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Last Notes

2023-06-08 01:17:24 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-12-05
📝 Original message:You are doing quite big claims without explaining those, let me add a few
questions inline:
On Mon, Dec 5, 2022 at 10:39 AM Greg Sanders <gsanders87 at gmail.com> wrote:
This will greatly centralize the network as well as not actually achieve
> the intended goal which is literally impossible.
>
Why would this centralize the network? Adding more nodes that propagate
valid blocks on the network should be good. Also, I cannot see why you say
it is "literally impossible", could you give any explanation for your words?
On Mon, Dec 5, 2022 at 11:53 AM Rijndael via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Good morning,
>
> That sounds like a very dangerous mode of operation. You can already hand
> a transaction to a miner privately. I hand a transaction to a miner with
> some reasonable fee, and then I go and broadcast a different transaction
> with a minimal fee that spends the same inputs. The whole network
> (including the miner I handed the tx to) could all be running with a strict
> first-seen mempool policy, but we can still have a situation where the
> miner creates a block with a different transaction from what you see in
> your mempool. If anytime this happens, the nodes running your proposed rule
> drop the block, then anyone can fork those nodes off the network whenever
> they want.
>
I cannot see the danger you are talking about, sending a transaction
directly to a miner does not sound like anyone can do (except a miner) and
is not the main workflow, usually transactions propagate on the network and
it is quite difficult to have different miners with different opt-out-rbb
transactions that spends the same input. In that strange scenario that you
mention, the miner generated block might be lost if another miner creates
an alternative block.
> Even outside of adversarial settings, Bitcoin doesn't (and doesn't attempt
> to) promise consistency across mempools. Making a consensus rule that
> enforces mempool consistency is a recipe for (unintended?) chainsplits.
>
That is not entirely true for opt-out rbf transactions, as most 0conf
setups are based on such consistency. And breaking a consensus rule always
leads to a chainsplit. For example when a miner creates a block that
double-spends an input, the normal bitcoin flow is a chain-split. That is
not an unintended chainsplit, is a consensus rule enforcement.
> - rijndael
>
>
> On 12/5/22 7:20 AM, El_Hoy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> The only option I see against the attack Peter Todd is doing to opt-in RBF
> and 0Conf bitcoin usage is working on a bitcoin core implementation that
> stops propagation of full-rbf replaced blocks. Running multiple of such
> nodes on the network will add a risk to miners that enable full-rbf that
> would work as an incentive against that.
>
> Obviously that would require adding an option on bitcoin core (that is not
> technically but politically difficult to implement as Petter Todd already
> have commit access to the main repository).
>
> That said, a sufficiently incentivized actor (like Daniel Lipshitz or Muun
> wallet developers) could work on a fork and run several nodes with such
> functionality. As far as I understand the percolation model, with 10 to 20
> nodes running such a rule would create a significant risk for full-rbf
> miners.
>
> Regards.
>
> --- Eloy
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 11:43 AM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 03:36:08PM +1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
>> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 01:16:13PM -0500, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
>> wrote:
>> > > FYI I've gotten a few hundred dollars worth of donations to this
>> effort, and
>> > > have raised the reward to about 0.02 BTC, or $400 USD at current
>> prices.
>> >
>> > Seems like this has been mostly claimed (0.014btc / $235, 9238sat/vb):
>>
>> I'm turning it back on when (if) the mempool settles down. I've got more
>> than
>> enough donations to give another run at it (the majority was donated
>> privately
>> FWIW). There's a risk of the mempool filling up again of course; hard to
>> avoid
>> that.
>>
>> Right now of course it's really easy to double spend with the obvious
>> low-fee/high-fee method as the min relay fee keeps shifting.
>>
>> >
>> https://mempool.space/tx/397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c
>> >
>> > The block it was claimed in seems to have been about an hour after the
>> > default mempool filled up:
>> >
>> > https://twitter.com/murchandamus/status/1592274621977477120
>> >
>> > That block actually seems to have included two
>> > alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org txs, the other paying $7.88
>> > (309sat/vb):
>> >
>> >
>> https://mempool.space/tx/ba9670109a6551458d5e1e23600c7bf2dc094894abdf59fe7aa020ccfead07cf
>>
>> The second is because I turned down the full-rbf reward to more normal fee
>> levels. There's also another full-rbf double-spend from the Bob calendar,
>> along
>> the same lines:
>> 7e76b351009326a574f3120164dbbe6d85e07e04a7bbdc40f0277fcb008d2cd2
>>
>> I double-spent the txin of the high fee tx that got mined. But I
>> mistakenly had
>> RBF enabled in that double-spend, so while it propagated initially, I
>> believe
>> it was replaced when something (someone?) rebroadcast the high-fee 397dcb
>> tx.
