.
RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility
value. So it's a bad thing.
for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of
confirmations was always recommended practice.
Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:
> Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin
> payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
> irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several
> blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a
> co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign
> a double-spend.
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2023-06-07 10:44:55 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2012-12-03
📝 Original message:These discussed features are all useful but quite contradicting.
I imagine that a user will be able to switch between different coin
selection policies "minimize fees","max privacy","defragmentation","i
don't care" and even switch between them for individual sends.

2023-06-07 10:23:43 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2012-07-23
📝 Original message:Some concerns regarding Bloom Filters. I talked with Stefan Thomas on
the Hackathon Berlin about this.
I tried to follow the discussion closely but i have not taken a look at
the code yet (is there already an implementation?) so please correct me
if i got something wrong.
The way the Bloom filters are planned now this requires a complicated
setup. basically the client will ask the server to replay the whole
blockchain, but filtered.
This is not optimal for the following reasons:
This will require the server to do a full scan of his data and only
filter out non-matching entries.
Really lightweight clients (like Bitcoincard), clients with shared
private keys (electrum-style), or brainwallets - will ask the following
question quite often to "supernodes": Given my public keys/addresses,
what is the list of unspent outputs. i think it would make sense to
include such a command, instead or in addition to the filterload/filterinit.
And perhaps more severe: as far as i understand classic bloom filters,
the server has no method of indexing his data for the expected requests.
There is simply no data structure (or maybe it has to be invented) which
allows the use of an index for queries by bloom filters of *varying
length* and a generic hashing method.
im not sure what a really efficient data structure for these kinds of
query is. but i think it should be possible to find a good compromise
between query flexibility, server load, client privacy.
one possible scheme, looks like this:
the client takes his list of addesses he is interested in. he hashes all
of them to a fixed-length bit array (bloom filter) of length 64KiB (for
example), and combines them with | to add more 1's with each address.
the server maintains a binary tree data structure of unspent outputs
arranged by the Bloom filter bits.
to build the tree, the server would need to calculate the 64KiB bits for
each address and arrange them in a binary tree. that way he can easily
traverse the tree for a given bloom query.
if a client whishes to query more broadly he can calculate the bloom
filter to 64KiB and after that fill up the last 50% of the Bits with 1.
or 95%. the trailing 1 bits even don't need to be transmitted to the
server when a client is querying. of course, if the client is more
privacy-concerned he could also fill up random bits with 1, which would
not change much actually.
the value of 64KiB is just out of thin air.
according to my experimentation using BloomFilter from Guava -
currently, also 8KiB would be sufficient to hava a 3% false positive
rate for the 40000 active addresses we have right now.
someone more familiar with hashing should please give his opinion if
cutting a bloom filter in half has any bad consequences.
Andreas