GrapheneOS

Open source privacy and security focused mobile OS with Android app compatibility.

Website: https://grapheneos.org/
Forum: https://discuss.grapheneos.org/
X: https://x.com/GrapheneOS
GitHub: https://github.com/GrapheneOS

Public Key

npub1kwarc5z9lwhen05uknd2nuwhhthd4ws0cku3t9j3rchm0fcd6luslse0nj

NIP-05 Address

[email protected]

Profile Code

nprofile1qqst8w3u2pzlhtueh6wtfk4f78tm4mk6hg8utwg4jeg3utah5uxa07gprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumt0d4hhxarj9ecxjmntqy08wumn8ghj7mtpw34x7efwvejk2ern9eex2mrp0yh8gmm0d3esfckw9y

Publishing to

relay.momostr.pink

matjoe.feeds.relay.tools

Author Public Key

npub1kwarc5z9lwhen05uknd2nuwhhthd4ws0cku3t9j3rchm0fcd6luslse0nj

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Last Notes

2026-07-16 16:29:00 UTC

GrapheneOS version 2026071500 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026071500
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40416-grapheneos-version-2026071500-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2026-07-15 19:55:18 UTC

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No, since that's using the Play Integrity API.

2026-07-15 18:54:05 UTC

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We've resolved the new compatibility issues with anti-tampering code in banking apps. We're in the process of making a new release with the workarounds. We posted a new thread about it:
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116925427491681935
#note17f0…yd8y

2026-07-15 18:51:13 UTC

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You can see the relevant changes here:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_frameworks_base/pull/410
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/pull/43

2026-07-15 18:50:18 UTC

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Our new secure spawning improved overall app compatibility despite these 2 anti-tampering SDKs causing new issues with it. We've solved the regressiond and are currently building a new release with the improvements. It will be available in around 12 hours. App compatibility will be better than ever.

2026-07-15 18:46:12 UTC

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Our new secure spawning implementation has better app compatibility. This made it possible for the V-KEY V-OS Mobile App Protection anti-tampering SDK to run instead of crashing and it began blocking GrapheneOS. We've solved this problem by simply blocking their code from running for the time being.

2026-07-15 18:43:10 UTC

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Our new secure spawning also added a per-app toggle. Alongside this, we made is possible to disable secure spawning and hardened_malloc at the same time. This requires an extra zygote with hardened_malloc disabled which we spawned on-demand. It has to be spawned at boot instead for low mount IDs.

2026-07-15 18:39:42 UTC

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Our new secure spawning implementations runs the same code run by the Zygote after exec to improve compatibility. Many apps which didn't work before are now compatible. However, that tripped this mount ID check by recreating a mount namespace. It doesn't need that part so we've simply removed it.

2026-07-15 14:55:50 UTC

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Motorola flagships with GrapheneOS support will likely be available in 2027, hopefully within 12 months. It will take longer for lower end devices to be supported. The initial devices will be more expensive than most Pixels but it will end up supporting devices in a similar price range as Pixels including the 'a' series devices over time.

2026-07-15 13:36:36 UTC

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That may require an OS change if it's based on it being the system gallery app.

2026-07-15 13:35:07 UTC

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Revolut should currently work fine on GrapheneOS but they may ban it in the future with the Play Integrity API. We'll have to do a pressure campaign to get them to unban it if that happens. We suspect it will happen because we had to work around an SDK in the Revolut app which was explicitly banning using GrapheneOS. It was even detecting the string "grapheneos" as the build user for the OS which we had set for reproducible builds. We had to change that and other things it checked.

2026-07-14 22:16:13 UTC

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The system would be fine if it was open sourced after a week instead of typically taking 2-4 months and sometimes longer.
It's worth noting security preview patches include patches to external projects. These patches aren't only for things Android uses. Some are publicly disclosed elsewhere already while others are not. There have been patches from Android security previews for projects used outside Android shipped in GrapheneOS according to the rules prior to disclosure elsewhere.

2026-07-14 22:13:47 UTC

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It's done because OEMs are so terrible at shipping patches. They started off giving them 30 days of early embargoed access but it wasn't enough and OEMs found it too difficult to ship patches each month. It also put users at risk from having it broadly disclosed for 30 days.
The new system allows every OEM to ship the patches without an embargo as GrapheneOS does while papering over OEMs taking many months to ship it. It's more secure when used well and covers up the failures.

