<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1h0jpmhuc5ufwtzz92ut7erelpzfu2vrfntc2nr97smq27qfckfwsyc9su0

Profile Code

nprofile1qqstheqam7v2wyh93pz4w9lv3uls3y79xp5e4u9f3jlgds90qyutyhgprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuumwdae8gtnnda3kjctv2sw6m8

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relay.snort.social

Last Notes

2023-06-07 18:26:36 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2020-08-21
📝 Original message:It's been 5 years since minrealytxfee was lowered. At the time
bitcoin was trading for $255 and it was agreed that the fee of 5000
sat/vkB was too high. It was lowered to 1000 sat/vkB. In regards to
how much anti-DoS protection that provided, it comes out to $0.00255 /
vkB in USD terms. To have parity with the last reduction, we would
need to reduce minrealytxfee to 22 sat/vKB, though an even more
conservative reduction to 100 or 50 sat/vKB would be welcome.
With the growing adoption of LN, there is a need for ultra-low-fee
on-chain TXNs. Having these queue and confirm overnight, or even
waiting until the Sunday lull would still probably be welcome to many
users. The fact that the mempool is going empty at least every week
indicates that miners have not reached the floor of what they are
willing to mine.
About 2 years ago there was a PR (#13922) to try to make a reduction
from 1000 to 200 sat/vkB. It was widely accepted but the submitter
eventually closed it in favor of PR #13990.
If minrelaytxfee is already parameterized and configurable in
bitcoin.conf, how could it be detrimental to operation of a node to
change the default?
References:
* https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/9e93640be6c49fa1505ba5c5df8c89210da5a6e4
* https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13922
* https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13990

2023-06-07 18:09:05 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-12-28
📝 Original message:I was considering starting a BIP, but wanted to ask the thread if anything
like this was already done or in the works. My proposal is to expand the
TXN format to include chain-height (block number) in the TXN. This would
allow nodes / miners to age the TXN and choose (optionally) not to
rebroadcast it after a certain age threshold. Currently (as I understand
it), nodes and miners keep effectively a "seen-list" of TXNs and age them
based upon when they were last seen. This is very effective as it reduces
TXN size and frees the TXN from having to declare its age. The downside to
this is that those TXNs could be broadcast forever, assuming (big assume)
that the UTXO never got spent.
The goal here is not to enhance the protocol... if anything this would
increase TXN cost as it would add a few bytes to it. The goal here is to
make it easier for users to know with better certainty when an TXN is going
to age out. Obviously RBF is a better solution, but there may be some
instances when a user wants to effectively cancel a TXN.
Possible abuse vectors might include:
* Bad party broadcasting a low fee TXN at the edge of the age-out threshold
and trying to get goods, realizing the TXN will age out at the very next
block.
If this proposal might be something that core would entertain in a BIP
proposal I'll start drafting something. If there are suggestions about
where to place the block number to have minimal impact and ensure backward
compatibility, that would be great to. If this is simply silly and should
not be entertained, no harm there either.
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2023-06-07 18:08:33 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-12-08
📝 Original message:I know there are posts, and an issue opened against it, but is there anyone
writing a BIP for Sign / Verify message against a SegWit address?
I realize it is not a feature in wide use, but I think it still serves an
important purpose, such as when proof of assets are requested.
ref: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10542
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2023-06-07 18:07:50 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-11-20
📝 Original message:Is there any incentive for miners to pick segwit transactions over
non-segwit transaction. Do they require less, equal, or more compute to
process?
On Nov 20, 2017 11:46 AM, "Johnson Lau via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
We can’t “just compute the Transaction ID the same way the hash for signing
the transaction is computed” because with different SIGHASH flags, there
are 6 (actually 256) ways to hash a transaction.
Also, changing the definition of TxID is a hardfork change, i.e. everyone
are required to upgrade or a chain split will happen.
It is possible to use “normalised TxID” (BIP140) to fix malleability issue.
As a softfork, BIP140 doesn’t change the definition of TxID. Instead, the
normalised txid (i.e. txid with scriptSig removed) is used when making
signature. Comparing with segwit (BIP141), BIP140 does not have the
side-effect of block size increase, and doesn’t provide any incentive to
control the size of UTXO set. Also, BIP140 makes the UTXO set permanently
bigger, as the database needs to store both txid and normalised txid
On 21 Nov 2017, at 1:24 AM, Praveen Baratam via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Bitcoin Noob here. Please forgive my ignorance.
>From what I understand, in SegWit, the transaction needs to be serialized
into a data structure that is different from the current one where
signatures are separated from the rest of the transaction data.
Why change the format at all? Why cant we just compute the Transaction ID
the same way the hash for signing the transaction is computed?
--
Dr. Praveen Baratam
about.me <http://about.me/praveen.baratam>
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2023-06-07 15:41:52 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-10
📝 Original message:Some miners have voluntarily deployed CPFP.
I had a thread about it earlier this month where some other ideas got
tossed around.
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-July/009304.html
The specific pull request to get it into the reference implementation
is still open based on a merge conflict
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/1647
Peter Todd has another thread on RBF which you mentioned earlier
http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-April/005620.html
There is also a beautiful example of CPFP in action from Eligius in
this transaction:
https://blockchain.info/tx/4cc3e2b6407ae8cdc1fd62cb3235f9c92654277684da8970db19a0169e44c68c
Follow the spent outputs and you will see the person is trying to
incentive the transaction by upping the fees of dependent
transactions. It set in the mempool until Eligius won a block, then
it made it into the chain. CPFP still works, but only in an Eligius
block (that I can see). So it's better than nothing.

