<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1545ndtu0dzkpr5tef46wpa4x47lds2t7tw7htm4l654sskf5zshsfw8pjr

Profile Code

nprofile1qqs226fk478k3tq369u56a8q76n2l0kc99l9h0t4a6la22cgty6pgtcpzpmhxue69uhkummnw3ezuamfdejsz9rhwden5te0wfjkccte9ejxzmt4wvhxjmchglac5

Publishing to

nostr.wine

relay.damus.io

nos.lol

Last Notes

2023-06-07 17:21:56 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2014-05-23
📝 Original message:Multisig is great for irreversible actions, but pointless most of the
time, which is why no PGP developer or user ever thought to implement it.
If you lose a key and an attacker signs a bogus email or commit with it,
we all roll back with no lasting harm done.
Wladimir wrote:
> On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 8:06 PM, Jeff Garzik <jgarzik at bitpay.com> wrote:
>> Related: Current multi-sig wallet technology being rolled out now,
>> with 2FA and other fancy doodads, is now arguably more secure than my
>> PGP keyring. My PGP keyring is, to draw an analogy, a non-multisig
>> wallet (set of keys), with all the associated theft/data
>> destruction/backup risks.
>>
>> The more improvements I see in bitcoin wallets, the more antiquated my
>> PGP keyring appears. Zero concept of multisig. The PGP keyring
>> compromise process is rarely exercised. 2FA is lacking. At least
>> offline signing works well. Mostly.
> Would be incredible to have multisig for git commits as well. I don't
> think git supports multiple signers for one commit at this point -
> amending the signature replaces the last one - but it would allow for
> some interesting multi-factor designs in which the damage when a dev's
> computer is compromised would be reduced.
>
> Sounds like a lot of work to get a good workflow there, though.
>
> My mail about single-signing commits was already longer than I
> expected when I started writing there. Even though the process is
> really simple.
>
> Though if anyone's interest is piqued by this, please pick it up.
>
> Wladimir
>
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2023-06-07 17:09:03 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2013-11-07
📝 Original message:Each block that you solve has a reward. In practice, some blocks will
be orphaned, so the expected reward is slightly less than the nominal
reward. Each second that you delay publishing a block, the expected
reward drops somewhat.
On an infinite timeline, the total reward approaches the expected
reward. But reality is discrete, and zero tends to be a brick wall. If
you delay publishing a block, you will get either the nominal reward, or
zero, not some fraction in between. And if your personal random walk
involves an excursion through negative land, you may not stick around
long enough for it to come back.
Thus, a positive expected value is not sufficient for some strategy to
be a good one.
Peter Todd wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 10:15:40PM -0600, Kyle Jerviss wrote:
>> You are ignoring the gambler's ruin. We do not operate on an
>> infinite timeline. If you find a big pool willing to try this,
>> please give me enough advance warning to get my popcorn ready.
> Gamblers ruin has nothing to do with it.
>
> At every point you want to evaluate the chance the other side will get
> ahead, vs. cashing in by just publishing the blocks you have. (or some
> of them) I didn't mention it in the analysis, but obviously you want to
> keep track of how much the blocks you haven't published are worth to
> you, and consider publishing some or all of your lead to the rest of the
> network if you stand to lose more than you gain.
>
> Right now it's a mostly theoretical attack because the inflation subsidy
> is enormous and fees don't matter, but once fees do start to matter
> things get a lot more complex. An extreme example is announce/commit
> sacrifices to mining fees: if I'm at block n+1, the rest of the network
> is at block n, and there's a 100BTC sacrifice at block n+2, I could
> easily be in a situation where I have zero incentive to publish my block
> to keep everyone else behind me, and just hope I find block n+2. If I
> do, great! I'll immediately publish to lock-in my winnings and start
> working on block n+3
>
>
> Anyway, my covert suggestion that pools contact me was more to hopefully
> strike fear into the people mining at a large pool and get them to
> switch to a small one. :) If everyone mined solo or on p2pool none of
> this stuff would matter much... but we can't force them too yet.
>
>
>
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2023-06-07 17:09:01 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2013-11-07
📝 Original message:You are ignoring the gambler's ruin. We do not operate on an infinite
timeline. If you find a big pool willing to try this, please give me
enough advance warning to get my popcorn ready.
Peter Todd wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 01:06:47PM -0500, Christophe Biocca wrote:
>> I might try building this sometime soon. I think it may also serve an
>> educational purpose when trying to understand the whole network's behaviour.
>>
>> What level of accuracy are we looking for though? Obviously we need to
>> fully emulate the steps of the network protocol, and we need to be able to
>> specify time taken for transmission/processing for each node. Do we care
>> about the actual contents of the messages (to be able to simulate double