2026-07-14 22:09:44 UTC

Vanadium version 150.0.7871.124.0 released:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/150.0.7871.124.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40347-vanadium-version-150078711240-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #browser

2026-07-12 15:08:08 UTC

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By default, GrapheneOS runs exec after fork from the zygote processes in order to create a fresh address space with a per-process randomized address space layout, randomized heap layout, random canaries, random memory tags and other per-process state. It substantially improves security especially when combined with the extensive usage of hardware memory tagging on GrapheneOS. Exec-based spawning was one of the earliest GrapheneOS features added in 2014.

2026-07-12 01:41:22 UTC

GrapheneOS version 2026071100 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026071100
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/39301-grapheneos-version-2026071100-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

2026-07-11 22:19:35 UTC

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> Eh, I wouldn't count the stuff trolls post on the web as attacks or smth.
The groups heavily investing into misleading people about GrapheneOS including multiple companies and governments are not trolls.
> overreacts with moderation
That's nonsense and has nothing to do with this.
> Regardless, don't worry or feel too bad about GOS attacks.
Our project and team are being heavily targeted with fabrications and harassment. It is severe and has a substantial impact.

2026-07-11 22:19:03 UTC

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You can see the account which replied to you is a single purpose account created for the sole purpose of attacking the GrapheneOS project: It was created on July 9th and now has 4 posts downplaying the ongoing attacks across platforms and engaging in trolling. The account goes out of the way to act as a juvenile troll while downplaying extremely malicious misinformation, libel and harassment as being people joking around. It's a very serious situation including real world attacks.

2026-07-04 12:08:22 UTC

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There are a bunch of companies selling phones with GrapheneOS preinstalled includiinng NitroKey. It's very easy for people to install it themselves without being technical via https://grapheneos.org/install/web. That's what we recommend since it saves people a lot of money and they don't need to rely on someone else doing it.

2026-07-03 08:59:33 UTC

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> Is it possible to take away from all apps by default?
That could be added as an option.
> Also now enabling local network requires granting nearby devices which would allow bluetooth beacons too right?
Yes, when the app asks for it from the OS. We would have implemented it as a separate toggle but they prefer minimizing the number of toggles over providing these kinds of useful distinctions. We could split it out later or add another way to do it.

2026-07-01 22:54:40 UTC

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If you're not on Android 17 then every app with network access has local network access.
If you're on Android 17 then apps targeting Android 17 lack access to local networks by default. Apps not yet targeting Android 17 can now have it taken away after installation.
GrapheneOS can eventually remove the backwards compatibility mode in a couple years. It doesn't make sense to immediately drop it and break compatibility with apps which aren't behind on target API level.

2026-07-01 22:51:43 UTC

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Android 17 disallowed apps without the Nearby Devices permission group from accessing the local network. For backwards compatibility, apps not yet targeting Android 17 are allowed to access the local network by default. No additional access is granted to apps compared to before. Targeting Android 17 eliminates the compatibility mode. Apps on the Play Store will be required to target Android 17 in around a year. This is how Android does backwards incompatible improvements.

2026-06-30 14:33:37 UTC

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GrapheneOS isn't a modification of the stock OS but rather is a fork of the Android Open Source Project. The only proprietary code it uses is firmware and userspace driver code for Pixel hardware support. That won't be present for other devices. Every device has proprietary firmware in practice but we can work towards replacing all of the proprietary userspace driver code over the long term for future Qualcomm devices.

2026-06-30 14:13:00 UTC

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GrapheneOS is an open source project which owns a non-profit organization. It has a total of around 30 project members where around half are being paid to work on it. There are people on our team who are various kinds of anarchists, libertarians, social democrats and more. We're not left, centrist or right as a group. We're not going to do more than label ourselves as anti-authoritarian. That is a core value of the project and that's who is attracted to work on it in practice.

2026-06-30 13:58:09 UTC

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If a fascist or tankie donates to GrapheneOS via Wise, Monero or another method, that's our money now and we're spending it to oppose authoritarianism.
We see all of the work we're doing improving the usability, compatibility, privacy and security of GrapheneOS as opposing authoritarianism. It's far more useful to people defending themselves from abuse by states than it to states. In practice, dissidents aren't exploiting a dictator's smartphone but rather it's the other way around.

2026-06-30 13:48:35 UTC

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GrapheneOS is an anti-fascist project that's strongly opposed to all other forms of authoritarianism too.
GrapheneOS is entirely funded by donations. Donations can be sent to GrapheneOS from anywhere in the world. We don't know the names of nearly anyone donating via Wise and we don't know anything about people donating via Monero.
There isn't an identification and vetting process for people making donations. It would be highly unusual even if a project not based on privacy did that.

