<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1assqju94qjdpunps2yck2vtzfhnme5pclv0aantfajkjs5w2057quzu5p3

Profile Code

nprofile1qqswcgqfwz6sfxs7fsc9zvt9x93ymeau6qu0k877e457etfg289860qpzemhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgqg5waehxw309aex2mrp0yhxgctdw4eju6t0p63gyy

Publishing to

relay.primal.net

relay.damus.io

Last Notes

2023-06-07 15:43:05 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-23
📝 Original message:> So to point out what I consider obvious: if Bitcoin requires central
> control over its rules by a group of developers, it is completely
> uninteresting to me. Consensus changes should be done using consensus, and
> the default in case of controversy is no change.
This is a really interesting thread. Since we're no longer talking
about a consensus of the core committers, which would be central
control, but instead something broader, could you say a bit more about
what this consensus might look like, and how we'll know if we've got
one?
In plain language "no controversy" sounds like very high bar for a
diverse community like this; Even bringing in P2SH kicked up a fair
bit of fur and feathers. Do you have a definition in mind where it
isn't an _impossibly_ high one?
--
Edmund Edgar
Founder, Social Minds Inc (KK)
Twitter: @edmundedgar
Linked In: edmundedgar
Skype: edmundedgar
http://www.socialminds.jp
Reality Keys
@realitykeys
support at realitykeys.com
https://www.realitykeys.com

2023-06-07 15:14:38 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2014-03-08
📝 Original message:On 8 March 2014 17:10, Alan Reiner <etotheipi at gmail.com> wrote:
> I create a new keypair, <c_pub> with <c_priv> which I know (it can be any
> arbitrary key pair). But I don't give you <c_pub>, I give you <b_pub> =
> <c_pub> minus <a_pub> (which I can do because I've seen <a_pub> before
> doing this).
>
> Sure, I don't know the private key for <b_pub>, but it doesn't matter...
> because what
>
> <b_pub> + <a_pub> = <c_pub> (mine)
>
> You have no way to detect this condition, because you don't know what
> c_pub/c_priv I created, so you can only detect this after it's too late
> (after I abuse the private key)
>
Thanks Alan and Forrest, that makes sense. So to salvage the situation in
the original case, we have to make sure the parties exchange their public
keys first, before they're allowed to see the public keys they'll be
combining them with.
--
--
Edmund Edgar
Founder, Social Minds Inc (KK)
Twitter: @edmundedgar
Linked In: edmundedgar
Skype: edmundedgar
http://www.socialminds.jp
Reality Keys
@realitykeys
ed at realitykeys.com
https://www.realitykeys.com
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2023-06-07 15:14:37 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2014-03-08
📝 Original message:On 4 March 2014 14:07, Odinn Cyberguerrilla <odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net
> wrote:
> Nothing is safe.
>
This is true. To rephrase, imagine I gave you an ECC public key <ed_pub>,
you gave me back a public key <odinn_pub> of your own devising, then I paid
some money to the address resulting from add_pubkeys(<ed_pub>,<odinn_pub>)
[1]. Can anyone either:
a) Think of a way that Odinn could make an <odinn_pub> such that they could
spend the resulting money without having <ed_priv>.
b) Opine, somewhat knowledgeably, that this probably wouldn't be an easy
thing to do, and they wouldn't be alarmed to see people running software
that did this kind of thing.
[1]
https://github.com/vbuterin/pybitcointools/blob/master/pybitcointools/main.py#L173
--
Edmund Edgar
Founder, Social Minds Inc (KK)
Twitter: @edmundedgar
Linked In: edmundedgar
Skype: edmundedgar
http://www.socialminds.jp
Reality Keys
@realitykeys
ed at realitykeys.com
https://www.realitykeys.com
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2023-06-07 15:14:36 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2014-03-04
📝 Original message:Some people may have seen my service Reality Keys, which can perform a role
a bit like an External State Oracle as described previously by Mike Hearn
and others. (I like to think of it as a Certificate Authority for
propositions, doing for facts what Verisign do for identities.) You
register a possible outcome with us, we publish a public key for "yes" and
another for "no", and once the outcome happens or fails to happen, we
publish the appropriate private key.
A few people have been asking for advice on the best way to use our keys to
make m-of-n contracts, where each party locks up their stake in a
transaction, then the winner gets their private key from Reality Keys and
uses it to release the funds. Peter Todd suggested what seems like a very
nice way to do this without needing non-standard transactions or refund
transactions. I've had a go at implementing it and it seems to work, but I
don't know enough about this to distinguish the ECC bit of it from magic,
so I'm wondering if people who do understand it could comment on whether
it's a safe thing to be doing.
What I'm trying to do here is to combine the public key of each party with
the public key of the outcome they're representing, eg I make a public key
with:
<alice-pub> + <reality-key-yes-pub>
...and another with:
<bob-pub> + <reality-key-no-pub>
That goes into a 1/2 P2SH address (in the simplest possible case), which is
spendable by one of Alice or Bob after the outcome occurs with either:
<alice-priv> + <reality-key-yes-priv>
...or
<bob-priv> + <reality-key-no-priv>
I'm making the transaction with add_pubkeys, then spending it with
add_privkeys, both from:
https://github.com/vbuterin/pybitcointools/blob/master/pybitcointools/main.py#L173
What's worrying my superstitious mind is that knowing <reality-key-no-pub>
before he has to produce <bob-pub>, I'm wondering if there's something Bob
could do with <bob-pub> to intentionally weaken the resulting (<bob-pub> +
<reality-key-no-pub>) so that he could sign a transaction with it without
needing to know <reality-key-no-priv>.
My example script (and specifically the bit that's scaring me) is here:
https://github.com/edmundedgar/realitykeys-examples/blob/master/realitykeysdemo.py#L247
PS. I hope I'm not too far off-topic. Peter Todd suggested it might be
worth talking about here as it potentially has implications for other
protocols. If people prefer to respond at bitcointalk instead, we've been
discussing it here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=260898.60
--
Edmund Edgar
Founder, Social Minds Inc (KK)
Twitter: @edmundedgar
Linked In: edmundedgar
Skype: edmundedgar
http://www.socialminds.jp
Reality Keys
@realitykeys
ed at realitykeys.com
https://www.realitykeys.com
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