>>
>> > Timeline (utc) to me looks like:
>> >
>> > - 13:12 - block 763148 is mined: last one that had a min fee <
>> 1.5sat/vb
>> > - 13:33 -
>> f503868c64d454c472859b793f3ee7cdc8f519c64f8b1748d8040cd8ce6dc6e1
>> > is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb)
>> > - 18:42 -
>> 746daab9bcc331be313818658b4a502bb4f3370a691fd90015fabcd7759e0944
>> > is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb)
>> > - 21:52 - ba967010 tx is announced and propogates widely, since
>> > conflicting tx 746daab9 has been removed from default
>> > mempools
>> > - 21:53 - murch tweets about default mempool filling up
>> > - 22:03 - 397dcbe4 tx is announced and propogates widely, since
>> > conflicting tx f503868 has already been removed from default
>> > mempools
>>
>> Is that 22:03 time for 397 from your node's logs? It was originally
>> announced
>> hours earlier. From one of my full-rbf nodes:
>>
>> 2022-11-14T14:08:37Z [mempool] replacing tx
>> 764867062b67fea61810c3858d587da83a28290545e882935a32285028084317 with
>> 397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c for
>> 0.00468 additional fees, -1 delta bytes
>>
>> > - 22:35 - block 763189 is mined
>> > - 22:39 - block 763190 is mined
>> > - 23:11 - block 763191 is mined
>> > - 23:17 - block 763192 is mined including 397dcbe4
>> >
>> > miningpool.observer reports both 397dcbe4 and ba967010 as missing in the
>> > first three blocks, and gives similar mempool ages for those txs to what
>> > my logs report:
>> >
>> >
>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/0000000000000000000436aba59d8430061e0e50592215f7f263bfb1073ccac7
>> >
>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000005600404792bacfd8a164d2fe9843766afb2bfbd937309
>> >
>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000004a3073f58c9eae40f251ea7aeaeac870daeac4b238fd1
>> >
>> > That presumably means those pools (AntPool twice and "unknown") are
>> > running with large mempools that didn't kept the earlier 1.2sat/vb txs.
>>
>> To be clear, you think that AntPool and that other exchange is running
>> with a
>> larger than normal max mempool size limit? You mean those miners *did*
>> keep the
>> earlier 1.2sat/vb tx?
>>
>> > The txs were mined by Foundry:
>> >
>> >
>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000001382a226aedac822de80309cca2bf1253b35d4f8144f5
>> >
>> > This seems to be pretty good evidence that we currently don't have any
>> > significant hashrate mining with fullrbf policies (<0.5% if there was a
>> > high fee replacement available prior to every block having been mined),
>> > despite the bounty having been collected.
>>
>> Oh, we can put much lower bounds on that. I've been running OTS calendars
>> with
>> full-rbf replacements for a few months without clear evidence of a
>> full-rbf
>> replacement. While there was good reason to think some miners were mining
>> full-rbf before a few years back, they probably didn't bother to reapply
>> their
>> patches each upgrade. `mempoolfullrbf=1` is much simpler to use.
>>
>> --
>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-08 01:17:23 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-12-06
📝 Original message:On Mon, Dec 5, 2022 at 3:58 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> note: if it was possible to enforce this, we wouldn't need proof of work
> at all. since it isn't possible, proof of work is strictly necessary.
>
If making empty statements were enough to convince people, we would not
need to give good arguments to back our claims. Proof of work is "strictly
necessary" to build blocks that are accepted by the consensus rules, that
are enforced by the validation nodes that propagate those blocks. If there
are multiple valid blocks that are generated close enough and some of them
propagate faster than the others, then validation nodes add some economic
incentive against certain practices. Miners will obviously choose what
validation nodes enforce or they will lose money.
On Mon, Dec 5, 2022 at 3:58 PM Michael Folkson via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Daniel Lipshitz has been working on BSV apparently [0] so I guess anything
> is possible with him.(...)
>
--
> Michael Folkson
You are apparently making an Ad Hominem attack [1] so I guess your comment
is not serious. Thanks for the context anyway.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem
--- Eloy
> On Mon, Dec 5, 2022 at 9:53 AM Rijndael via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Good morning,
>>
>> That sounds like a very dangerous mode of operation. You can already hand
>> a transaction to a miner privately. I hand a transaction to a miner with
>> some reasonable fee, and then I go and broadcast a different transaction
>> with a minimal fee that spends the same inputs. The whole network
>> (including the miner I handed the tx to) could all be running with a strict
>> first-seen mempool policy, but we can still have a situation where the
>> miner creates a block with a different transaction from what you see in
>> your mempool. If anytime this happens, the nodes running your proposed rule
>> drop the block, then anyone can fork those nodes off the network whenever
>> they want.
