<unnamed>

Public Key

npub105eg2ny7gs448umtlsn4ns4slc5q3se8wpnzhtr22j8sgdrv2q7stlgz5a

Profile Code

nprofile1qqs86v59fj0yg26n7d4lcf6ec2c0u2qgcvnhqe3t4349frcyx3k9q0gpzemhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgqg5waehxw309aex2mrp0yhxgctdw4eju6t0qyxhwumn8ghj7mn0wvhxcmmvc0xnud

Publishing to

relay.primal.net

relay.damus.io

nos.lol

Last Notes

2023-06-07 17:38:15 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-27
📝 Original message:I would prefer not to download an attachment.
Generally and without having the benefit of reading your document, AML and
or KYC requirements are treated on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis.
You would probably need to factor obtaining a universal agreement between
all of the governments and regional enforcement bodies of the world on the
nature and scope of an acceptable set of policies before attempting to
attach rules to the protocol. Clearly, when one country unilaterally places
politicians of another country on banned lists and vice versa, for example,
would create some problems with implementation and automating checks
against banned lists produced by each country.
While you could apply a 'home rule' approach, you would be pushing
regulatory controls down to individuals transacting between each other
without having to go through any regulated intermediaries. This means you
have no way to enforce KYC or verify that the details are correct unless
you create a system of third party checkers in each country who would
enable transactions to proceed. To overcome all of this you would probably
need some identity verification system in place first and to add extra fees
into the network to pay for the maintenance of the system.
As has already been pointed out, the above would lead to individual coins
being tainted with previous ownership details creating the possibility for
blacklists rendering some coins worthless and creating the possibility of
these coins being passed on to unsuspecting users. All this goes against
the spirit of monetary systems, so you are back to regulating end points as
and when users come into contact with regulated entities.
Lastly, it might be worth knowing that criminal liability can be placed on
individuals responsible for implementing AML and KYC procedures and
policies that do not work or allow criminals to circumvent the systems of
controls.
On Thu, Aug 27, 2015 at 9:10 AM, prabhat via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I am proposing to create a AML-KYC module to control the network and also
> qualify use cases in OFAC compliant way.
> Here is the attached doc.
>
> Please provide your feedback and suggestions.
>
> Best,
> Prabhat Kumar Singh
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150827/ea799a7b/attachment.html>