2023-06-07 15:41:33 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-06
📝 Original message:On Wed, Jul 01, 2015 at 09:52:57PM -0700, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
> This is called child pays for parent and there is a three year old pull
> request implementing it:
>
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/1647
Understood... When I wrote the BIP proposal I was assuming
(incorrectly) that CPFP TX selection was already being done by miners,
but I see now that certain trees could bloom the TX selection latency
as miners would need to be more dependency aware. Perhaps the BIP66
orphan block chain shows that some miners may not always be counted on
to ensure that all TX stuffed in a block have dependencies met.
Certainly not until the PR1647 is fully merged and deployed.
On Wed, Jul 1, 2015 at 11:57 PM, Matt Whitlock <bip at mattwhitlock.name> wrote:
> PR#1647 only addresses miner policy, though, right? I believe the BIP is
> addressing the user-facing side of this functionality. CPFP mining policy
> does very little good if wallets don't offer any way for users to goose up
> incoming transactions.
On Wed, Jul 01, 2015 at 09:52:57PM -0700, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
> The points regarding sweep transaction UI is out of scope for a BIP I'm
> afraid. I suggest talking with wallet authors, and if agreement can be
> found writing a pull request.
Yes... although I certainly admit, I didn't know about CPFP or I would
have called it out as a requirement for this UI enhancement request.
I'll see if I can't get some wallet authors interested in this as a
feature enhancement when PR1647 commits.
Perhaps there are risks raised if CPFP is not enabled but these sweep
tx enter the mempool. If miners take the high fee "children" but
ignore the low fee "parents" then the child might enter the blockchain
without the parent. If miners were light on block validation,
wouldn't it be possible that the child may go forward with many
confirmations, while the parent patiently waits in the mempool? This
could be bad since spending the child may look good, as it might have
many confirmations, while its parent has few.
On Fri, Jul 3, 2015 at 4:56 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> "Replace-by-fee scorched-earth without child-pays-for-parent",
> Peter Todd, Bitcoin-development mailing list, Apr 28th 2014
> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-April/005620.html
Very good! So if I follow, RPF can work one of two ways:
In the "countermeasure" form, spender gives receiver a partially
signed "countermeasure" transactions with juiced up fees.
In the "anyonecanpay" form, spender signs the transaction with
ANYONECANPAY bit allowing the reviver to add fees at will.
One question I did have about RBF is this.. Is it correct to presume
that the spender doesn't send the incomplete "countermeasure"
transaction to the network? If they did, wouldn't they get flagged on
DoS code banning them from peers?
Corollary question. If the "countermeasure" transaction is not
broadcast, is it sent to the receiver via back channel (email, etc)
I'll try to clean up the draft BIP to include CPFP dependencies and
RBF capabilities. Whether it belongs in a BIP or a PR, its just a doc
to outline my thoughts at this point. Not burning a whole in my head,
so may take some time.
Thx.