>>
>> Even outside of adversarial settings, Bitcoin doesn't (and doesn't
>> attempt to) promise consistency across mempools. Making a consensus rule
>> that enforces mempool consistency is a recipe for (unintended?)
>> chainsplits.
>>
>> - rijndael
>>
>>
>> On 12/5/22 7:20 AM, El_Hoy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>
>> The only option I see against the attack Peter Todd is doing to opt-in
>> RBF and 0Conf bitcoin usage is working on a bitcoin core implementation
>> that stops propagation of full-rbf replaced blocks. Running multiple of
>> such nodes on the network will add a risk to miners that enable full-rbf
>> that would work as an incentive against that.
>>
>> Obviously that would require adding an option on bitcoin core (that is
>> not technically but politically difficult to implement as Petter Todd
>> already have commit access to the main repository).
>>
>> That said, a sufficiently incentivized actor (like Daniel Lipshitz or
>> Muun wallet developers) could work on a fork and run several nodes with
>> such functionality. As far as I understand the percolation model, with 10
>> to 20 nodes running such a rule would create a significant risk for
>> full-rbf miners.
>>
>> Regards.
>>
>> --- Eloy
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 11:43 AM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 03:36:08PM +1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
>>> wrote:
>>> > On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 01:16:13PM -0500, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
>>> wrote:
>>> > > FYI I've gotten a few hundred dollars worth of donations to this
>>> effort, and
>>> > > have raised the reward to about 0.02 BTC, or $400 USD at current
>>> prices.
>>> >
>>> > Seems like this has been mostly claimed (0.014btc / $235, 9238sat/vb):
>>>
>>> I'm turning it back on when (if) the mempool settles down. I've got more
>>> than
>>> enough donations to give another run at it (the majority was donated
>>> privately
>>> FWIW). There's a risk of the mempool filling up again of course; hard to
>>> avoid
>>> that.
>>>
>>> Right now of course it's really easy to double spend with the obvious
>>> low-fee/high-fee method as the min relay fee keeps shifting.
>>>
>>> >
>>> https://mempool.space/tx/397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c
>>> >
>>> > The block it was claimed in seems to have been about an hour after the
>>> > default mempool filled up:
>>> >
>>> > https://twitter.com/murchandamus/status/1592274621977477120
>>> >
>>> > That block actually seems to have included two
>>> > alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org txs, the other paying $7.88
>>> > (309sat/vb):
>>> >
>>> >
>>> https://mempool.space/tx/ba9670109a6551458d5e1e23600c7bf2dc094894abdf59fe7aa020ccfead07cf
>>>
>>> The second is because I turned down the full-rbf reward to more normal
>>> fee
>>> levels. There's also another full-rbf double-spend from the Bob
>>> calendar, along
>>> the same lines:
>>> 7e76b351009326a574f3120164dbbe6d85e07e04a7bbdc40f0277fcb008d2cd2
>>>
>>> I double-spent the txin of the high fee tx that got mined. But I
>>> mistakenly had
>>> RBF enabled in that double-spend, so while it propagated initially, I
>>> believe
>>> it was replaced when something (someone?) rebroadcast the high-fee
>>> 397dcb tx.
>>>
>>> > Timeline (utc) to me looks like:
>>> >
>>> > - 13:12 - block 763148 is mined: last one that had a min fee <
>>> 1.5sat/vb
>>> > - 13:33 -
>>> f503868c64d454c472859b793f3ee7cdc8f519c64f8b1748d8040cd8ce6dc6e1
>>> > is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb)
>>> > - 18:42 -
>>> 746daab9bcc331be313818658b4a502bb4f3370a691fd90015fabcd7759e0944
>>> > is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb)
>>> > - 21:52 - ba967010 tx is announced and propogates widely, since
>>> > conflicting tx 746daab9 has been removed from default
>>> > mempools
>>> > - 21:53 - murch tweets about default mempool filling up
>>> > - 22:03 - 397dcbe4 tx is announced and propogates widely, since
>>> > conflicting tx f503868 has already been removed from default
>>> > mempools
>>>
>>> Is that 22:03 time for 397 from your node's logs? It was originally
>>> announced
>>> hours earlier. From one of my full-rbf nodes:
>>>
>>> 2022-11-14T14:08:37Z [mempool] replacing tx
>>> 764867062b67fea61810c3858d587da83a28290545e882935a32285028084317 with
>>> 397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c for
>>> 0.00468 additional fees, -1 delta bytes
>>>
>>> > - 22:35 - block 763189 is mined
>>> > - 22:39 - block 763190 is mined
>>> > - 23:11 - block 763191 is mined
>>> > - 23:17 - block 763192 is mined including 397dcbe4
>>> >
>>> > miningpool.observer reports both 397dcbe4 and ba967010 as missing in
>>> the
>>> > first three blocks, and gives similar mempool ages for those txs to
>>> what
>>> > my logs report:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/0000000000000000000436aba59d8430061e0e50592215f7f263bfb1073ccac7
>>> >
>>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000005600404792bacfd8a164d2fe9843766afb2bfbd937309
>>> >
>>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000004a3073f58c9eae40f251ea7aeaeac870daeac4b238fd1
>>> >
>>> > That presumably means those pools (AntPool twice and "unknown") are
>>> > running with large mempools that didn't kept the earlier 1.2sat/vb txs.