2026-06-30 13:24:19 UTC

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We've made it entirely clear we define the GrapheneOS project as being anti-authoritarian and as part of that it's opposed to ethnonationalism. These are shared values for people working on GrapheneOS. We aren't going to define the project as being anti-statist or anarchist since only some people working on it are.
> plus you're saying all this fascist shit
This is an outrageous lie.
> the money/support you receive is NEVER apolitical
We don't take money with strings attached.

2026-06-27 22:11:40 UTC

GrapheneOS opposes authoritarianism. It's a core part of why we're building privacy technology as part of a non-profit open source project. We're opposed to it regardless of whether it comes from left, center or right. The flood of people lying about what we believe and have said won't change this.

2026-06-27 20:50:34 UTC

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We did say we opposed the donation to this party and what they stand for but we clarified they don't seem far right but rather an ethnonationalist leftist party. Someone here is saying they're phony but they were in left parties for years prior and still support most of it.
catraxx has repeatedly blatantly misrepresented and outright lied about what we said with the clear goal of causing harm to GrapheneOS. He has been doing it from before here. He's also actively promoting /e/ with it.

2026-06-27 20:47:17 UTC

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CalyxOS lags far behind standard AOSP on updates and privacy protections. They bundle a bunch of problematic apps/services reducing privacy. It has never been a privacy or security hardened OS. It heavily has recently moved more towards being a branded fork of LineageOS with a bunch of bundled apps/services including granting problematic privileged access to many of those those. An AOSP or especially LineageOS fork marketed as private that's less private than AOSP isn't privacy hardened.

2026-06-27 20:47:09 UTC

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GrapheneOS doesn't run on highly insecure devices with end-of-life kernels, an insecure SoC without basic updates and lack of essentially privacy/security updates and features. It isn't going to start supporting those.
We have a publicly announced partnership with a major OEM and have said there will be devices from them meeting our requirements and supporting GrapheneOS within a year. Those are non-Google phones.
Mullvad sponsors us just as many of our users and other companies do.

2026-06-27 19:35:23 UTC

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/e/, Murena and their supporters have spent years misleading people about the GrapheneOS project for profit. Their business is based around misleading people and steering people away from GrapheneOS is part of it.
The false attacks you're spreading on us are an example of a company and their supporters attacking us, not the other way around. You're spreading libelous claims from people who are supporting these efforts to marginalize us:
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116353973732143171
#note1r96…za7j

2026-06-27 19:28:26 UTC

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Mullvad sponsors other open source projects including with large donations. The sponsorship of GrapheneOS is paying for 2 servers from DataPacket for us.
Someone left a reply to our thread about Android 17 being rolled out to Stable attacking us for Mullvad sponsoring us. We tried to have a discussion about it similaly to what we're doing here, but he was focused on attacking us and kept misrepresenting our statements. He then turned it into a public attack on us.

2026-06-27 13:30:23 UTC

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You very blatantly lied about what we said in a manipulative attack on us and refuse to retract it.
> instead you here you are, defending Mullvad
That's not whwt we did. We corrected the claim that they're a far right party.
> you also seem to think they're tankies
We think the party which others have said one of the Mullvad founders donated to is a racist, anti-immigrant and tankie adjacent party. We're strongly opposed to that and we haven't posted anything defending that party.

2026-06-27 13:22:07 UTC

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Meanwhile leftists are largely fine with mass ethnic cleansing as long as it's Russia, China, etc. doing it. Did the USSR not exist in your version of history?

2026-06-27 13:15:06 UTC

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They're an anti-immigrant and racist leftist party. We looked into what we were told about and found that they're a very local (7th largest city) racist socialist party combining Marxism with Swedish nationalism. If what we were told is that it's a racist anti-immigrant party then we'd agree with that from what we've read about them. That isn't what we were told, you linked a post saying they're far right and we found something quite different when we spent an hour looking into it.

2026-06-27 13:12:27 UTC

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They're leftists with very clearly left wing domestic policy. They have traditional leftist foreign policy including being anti-Ukraine, anti-NATO, supporting the Cuban government and more. The foreign policy of far left and far right in Europe has a lot of similarities but there are some stark differences.
We read some of what they say about the political classes, office workers, etc. being parasites and also immigrants who they claim are brought in by those people to support them.

2026-06-27 13:05:12 UTC

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A party heavily based around Marxism with left wing domestic policy and tankie adjacent foreign policy is not a right wing party just because they're racist. If you can't be honest about what they are or what we've said then there's little point in bringing this up. We did look into this and an found anti-immigrant socialist party espousing Marxist views combined with nationalism. Leftists can be anti-immigrant and racist. Claiming they're far right is just lazy and inaccurate.

