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2023-06-08 01:21:52 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2023-05-23
🗒️ Summary of this message: A discussion on the potential risks of using Lightning Network and Atomic Swap Protocol (ASP) for Bitcoin transactions without waiting for on-chain confirmations.
📝 Original message:Do you have any write up that presents a fully detailed architecture,
including mechanisms like bitcoin scripts, transactions and L2 protocols,
and then derives claims from that base?
On Tue, May 23, 2023, 5:59 AM Burak Keceli via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > As the access to Lightning is also by the (same?) ASP, it seems to me
> that the ASP will simply fail to forward the payment on the broader
> Lightning network after it has replaced the in-mempool transaction,
> preventing recipients from actually being able to rely on any received
> funds existing until the next pool transaction is confirmed.
>
> Yes, that's correct. Lightning payments are routed through ASPs. ASP may
> not cooperate in forwarding HTLC(s) AFTER double-spending their pool
> transaction. However, it's a footgun if ASP forwards HTLC(s) BEFORE
> double-spending their pool transaction.
>
> What makes Ark magical is, in the collaborative case, users' ability to
> pay lightning invoices with their zero-conf vTXOs, without waiting for
> on-chain confirmations.
>
> This is the opposite of swap-ins, where users SHOULD wait for on-chain
> confirmations before revealing their preimage of the HODL invoice;
> otherwise, the swap service provider can steal users' sats by
> double-spending their zero-conf HTLC.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-07 19:56:31 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-02-23
📝 Original message:Can an insertion ordered MMR allow an efficient nonexistence proof?
On Feb 23, 2017 1:20 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 09:53:58AM -0800, Chris Priest wrote:
> > On 2/22/17, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
> > <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > Reposting something that came up recently in a private discussion with
> some
> > > academics:
> > >
> > > Concretely, let's define a prunable MMR with the following grammar.
> This
> > > definition is an improvement on whats in the python-proofmarshal by
> > > committing
> > > to the number of items in the tree implicitly; an obvious
> max-log2(n)-sized
> > > proof-of-tree-size can be obtained by following the right-most nodes:
> >
> > What problem does this try to solve, and what does it have to do with
> bitcoin?
>
> See the discussion on TXO commitments for how MMR's could be used; a
> better MMR
> makes for a better TXO commitment.
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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