2023-06-07 15:41:32 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-02
📝 Original message:This is a process BIP request to add functionality to the Bitcoin-Core
reference implementation. If accepted, this could also add
flexibility into any future fee schedules.
https://github.com/d4n13/bips/blob/master/bip-00nn.mediawiki
Note, left the formatting in, since mediawiki is a fairly light markup.
==================================
<pre>
BIP: nn
Title: Sweep unconfirmed transactions by including their outputs in
high fee transactions
Author: Dan Bryant <dkbryant at gmail.com>
Status: Draft
Type: Process
Created: 2015-07-01
</pre>
==Abstract==
This BIP describes an enhancement to the reference client that
addresses the need incentive inclusion of unconfirmed transactions.
This method will create new high fee (or bounty) transactions that
spend the desired unconfirmed transactions. To claim the high fee
(bounty) transactions, miners will need to include the desired
unconfirmed transactions.
==Motivation==
There are times when an individual receives a payment from someone
that is in a poorly crafted transaction. This transaction may include
no fees, or insufficient fees to be included by many miners. The
recipient would be willing to pay a nominal transaction fee to have
the payment transaction swept into the next block, but has no simple
way to craft this incentive.
This BIP could be highly desirable for merchants who may have little
control over the type of wallets their customers use. A merchant will
want to ensure that all POS transactions to their hot wallet be given
a high probability of inclusion in the next block. This BIP would
allow the merchant to sweep all their POS transactions currently in
the mempool into one high fee sweep, thus greatly increasing the
chance that they are in the next block.
Although many wallets have the ability to tailor the transaction fees
of payments that are sent, this BIP is unique in the sense that it
allows people to offer a bounty for transactions that are incoming.
==Specification==
This BIP would have two implementations; an automatic sweep of
incoming unconfirmed transaction setting, and a manual sweep of
unconfirmed transaction setting. Both would have the ability to set
the fee amount the user would like to pay for the sweep.
====Automatic sweep of incoming unconfirmed transactions====
An automatic sweep configuration may be ideal for merchants who want
to ensure that their incoming transactions are not skipped over by
miners. An automatic sweep setting would consist of four fields,
<tt>'''sweep_fee'''</tt>, <tt>'''skipped_count'''</tt>, and
<tt>'''btc_threshold'''</tt>
Currently, the standard transaction fee is 0.0001 BTC, a generous
sweep bounty would be 0.001 BTC. Skipped-count will control the age
of unconfirmed transactions to include in the sweep. If skipped-count
is set to three, then any incoming transaction that remains
unconfirmed for 3 blocks would trigger a sweep. A skipped-count of 0
would trigger a sweep whenever any transaction is skipped, or if it
reaches an age of 10 minutes, regardless of how long the current block
is taking.
As a safeguard to paying a bounty for small "dust" transactions, a
minimum btc-threshold would be required for any automatic
configuration. A good starting threshold would be 0.10 BTC. These
automatic settings would allow a wallet implementing this BIP to
automatically perform a sweep of unconfirmed transactions whenever
more than 0.10 BTC of incoming transactions were detected in the
mempool. Furthermore, no more than one automatic sweep would be
performed in any 10 minute window.
Whenever a sweep is triggered, all incoming unconfirmed transactions
should be swept, not simply the ones that triggered the sweep. These
would include new transactions as well as dust transactions. Each
sweep transaction would go to a new wallet address since recycling
wallet addresses is poor practice.
====Manual sweep of incoming unconfirmed transactions====
A manual sweep of incoming unconfirmed transactions would be a special
type of "Send" in the current reference implementation. A manual
sweep would auto-fill a send transaction with all currently
unconfirmed incoming transactions in the mempool. The fee field would
be completely settable by the user and would auto-fill with the
suggestions of 0.001 BTC
A manual sweep would also be available as a context option when
selecting any unconfirmed transaction.
==Compatibility==
Wallet software that does not support this BIP will continue to
operate without modification.
==Examples==
<pre>
//unconf_tx = ef7c0cbf6ba5af68d2ea239bba709b26ff7b0b669839a63bb01c2cb8e8de481e
//hifee_tx = f5a5ce5988cc72b9b90e8d1d6c910cda53c88d2175177357cc2f2cf0899fbaad
//rcpt_addr = moQR7i8XM4rSGoNwEsw3h4YEuduuP6mxw7 # recipient controlled addr.
//chng_addr = mvbnrCX3bg1cDRUu8pkecrvP6vQkSLDSou # recipient controlled addr.
// UNCONF_TX - Assume a zero fee TX that miners are refusing in mempool
{
"txid" : "$unconf_tx",
//...
"vin" : [
//...
],
"vout" : [
{
"value" : 1.50000000,
"n" : 0,
"scriptPubKey" : {
//...
"addresses" : [
"$rcpt_addr"
]
}
}
]
}
// HIFEE_TX - Requires UNCONF_TX to be included in order to claim the
// high (0.001 BTC) fee. Note this transaction is going from one
// address to another in the same wallet. Both are controlled by the
// recipient.
{
"txid" : "$hifee_tx",
//...
"vin" : [
{
"txid" : "$unconf_tx",
"vout" : 0
//...
}
],
"vout" : [
{
"value" : 1.49900000,
"n" : 0,
"scriptPubKey" : {
//...
"addresses" : [
"$chng_addr"
]
}
}
]
}
</pre>