2026-06-27 12:46:28 UTC

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We never said anything of the kind. This is what we said:
> The light amount of foreign policy from this party strongly indicataes they're actual leftists [...]
Either you don't know what foreign policy means or are deliberately being dishonest about what we said. Based on your other response, you know what foreign policy means and are being dishonest.
We looked into this and contrary to what was linked found it was a leftist party split from a socialist party.

2026-06-27 11:51:07 UTC

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Leftists can absolutely be racist and anti-immigrant. That isn't a right wing concept at all. The light amount of foreign policy from this party strongly indicataes they're actual leftists and not right wing people taking on left wing positions as part of populism. The USSR absolutely committed a bunch of population transfers, genocides, etc. and what this party is advocating fits right in with it. It's not something owned by the right wing.

2026-06-26 23:08:32 UTC

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We did look into it and quickly determined that it's a very local left wing party which split from the socialist Left Party. It's a municipal party in the 7th largest city right now. They're combining Marxism with anti-immigration nationalism. It's definitely not a far right party. Their views on nearly all domestic policy are leftist. Their foreign policy matches the European far left more than the European far right, although those are similar in a lot of ways.

2026-06-26 19:46:51 UTC

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The 2 sponsored servers we have from Mullvad are with DataPacket. Our DataPacket account for this is a sub-account of Mullvad's account. They have around a 30% discount on the hardware and traffic but DataPacket is very premium so it's still fairly expensive. DataPacket has fantastic transit and private peering including having DTAG peering which is very beneficial to our German users. No more slow downloads due to DTAG's congested links with transit providers.

2026-06-26 00:10:31 UTC

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Our update servers are sponsored by Mullvad, ReliableSite, Cherry Servers, Zare and Xenyth. You can see those here:
https://grapheneos.org/articles/grapheneos-servers#releases.grapheneos.org
The screenshot shows bandwidth usage for Frankfurt with staggered rollout to 10th gen, then 9th, then 8th and finally 7th+6th together.
https://grapheneos.social/system/media_attachments/files/116/813/503/997/088/027/original/1099199c1eddb307.png

2026-06-25 22:55:36 UTC

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2026062300 is now available in Stable for all of the supported devices. Bandwidth usage in Frankfurt is now at 20Gbps and the other locations have also increased a similar proportion. We'll need more update servers within a year or two but we have enough to avoid staggering the largest updates.

2026-06-25 22:44:52 UTC

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It will stop enforcing certificate transparency after the log lists are outdated by more than 70 days resulting in reduced security for HTTPS and other TLS connections made by apps using enforced certificate transparency. Close to nothing used it in Android 16 but it's enforced by default for targeting Android 17 or later.
Why are you concerned about downloading these static files in the first place? The only thing us hosting it achieves is making people feel better anyway.

2026-06-25 20:50:14 UTC

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Downloading a static set of certificate transparency log lists and a public key to verify those isn't an information leak. The only thing we're currently planning to change is hosting a service providing the static files ourselves.

2026-06-25 20:14:04 UTC

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It doesn't require much explanation:
https://www.gstatic.com/android/certificate_transparency/v2/log_list.json
https://www.gstatic.com/android/certificate_transparency/v2/log_list.sig
https://www.gstatic.com/android/certificate_transparency/v3/log_list.ctfb
https://www.gstatic.com/android/certificate_transparency/v3/log_list.sig
https://www.gstatic.com/android/certificate_transparency/log_list.pub
The OS has a list of pinned keys enforced for the public key, which we haven't looked into in detail yet. Those might be intermediates or roots with the actual key downloaded from the servers being a leaf key validated with those. We initially thought it was trusting the public key it downloads but it checks it.

2026-06-25 19:48:57 UTC

GrapheneOS update downloads are usually around 20MB to 80MB when updating from a recent release. The download for updating from our final Android 16 QPR2 release to Android 17 ranges from 620MB to 760MB depending on device model. We're in the process of rolling it out to the Stable channel now.

2026-06-25 19:36:55 UTC

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We already added our own service providing a cache of the 5 files at gstatic.grapheneos.org. We plan to integrate it into the OS for the next release. This wasn't really on our radar before because almost nothing was using certificate transparency enforcement including nothing in the base OS.
Android 17 makes it opt-out instead of opt-in for apps targeting Android 17 so it's more important now. We have to consider possible consequences of it for System Updater before it targets 17.