2023-06-07 17:38:04 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-24
📝 Original message:Adam,
Thank you for your comments. We will address them in the next update.
Privacy is an area you have been championing for many years and your input
in this area has created the environment for Bitcoin to exist. Anonymity is
not something we would be willing to compromise, despite the general
public's endless willingness to give away their intimate life histories and
contact details to Facebook and other social media.
If you have the will to read a longish response, we have tried to expand a
little on the rationale for the type of data we believe will be useful and
valuable, in addition to broadly addressing the privacy issues.
Arguably, the greater the cryptographic protections on the ownership of a
transaction, the more value will be placed on the nature of transactions.
Without wishing to frame the conversation on specifics or particular
sectors, here are some distinctions to address some of the previously noted
Orwellian fears on attaching identity markers to Bitcoin transactions.
* We have no desire to create tools that can analyze which brand of baked
beans Bob may prefer compared to Alice. That is a matter of extreme detail
for supermarkets, their suppliers and internal point of sale systems. When
you make a store purchase, your basket of goods are wrapped up in a single
payment which appears on your credit card or bank statement. Knowing on an
aggregated basis that people spend around $120 / week on retail shopping
and that Saturday is the busiest period for that activity is more valuable
for payment processors than knowing the contents of Bob's basket of goods.
As a retailer or supplier, I would buy that data in order to plan
inventory, marketing budgets, promotional activity, staffing levels,
logistics, factory production, bank borrowing, store expansion planning,
etc.
* Now consider petrol. Bitcoin is very well suited for fuel purchases,
especially for small independent petrol filling stations. Aggregated data
would help the entire supply chain that serves the consumer, if businesses
at the front end had access to data for when demand was at peaks and
troughs. Extend that from individual petrol stations to regional, national
and international consumer purchases and you have the basis of the market
pricing oil based on demand per period and per country. Again, we don't
care that it is actually Bob who fills up every Sunday so he has enough
fuel to last him the week or to track him along his driving holiday.
* Now consider remittances. While the global headlines are that it is a
$500bn a year industry. Few people know that remittances are based on a
relatively small number of remittance corridors that make up the bulk of
the market. These corridors are based around people leaving small towns
and villages in poor areas and travelling to work in locations based on
knowing someone or a family member who used to live in their area and are
doing well in xyz location because they can see the beneficial impact on
the recipients quality of life. At the coal face, remittances are a word of
mouth grey market sector and part of the reason that WU and the like can
charge so much is because the last mile of remittances are in areas where
monetary infrastructure and logistics are difficult to serve and they can
get away with setting high prices. They prosper because they use data to
organise themselves better. Banks have no desire to serve this market
because you end up clogging up branches every Friday or Saturday with
people that transact relatively small sums compared to those that are
banked and get annoyed waiting. Having access to Bitcoin transaction data
on this sector would help Bitcoin businesses to understand the end points
of this market and serve it better and focus their promotional activities.
We have no desire to identify that Bob's cousin José is working illegally
in Texas.
These are three sectors where there are millions of small businesses that
would, for the first time, be able to access global, national and regional
industry data figures typically reserved for large businesses due to the
high cost of acquiring or commissioning research.
While increasing anonymity or having zero knowledge proofs in transactions
is desirable so that I can keep my Bitcoin salary payments private and my
membership of Ashley Madison out of the news, it would be helpful to know
that when I want to spend my salary that the world around me is organised
enough to serve my needs.
The block chain is ledger. It will contain a global data set that could end
up being one of the most valuable databases in the world. Why not use it to
fund Bitcoin's security infrastructure and growing bandwidth challenges?
Regards,
Ahmed
On Sun, Aug 23, 2015 at 5:05 PM, Adam Back <adam at cypherspace.org> wrote:
> Some comments:
>
> "(i) remove any possibility of free transactions unless
>
> associated with basic transaction data;"
>
> I believe it is not possible to prevent free transactions for the
> reason that people can pay out of band (via existing banking transfers
> to miners) or make payments to addresses belonging to miners (that are
> contingent on the requested user transaction being processed via input
> dependency) .
>
>
> I am not sure I fully understand the way you see monetisation working,
> and you do indicate this is quite far future what-if stage idea, and
> you do identify a conflict with fungibility - but I think this is
> probably quite badly in conflict with fungibility to the point of
> conflicting with many planned Bitcoin improvements? And mid term
> technical directions.
>
> I would say the long term idealised requirements are that the
> transaction itself would have cryptographic fungibility, and policy
> relating to identity for authorisation, approval in regulated
> transactions would take place at the payment protocol layer. The
> payment protocol is already seeing some use.
>
> Lightning protocol sees more of the data going point to point and so
> not broadcast nor visible for big data analytic monetisation.
>
> Adam
>
> On 22 August 2015 at 23:51, Jorge Timón
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Again, did you got a bip number asigned or did you self-assigned it
> yourself?
> >
> > On Sat, Aug 22, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Ahmed Zsales via bitcoin-dev
> > <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> In response to public and private comments and feedback, we have updated
> >> this working draft.
> >>
> >>
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwEbhrQ4ELzBOUVtOHJQdlhvUmc/view?usp=sharing
> >>
> >> Update highlights:
> >>
> >> 1. Specific clarifications on replacing the Coinbase subsidy and
> >> supplementing and not replacing transaction fees.
> >>
> >> 2. Clarification on block chain overhead. The value of data mining is
> on a
> >> bell curve, so year six data will be removed every year.
> >>
> >> 3. Added references to an ability to create global, national and
> regional
> >> Bitcoin Price Indices for popular baskets of goods transacted with
> Bitcoin.
> >>
> >> 4. Added references for an ability to use structured block chain data
> for
> >> Bitcoin capacity and fork planning.
> >>
> >> 5. Removed references to price speculation.
> >>
> >> 6. Added preferences for deployment dates of January 2017 or January
> 2018.
> >>
> >> 7. Moving towards BIP format after discussion and evaluation period.
> >> Technical content will increase in due course and discussion content
> will be
> >> removed.
> >>
> >> Further views and feedback welcome.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Ahmed
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mon, Aug 17, 2015 at 5:23 PM, Ahmed Zsales <ahmedzsales18 at gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Hello,
> >>>
> >>> Here we propose a long-term solution to replace mining rewards and
> >>> transactions fees.
> >>>
> >>> BIP 104 is currently a discussion draft only.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwEbhrQ4ELzBSXpoUjRkc01QUGc/view?usp=sharing
> >>>
> >>> Views and feedback welcome.
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>>
> >>> Ahmed
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150824/738f4586/attachment.html>