>> spend attempts, invalid transactions and blocks, SPV node communication),
>> and their validation (actual signatures and proof of work)?
>>
>> I imagine the latter is pretty useless, beyond specifying that the
>> signature/proof of work is valid/invalid.
>>
>> If we could build up a set of experiments we'd like to run on it, it would
>> help clarify what's needed.
>>
>> Off the top of my head:
>>
>> - Peter Todd's miner strategy of sending blocks to only 51% of the
>> hashpower.
> Speaking of, I hadn't gotten around to doing up the math behind that
> strategy properly; turns out 51% I was overly optimistic and the actual
> threshold is 29.3%
>
> Suppose I find a block. I have Q hashing power, and the rest of the
> network 1-Q. Should I tell the rest of the network, or withhold that
> block and hope I find a second one?
>
> Now in a purely inflation subsidy environment, where I don't care about
> the other miners success, of course I should publish. However, if my
> goals are to find *more* blocks than the other miners for whatever
> reason, maybe because transaction fees matter or I'm trying to get
> nLockTime'd announce/commit fee sacrifices, it gets more complicated.
>
>
> There are three possible outcomes:
>
> 1) I find the next block, probability Q
> 2) They find the next block, probability 1-Q
> 2.1) I find the next block, probability Q, or (1-Q)*Q in total.
> 2.2) They find the next block, probability (1-Q)^2 in total.
>
> Note how only in the last option do I lose. So how much hashing power do
> I need before it is just as likely that the other miners will find two
> blocks before I find either one block, or two blocks? Easy enough:
>
> Q + (1-Q)*Q = (1-Q)^2 -> Q^2 - Q + 1/2 -> Q = (1 - \sqrt(2))/2
>
> Q ~= 29.2%
>
> So basically, if I'm trying to beat other miners, once I have >29.3% of
> the hashing power I have no incentive to publish the blocks I mine!
>
> But hang on, does it matter if I'm the one who actually has that hashing
> power? What if I just make sure that only >29.3% of the hashing power
> has that block? If my goal is to make sure that someone does useless
> work, and/or they are working on a lower height block than me, then no,
> I don't care, which means my original "send blocks to >51% of the
> hashing power" analysis was actually wrong, and the strategy is even
> more crazy: "send blocks to >29.3% of the hashing power" (!)
>
>
> Lets suppose I know that I'm two blocks ahead:
>
> 1) I find the next block: Q (3:0)
> 2) They find the next block: (1-Q) (2:1)
> 2.1) I find the next block: (1-Q)*Q (3:1)
> 2.2) They find the next block: (1-Q)^2 (2:2)
> 2.2.1) I find the next block: (1-Q)^2 * Q (3:2)
> 2.2.2) They find the next block: (1-Q)^3 (2:3)
>
> At what hashing power should I release my blocks? So remember, I win
> this round on outcomes 1, 2.1, 2.2.1 and they only win on 2.2.2:
>
> Q + (1-Q)*Q + (1-Q)^2*Q = (1-Q)^3 -> Q = 1 - 2^-3
>
> Q ~= 20.6%
>
> Interesting... so as I get further ahead, or to be exact the group of
> miners who have a given block gets further ahead, I need less hashing
> power for my incentives to be to *not* publish the block I just found.
> Conversely this means I should try to make my blocks propagate to less
> of the hashing power, by whatever means necessary.
>
> Now remember, none of the above strategy requires me to have a special
> low-latency network or anything fancy. I don't even have to have a lot
> of hashing power - the strategy still works if I'm, say, a 5% pool. It
> just means I don't have the incentives people thought I did to propagate
> my blocks widely.
>
> The other nasty thing about this, is suppose I'm a miner and recently
> got a block from another miner: should I forward that block, or not
> bother? Well, it depends: if I have no idea how much of the hashing
> power has that block, I should forward the block. But again, if my goal
> is to be most likely to get the next block, I should only forward in
> such a way that >30% of the hashing power has the block.
>
> This means that if I have some information about what % already has that
> block, I have less incentive to forward! For instance, suppose that
> every major miner has been publishing their node addresses in their
> blocks - I'll have a pretty good idea of who probably has that most
> recent block, so I can easily make a well-optimized decision not to
> forward. Similarly because the 30% hashing power figure is the
> *integral* of time * hashes/second, if miners are forwarding
> near-target-headers, I might as well wait a few seconds and see if I see
> any near-target-headers; if I do for this block then I have evidence
> that hashing power does have it, and I shouldn't forward.
>
>
> So yeah, we're fucked and have got to fix this awful incentive structure
> somehow before the inflation subsidy gets any smaller. Also, raising the
> blocksize, especially by just removing the limit, is utter madness given
> it can be used to slow down block propagation selectively, so the
> hashing power that gets a given block is limited repeatably to the same
> group.
>
>
> P.S: If any large pools want to try this stuff out, give me a shout. You
> have my PGP key - confidentiality assured.
>
> P.P.S: If you're mining on a pool with more than, like, 1% hashing
> power, do the math on varience... Seriously, stop it and go mine on a
> smaller pool, or better yet, p2pool.
>
>
>
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>
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