2026-06-25 18:28:45 UTC

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There was nothing in the OS opting into using it but there will be a lot using it now that it's based on Android 17. We'll write documentation for it to go along with the next release.

2026-06-25 17:23:27 UTC

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Some users have reported seeing a connection to www.gstatic.com when the device starts charging which is due to certificate transparency logs being fetched. We've been planning to review certificate transparency log updates for a while but hadn't gotten to it yet. We'll have our own approach soon.

2026-06-25 17:19:59 UTC

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Android 16 added certificate transparency enforcement for apps. It checks Signed Certificate Timestamps proving certificates were logged in at least 2 logs for certificates with <= 180 day expiry or 3 logs for > 180 day. It was opt-in for targeting Android 16 but is opt-out for targeting Android 17.

2026-06-25 16:26:17 UTC

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DownloadManager is used by the OS, Vanadium and many user installed apps. The connections don't come from DownloadManager or the other media components such as MTP Host. Downloads can be set to require charging or idle, causing those to trigger it:
https://developer.android.com/reference/kotlin/android/app/DownloadManager.Request#setrequirescharging

2026-06-25 16:20:14 UTC

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MTP Host and several other media components share a UID with Download Manager. Connection monitoring software attributing connections to those is incorrect and doesn't correctly handle shared UID apps. RethinkDNS properly attributes it to the UID group instead of picking an arbitrary app to blame.

2026-06-25 16:19:04 UTC

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Download Manager exists to provide a way for apps to trigger a download for a large file while running and then get woken up when it completes. It avoids the app needing to continuously run to perform the download, which would require a foreground service to keep running when user switches away.

2026-06-25 16:17:53 UTC

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By default, apps are limited in how much they can run in the background. Users can change the default Optimized to Restricted to delay tasks apps want to run in the background to the next time the app is started including being started by another app. Apps can run for a little bit after being run.

2026-06-25 16:09:47 UTC

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Chromium uses Android's DownloadManager for a bunch of functionality including user downloads, saving and updating offline pages. Search the Chromium sources for DownloadManager to get an overview. DownloadManagerService is a Chromium service implemented on top of Android's DownloadManager.

2026-06-25 16:01:47 UTC

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Unlike regular apps with a unique uid/gid, DownloadManager shares a UID with several other OS media components. Components with a shared UID have shared permission toggles, data usage statistics, etc. Apps attributing connections to apps based on UID often attribute it to another app in the group.

2026-06-25 15:57:51 UTC

Download Manager is an Android component handling long-term HTTP(S) downloads for apps in the background. Apps with the INTERNET permission (GrapheneOS Network toggle) can offload their downloads to it. Download Manager doesn't trigger any connections itself.
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/DownloadManager

2026-06-24 04:22:51 UTC

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Only if you use it in a profile without sandboxed Google Play where it does push itself instead of via FCM. That also requires toggling on their own push. It may not work well in practice without FCM since they've never given it much attention and likely give it less now with the direction WhatsApp has taken on this.

2026-06-23 16:09:44 UTC

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This doesn't cause any Play services crashes. If it's crashing for you that's likely caused by a configuration issue such as enabling Google Play location features which it won't be able to use by default due to not having the Location permission. It's also not compatible with certain exploit protections which we disable by default for it but users can override those default exceptions and cause it to crash. You need to show us the crash traceback to determine what's wrong.

2026-06-19 18:07:46 UTC

Our community is helping us test the initial release of GrapheneOS based on Android 17. It's working very well for most people with very few issues. We've resolved the main regressions reported to us already. We'll start builds for a 2nd public release based on 17 later today after a few more fixes.

2026-06-18 12:04:42 UTC

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Vanadium doesn't tie WebAssembly being available to the JIT being enabled. The JIT toggle is a performance (enabled) vs. security (disabled) toggle for reducing attack surface. Toggling WebAssembly, WebRTC, WebGL, WebGPU, etc. are going to be separate toggles. Vanadium uses the DrumBrake WebAssembly interpreter when WebAssembly is enabled but JIT is disabled so everything works, just slowly. WebAssembly will be another toggle because it has a lot of attack surface..

2026-06-18 12:03:09 UTC

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Vanadium doesn't support extensions and that's not a planned feature. It has a built-in JavaScript toggle shown as part of the per-site toggle interface when it's disabled by default for easily opting into it per-site. It also has the JavaScript JIT off by default with a per-site opt-in for it.