>>>
>>> To be clear, you think that AntPool and that other exchange is running
>>> with a
>>> larger than normal max mempool size limit? You mean those miners *did*
>>> keep the
>>> earlier 1.2sat/vb tx?
>>>
>>> > The txs were mined by Foundry:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000001382a226aedac822de80309cca2bf1253b35d4f8144f5
>>> >
>>> > This seems to be pretty good evidence that we currently don't have any
>>> > significant hashrate mining with fullrbf policies (<0.5% if there was a
>>> > high fee replacement available prior to every block having been mined),
>>> > despite the bounty having been collected.
>>>
>>> Oh, we can put much lower bounds on that. I've been running OTS
>>> calendars with
>>> full-rbf replacements for a few months without clear evidence of a
>>> full-rbf
>>> replacement. While there was good reason to think some miners were
>>> mining
>>> full-rbf before a few years back, they probably didn't bother to reapply
>>> their
>>> patches each upgrade. `mempoolfullrbf=1` is much simpler to use.
>>>
>>> --
>>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-08 01:17:18 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-12-05
📝 Original message:The only option I see against the attack Peter Todd is doing to opt-in RBF
and 0Conf bitcoin usage is working on a bitcoin core implementation that
stops propagation of full-rbf replaced blocks. Running multiple of such
nodes on the network will add a risk to miners that enable full-rbf that
would work as an incentive against that.
Obviously that would require adding an option on bitcoin core (that is not
technically but politically difficult to implement as Petter Todd already
have commit access to the main repository).
That said, a sufficiently incentivized actor (like Daniel Lipshitz or Muun
wallet developers) could work on a fork and run several nodes with such
functionality. As far as I understand the percolation model, with 10 to 20
nodes running such a rule would create a significant risk for full-rbf
miners.
Regards.
--- Eloy
On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 11:43 AM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 03:36:08PM +1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 01:16:13PM -0500, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > > FYI I've gotten a few hundred dollars worth of donations to this
> effort, and
> > > have raised the reward to about 0.02 BTC, or $400 USD at current
> prices.
> >
> > Seems like this has been mostly claimed (0.014btc / $235, 9238sat/vb):
>
> I'm turning it back on when (if) the mempool settles down. I've got more
> than
> enough donations to give another run at it (the majority was donated
> privately
> FWIW). There's a risk of the mempool filling up again of course; hard to
> avoid
> that.
>
> Right now of course it's really easy to double spend with the obvious
> low-fee/high-fee method as the min relay fee keeps shifting.
>
> >
> https://mempool.space/tx/397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c
> >
> > The block it was claimed in seems to have been about an hour after the
> > default mempool filled up:
> >
> > https://twitter.com/murchandamus/status/1592274621977477120
> >
> > That block actually seems to have included two
> > alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org txs, the other paying $7.88
> > (309sat/vb):
> >
> >
> https://mempool.space/tx/ba9670109a6551458d5e1e23600c7bf2dc094894abdf59fe7aa020ccfead07cf
>
> The second is because I turned down the full-rbf reward to more normal fee
> levels. There's also another full-rbf double-spend from the Bob calendar,
> along
> the same lines:
> 7e76b351009326a574f3120164dbbe6d85e07e04a7bbdc40f0277fcb008d2cd2
>
> I double-spent the txin of the high fee tx that got mined. But I
> mistakenly had
> RBF enabled in that double-spend, so while it propagated initially, I
> believe
> it was replaced when something (someone?) rebroadcast the high-fee 397dcb
> tx.