2023-06-07 17:37:49 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-21
📝 Original message:Interesting.
Unless I misunderstand the proposal, you would have to factor a way to deal
with miner cartel behavior. A few emails every week and the larger miners
could collude to set prices.
With that figured, then your voting proposal could be triggered by a moving
day block average which takes into account capacity for any given period,
plus a level of headroom for unexpected spikes. The issue with this is
forward planning is more important, especially when the moving average is
longer than a week.
Credit card providers and retailers use a number of factors to plan for
capacity on a regional basis. From previous years figures, long-term
weather forecasts, annual calendar events, one off events, etc. A global
currency can't use many of these tools for forward planning.
E.g. religious holidays are among the biggest events for transactions; if
we take Christmas, your proposal could work out a capacity during a quiet
period in November leading to a downward adjustment which then sees
transactions getting maxed out during the two weeks before Christmas eve.
You could then have an upward adjustment, but people stop spending on
Christmas day.
These are human factors that need to be considered.
On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 11:22 PM, Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I wanted to offer a potential way to adjust the block size limit in a
> democratic way without making it easy to game. This is meant only as a
> starting point for a general idea. Thresholds and exact figures and
> the details of the algorithm are up for debate, and possibly some
> formula based determination.
>
> The living document is currently a gist available at
> https://gist.github.com/btcdrak/1c3a323100a912b605b5
>
>
> <pre>
> BIP: XX
> Title: Consensus based block size retargeting algorithm
> Author: BtcDrak <btcdrak at gmail.com>
> Status: Draft
> Type: Standards Track
> Created: 2015-08-21
> </pre>
>
> ==Abstract==
>
> A method of altering the maximum allowed block size of the Bitcoin
> protocol using a consensus based approach.
>
> ==Motivation==
>
> There is a perception that Bitcoin cannot easily respond to raising
> the blocksize limit if popularity was to suddenly increase due to a
> mass adoption curve, because co-ordinating a hard fork takes
> considerable time, and being unable to respond in a timely manner
> would irreparably harm the credibility of bitcoin.
>
> Additionally, predetermined block size increases are problematic
> because they attempt to predict the future, and if too large could
> have unintended consequences like damaging the possibility for a fee
> market to develop as block subsidy decreases substantially over the
> next 9 years; introducing or exacerbating mining attack vectors; or
> somehow affect the network in unknown or unpredicted ways. Since fixed
> changes are hard to deploy, the damage could be extensive.
>
> Dynamic block size adjustments also suffer from the potential to be
> gamed by the larger hash power.
>
>
> ==Rationale==
>
> By introducing a cost to increase the block size ensures the mining
> community will collude to increase it only when there is a clear
> necessity, and reduce it when it is unnecessary. Rogue miners cannot
> force their wishes so easily because not only will they have to pay
> extra a difficulty target, then can be downvoted at no cost by the
> objecting hash power.
>
>
> ==Specification==
>
> The initial "base block size limit" shall be 1MB.
>
> Miners can vote for a block size increase by signalling the proposed
> percentage increase of the "base block size limit" in the coinbase
> field. For the vote to be considered valid the block they mine must
> meets a difficulty target which is proportionally larger than the
> standard difficulty target based on the percentage increase they voted
> for. If a miner does not vote, or the vote is invalid, it shall be
> counted as a vote for no change.
>
> Miners may vote the size down by signalling in the coinbase field
> without paying a difficulty penalty.
>
> Every 2016 blocks, the maximum allowed block size will be recalculated
> by the average of all votes in the last 2016 blocks, i.e. sum each
> vote from each block and divide by 2016 then multiply by the base
> block size limit. This will redefine the base block size limit for the
> next 2016 blocks.
>
> Blocks that are larger than the calculated base block size limit are
> invalid and MUST be rejected.
>
> The maximum change up or down each retargeting period shall be limited
> to 10% of the base block size limit.
>
> The maximum block size may not increase above 8MB.
>
> Votes shall be cast by adding the following human readable multiplier
> to the coinbase string “/BXn.nnn/” where valid votes would exist
> between the ranges “/BX0.900/” (10% decrease) and “/BX1.100/” (10%
> increase). “/BX1.000/” would be a vote for no change. Invalid votes
> will be counted as a vote for no change: “/BX1.000/”.
>
>
> ==Acknowledgements==
>
> This proposal is based on ideas and concepts derived from the writings
> of Meni Rosenfeld and Gregory Maxwell.
>
>
> ==Copyright==
>
> This work is placed in the public domain.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150822/c9e0bb54/attachment.html>

2023-06-07 17:36:30 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-17
📝 Original message:Hello,
Here we propose a long-term solution to replace mining rewards and
transactions fees.
BIP [104] is currently a discussion draft only.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwEbhrQ4ELzBSXpoUjRkc01QUGc/view?usp=sharing
Views and feedback welcome.
Regards,
Ahmed
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150817/e68c7083/attachment.html>

2023-06-07 17:34:45 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-20
📝 Original message:Add:
For - If everyone agrees an increase is required at some point, The longer
you leave it the greater the numbers who have to upgrade
Against - Insufficient testing before moving to production ready releases
sets a bad precedent
On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 10:11 PM, Elliot Olds via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Jorge Timón <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> To be clear, these two are just my personal lists of arguments on
>> "each side" to clear my mind and try to be perfectly objective.
>> [...]
>> Here's the updated both-thread lists:
>>
>>
>> http://0bin.net/paste/igHZMgeoIbYjCJd9#ovaOUlSAKvQYT2p3VXuIuUmNk2XyLH-GnjR5NZMZgFb
>
>
> I thought this was a good idea, so I turned my personal notes into a site
> attempting to list all the strongest arguments and counterarguments on the
> block size debate. I made mine a bit more detailed.
>
> Here's the site: https://sites.google.com/site/bitcoinblocksizedebate/
>
> Feedback welcome.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150820/31894e56/attachment.html>

2023-06-07 15:49:27 UTC

- reply

2023-06-07 15:49:14 UTC

- reply

2023-06-07 15:48:05 UTC

- reply

2023-06-07 15:46:40 UTC

- reply