2026-06-17 18:45:31 UTC

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Vanadium has built-in adblocking via EasyList + EasyPrivacy + EasyList Adblock Warning Removal List + all of the EasyList supplementary language lists. The language specific lists are enabled based on which languages are enabled in the browser instead of having separate configuration.
Vanadium uses the built-in content filtering engine used by declarative-only content filtering extensions. Brave has their own filtering engine with more features. We may include it in Vanadium.

2026-06-17 18:17:18 UTC

Vanadium version 149.0.7827.159.0 released:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/149.0.7827.159.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36496-vanadium-version-149078271590-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #browser

2026-06-16 20:58:25 UTC

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WhatsApp has non-Google push notification support but it might not work well and it at least partially depends on Play services for various features. If you want to largely avoid Google Play then you can use a dedicated work profile or Private Space for it instead of putting it in the Owner user so that apps in the Owner user won't be able to see it or use it but rather will use their non-Play code paths. Alternatively, just use a single profile for simplicity.

2026-06-16 20:54:11 UTC

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It's needed for push notifications for most apps from the Play Store but there are definitely as decent number of apps supporting push notifications without it. Many email clients support IMAP IDLE for push notifications, there are Matrix clients with UnifiedPush support, Molly is a fork of Signal with UnifiedPush support and some apps like Signal itself have an inefficient fallback but in that case it's better to use Molly with UnifiedPush and a MollySocket server.

2026-06-16 20:28:26 UTC

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We recommend getting the Pixel 8 or later due to 7 years of support from launch and meeting all current security standards. Pixel 6/7 had 5 years of support from launch which is running out and don't have for hardware memory tagging, pointer authentication, branch target identification and other newer hardware security features. See https://grapheneos.org/faq#recommended-devices for our official answer.
Motorola flagships with GrapheneOS support will likely be available within a year.

2026-06-16 20:16:22 UTC

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It will get Android 17 and Android 17 QPR1 but won't receive official Android 17 QPR2 support since it will be end-of-life soon. We haven't decided what we'll be doing in terms of extended support for 6th generation and later Pixels. We don't recommend continuing to use it beyond testing once it's end-of-life. Pixel 6a was released later so the support guarantee runs out a bit later but it's approaching end-of-life too. Pixel 8 and later get 7 years from launch instead of 5.

2026-06-16 20:06:34 UTC

Today is the official release day for Android 17. We've already fully ported GrapheneOS to Android 17 and are in the process of pushing the code to our public repositories. We're building a final official release based on Android 16 QPR2 today and we'll do an initial Android 17 release tomorrow.

2026-06-13 20:18:26 UTC

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GrapheneOS has over 400k users. It's hard to understand why one of our users running a Discourse forum is resulting in us suddenly getting attacked across platforms. These attacks on GrapheneOS happening across platforms every single day are increasingly desperate and ridiculous.

2026-06-13 20:18:20 UTC

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People used Discourse's data export feature to obtain their data from his forum and are upset with Kuketz about how much metadata is retained by Discourse. He didn't make the software but rather is using it so that's already a bit extreme but blaming us is absolutely ridiculous.

2026-06-13 20:18:13 UTC

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Kuketz hosts a German language forum about privacy at https://kuketz-forum.de. It's hosted with the widely used open source Discourse project. It has the standard account system and metadata retention of Discourse. Many sites use Discourse and he has nothing to do with making it.

2026-06-13 20:18:04 UTC

Mike Kuketz has never had any role in the GrapheneOS project. He certainly isn't a GrapheneOS developer. He uses GrapheneOS and has a widely known privacy blog and community where he has written about it. That doesn't somehow make him part of GrapheneOS.
https://x.com/CryptoCyberia/status/2065832332313919886

2026-06-08 04:30:21 UTC

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Why use LineageOS forks with worse privacy and security than LineageOS? That's not to say that using LineageOS is a reasonable choice for someone who cares about privacy, but it's a better choice than these LineageOS forks in many ways. These forks being marketing as privacy products doesn't mean they're more private than the LineageOS project they're forking and it's generally the opposite in a bunch of ways. It also doesn't mean they provide reasonable privacy.

2026-06-08 03:52:17 UTC

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It doesn't make sense for someone to use iodéOS on a Pixel 8. It isn't a privacy or security hardened OS but rather the direct opposite of that. It's not only far less private and secure than GrapheneOS but much less usable and compatible.
On other devices, why use it over regular LineageOS if it lags further behind on private and security patches? LineageOS isn't a privacy or security hardened OS and has reductions in privacy and security vs. AOSP but these are worse.