>
> > Timeline (utc) to me looks like:
> >
> > - 13:12 - block 763148 is mined: last one that had a min fee < 1.5sat/vb
> > - 13:33 -
> f503868c64d454c472859b793f3ee7cdc8f519c64f8b1748d8040cd8ce6dc6e1
> > is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb)
> > - 18:42 -
> 746daab9bcc331be313818658b4a502bb4f3370a691fd90015fabcd7759e0944
> > is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb)
> > - 21:52 - ba967010 tx is announced and propogates widely, since
> > conflicting tx 746daab9 has been removed from default
> > mempools
> > - 21:53 - murch tweets about default mempool filling up
> > - 22:03 - 397dcbe4 tx is announced and propogates widely, since
> > conflicting tx f503868 has already been removed from default
> > mempools
>
> Is that 22:03 time for 397 from your node's logs? It was originally
> announced
> hours earlier. From one of my full-rbf nodes:
>
> 2022-11-14T14:08:37Z [mempool] replacing tx
> 764867062b67fea61810c3858d587da83a28290545e882935a32285028084317 with
> 397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c for
> 0.00468 additional fees, -1 delta bytes
>
> > - 22:35 - block 763189 is mined
> > - 22:39 - block 763190 is mined
> > - 23:11 - block 763191 is mined
> > - 23:17 - block 763192 is mined including 397dcbe4
> >
> > miningpool.observer reports both 397dcbe4 and ba967010 as missing in the
> > first three blocks, and gives similar mempool ages for those txs to what
> > my logs report:
> >
> >
> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/0000000000000000000436aba59d8430061e0e50592215f7f263bfb1073ccac7
> >
> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000005600404792bacfd8a164d2fe9843766afb2bfbd937309
> >
> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000004a3073f58c9eae40f251ea7aeaeac870daeac4b238fd1
> >
> > That presumably means those pools (AntPool twice and "unknown") are
> > running with large mempools that didn't kept the earlier 1.2sat/vb txs.
>
> To be clear, you think that AntPool and that other exchange is running
> with a
> larger than normal max mempool size limit? You mean those miners *did*
> keep the
> earlier 1.2sat/vb tx?
>
> > The txs were mined by Foundry:
> >
> >
> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000001382a226aedac822de80309cca2bf1253b35d4f8144f5
> >
> > This seems to be pretty good evidence that we currently don't have any
> > significant hashrate mining with fullrbf policies (<0.5% if there was a
> > high fee replacement available prior to every block having been mined),
> > despite the bounty having been collected.
>
> Oh, we can put much lower bounds on that. I've been running OTS calendars
> with
> full-rbf replacements for a few months without clear evidence of a full-rbf
> replacement. While there was good reason to think some miners were mining
> full-rbf before a few years back, they probably didn't bother to reapply
> their
> patches each upgrade. `mempoolfullrbf=1` is much simpler to use.
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-08 01:13:40 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-09-22
📝 Original message:There is a known issue on bitcoin, that is that every transaction requires
a new address to prevent address reuse, making it uncomfortable to make
recurring payments, as every payment requires a new off-chain interaction.
A scheme is already mentioned on the [on the BIP32 itself][1], but it
cannot be implemented as is.
Here I propose a scheme that follows the structure described on [BIP44]
that should make it possible to send recurring payments using a single
offline interaction.
The proposed scheme is:
master / purpose' / coin_type' / contact' / index
Where the definitions of all the levels follow BIP44, except for `contact`
that is described below.
Example usage: Bob wants to make recurring payments to Carol, so he asks
her for a _contact address_, that is, an extended public key.
Bob can use that public key to generate multiple derived addresses to make
multiple recurring payments to Carol, the contact address is stored
off-chain, anyone inspecting the chain will just see normal transactions
on-chain.
## Considerations
[BIP47] tries to solve the same issue, but the solution is more complex and
involves more on-chain transactions that involve data, this implementation
simpler and requires less work to implement.
Also, the derivation path might need some adjustments for different address
types on bitcoin.
Finally, this only works in a single direction and does not make it
possible for Carol to send anything to Bob, as it would require Bob sending
her a contact address.
## Advantages
A positive side effect of using this, is that Bob can choose to send
payments to Carol using multiple outputs, giving him more privacy.
Also, those payments can be easily labeled by the receiving wallet, as they
are received.
Regards.
### References
[1]:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki#recurrent-business-to-business-transactions-nmih0
[BIP47]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0047.mediawiki
"Reusable Payment Codes for Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets"
[BIP43]:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0043.mediawiki#Purpose
--- Eloy
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