2026-06-08 03:49:59 UTC

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iodéOS is much more than 2 months behind GrapheneOS on patches and it has severe reductions to the privacy and security model.
> How would you personally rate a Fairphone on iodéOS against a Pixel on iodéOS?
Neither is reasonably secure. It's drastically less secure on a Fairphone due to years of missing updates to the kernel, but they're far behind compared to the stock Pixel OS on a Pixel and the stock Pixel OS isn't setting a high bar for kernel updates anyway.

2026-06-06 16:57:38 UTC

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We believe their intent is helping people improve their privacy but they're poorly informed and are largely doing the opposite. Companies claiming their products are private and secure doesn't make that true. It's usually not true.
Every person who follows their advice to buy one of those products is going to have far worse privacy and security than an iPhone user. Their data will be far more easily obtained through privacy and security weaknesses. That's not progress.

2026-06-06 16:54:07 UTC

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The content they've published is heavily based on marketing material from for-profit companies which they're taking at face value and spreading. The products they're promoting aren't safe due to lack of basic privacy and security patches/protections. It's their responsibility to do due diligence and avoid spreading false marketing for phony privacy products as they're doing. They haven't done that and they're recommending people purchase devices with very poor privacy.

2026-06-06 15:45:11 UTC

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We're informing you the article you linked is highly inaccurate. It contains many verifiably inaccurate statements. It's promoting using a bunch of products missing bare minimum privacy and security based on the marketing materials of the companies. Nearly everything it's promoting people use is drastically less private and secure than an iPhone. Products missing very basic privacy and security patches/protections are not a good choice for privacy.

2026-06-05 21:42:27 UTC

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The article only lists GrapheneOS at the bottom as an option for people installing the OS themselves despite it being sold on devices by a bunch of companies. The description of each OS in the section at the bottom is also quite inaccurate. As an example, the paragraph on LineageOS portrays it as being uniquely stable (what?) and having guaranteed long term support which is particularly wrong as it can be end at any time for a device and often is.

2026-06-05 21:39:57 UTC

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The article directs people towards buying multiple products lacking the most basic privacy and security including not providing basic patches for severe vulnerabilities. It makes highly inaccurate statements about the privacy and other properties of those products. It's clearly based on taking the marketing from those companies at face value. The article promotes outright scams from companies supporting authoritarian crackdowns on privacy.

2026-06-05 21:35:20 UTC

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Nearly the entire article consists of a mix of misleading and inaccurate information based on marketing material. The statements about the products being promoted are largely untrue. It promotes using a bunch of products without basic privacy/security patches and protections. It misleads people about the major differences between the options with highly inaccurate descriptions, especially the parts which try to compare and contrast between them.

2026-06-05 21:32:25 UTC

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The article is based on marketing materials from companies misleading people about what their products provide and about GrapheneOS. A common way to mislead people about GrapheneOS by those companies is falsely claiming it's an extreme option that's not as usable when the opposite is true combined with misrepresenting it as a security rather than a privacy project which is very inaccurate and backwards. We only work on security to protect privacy.

2026-06-05 14:51:15 UTC

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There's no other alternative OS available for Android devices keeping up with standard privacy/security patches and protections. There's certainly none greatly improving privacy and security with major enhancements as GrapheneOS does.
Privacy and security is getting much worse. Vulnerabilities are dense and becoming much easier to find and exploit. There are many alternatives to mainstream operating systems but not ones with reasonable privacy and security at all.

2026-06-05 14:39:58 UTC

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The next best option for privacy and security is a current generation iPhone with Lockdown Mode and Advanced Data Protection (ADP) enabled. ADP provides end-to-end encryption for most of Apple's cloud services but not Calendar and Contacts so it's better to use another option such as Proton for those. We also recommend people avoid Apple services to avoid vendor lock-in since otherwise they won't be easily able to move to an option like GrapheneOS in the future.

2026-06-05 14:29:23 UTC

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This is an extremely low quality article with highly inaccurate information about the topic. The article was written without a basic understanding of mobile privacy and security.
The information there about GrapheneOS is inaccurate, as is what they say about the operating systems. They don't know the purpose of GrapheneOS and what it provides. They clearly haven't used it.
Nearly everything they recommend has poor privacy and atrociouis security.

2026-06-04 22:21:37 UTC

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LineageOS isn't a privacy or security hardened OS, but it doesn't reduce privacy and security to the extent /e/ does. It's far less problematic. /e/ is a fork of LineageOS which claims to be much more privacy oriented despite being far worse at shipping privacy/security patches, rolling back the privacy/security model much more and integrating many invasive services. It doesn't make sense to use /e/. Why not use LineageOS which isn't as bad and works better?

2026-06-04 22:20:10 UTC

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For the bare minimum approach not trying to do better, the updates entirely come from the Android Open Source Project major releases (2 per year) and monthly security bulletins. With that approach, kernel updates fully come from the OEM. /e/ is much slower at Fairphone at integrating updates and adds more delays to what's already unacceptably delayed. Fairphone's approach is less bad but not safe. Using LineageOS isn't nearly as bad as the /e/ fork of it.

2026-06-04 15:19:00 UTC

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They're also not limiting themselves to attacks on the GrapheneOS project itself. /e/ and Murena have repeatedly targeted our team with vile personal attacks and harassment including by spreading harassment content. We have archives with several of the leader of both organizations personally GrapheneOS mainly benefits criminals and also of their organization accounts doing it. We also have archives of more than a dozen cases of blatant participation in harassment.

2026-06-04 15:16:29 UTC

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/e/ and Murena have dedicated years to heavily misleading people about GrapheneOS. They've widely spread misconceptions about it with their inaccurate claims and have severely harmed the project through doing it. They aren't limiting themselves to falsely claiming GrapheneOS is not usable, not compatible with apps and not meant for regular people. They repeatedly falsely claim GrapheneOS is primarily for criminals and mainly used by GrapheneOS alongside France's government.

2026-06-04 09:51:45 UTC

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The way Fairphones are marketed in terms of privacy, security and updates clearly isn't accurate. Devices without proper updates even in the short term which get much worse in the long term aren't sustainable. That draws into question the rest of the marketing. The reality of their devices is that they're designed and made by an ODM rather than Fairphone. Whether their ODM has more ethical practices than Foxconn does for iPhone or Pixels isn't easily determined.

2026-06-04 09:22:11 UTC

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Take a look at the Linux kernel version on your device. If you have a Fairphone 3, 4, or 5 then you're on an end-of-life Linux kernel branch no longer receiving updates. They didn't come close to keeping up with the LTS updates while they were available and now it's over.
Android Security Bulletins (ASBs) don''t cover more than a tiny subset of the crucial kernel patches or most driver/firmware patches. They're a bare minimum baseline for patch backports.

2026-06-04 09:08:23 UTC

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Fairphone markets providing a final major Android releases 2-3 years after it launched as providing 2-3 more years of major updates than an OEM which released it on the day it launched as a final update. That's extraordinarily manipulative and misleading marketing. They'll have a kernel which has been end-of-life for years while leading people to believe the device is safe to use and still supported. Fairphone 3, 4 and 5 have end-of-life Linux kernels.

2026-06-04 09:06:05 UTC

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Take a look at the Linux kernel versions on their devices. Their devices are going years without shipping updates to the Linux kernel while they're leading people to believe those devices are still supported and safe to use. Having close to zero Linux kernel patches for years with only a tiny set of patches listed by Google in the Android Security Bulletins is a disaster.
Fairphone promises many years of updates but NEVER follows through on truly providing it.

2026-06-04 09:04:02 UTC

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Fairphone markets themselves as ethical and sustainable so you repeat that and claim not supporting their devices is opposing it. Their marketing claims are not reality.
Android Security Bulletins are bare minimum backported patches with a 2-4 month delay from when patches can be shipped to when they're listed in the bulletin. Fairphone consistently lags 1-2 months behind those already delayed dates from the beginning and gets much worse as devices get older.

2026-06-04 09:01:16 UTC

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Fairphone are close business partners with Murena and have heavily participated in their inaccurate marketing. They've directly participated in misleading people about GrapheneOS. The idea that we'd ever work with them is ludicrous. How isn't that relevant?
Fairphone markets their devices as providing a far better levek of updates, privacy and security than they do in reality. They don't keep up with updates from launch and it gets drastically worse over time.

2026-06-04 08:47:20 UTC

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/e/ and Murena are not only tricking people into buying highly insecure and non-private devices for profit. They're heavily dependent on receiving millions of euros of government funding. It explains their choice to side with authoritarians and undermine the privacy movement pushing these talking points about a far more reasonable level of privacy and security being for criminals and pedophiles as a whole, not only GrapheneOS.
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116353973732143171
#note1r96…za7j

2026-06-04 08:43:52 UTC

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/e/ and Murena have spent years misleading people about GrapheneOS including repeatedly falsely claiming it mainly benefits criminals and is mainly used by criminals. They've heavily invested in misleading people about what GrapheneOS provides which has done enormous harm to it. They've tricked people into believing it isn't suited to them with the ludicrously false claim it isn't a privacy project and leading people to believe it isn't usable or useful to them.