<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1e7vdq905zr4xjr5nxuz58l9jcvffxq728ysl6m2xxgr024mjy5vq4fg307

Profile Code

nprofile1qqsvlxxszh6pp6nfp6fnwp2rljevxy5nq09rjg0ad4rryph42aez2xqpz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduqs6amnwvaz7tmwdaejumr0dsgmp5c5

Publishing to

nostr.wine

nos.lol

relay.damus.io

Last Notes

2023-06-07 18:11:13 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2018-03-15
📝 Original message:On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 5:46 AM, Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle at rosenbaum.se> wrote:
> I can't really see from your proposal if you had thought of this: A soft
> fork can make old nodes accept invalid message signatures as valid. For
> example, a "signer" can use a witness version unknown to the verifier to
> fool the verifier. Witness version is detectable (just reject unknown
> witness versions) but there may be more subtle changes. Segwit was not
> "detectable" in that way, for example.
>
> This is the reason why I withdrew BIP120. If you have thought about the
> above, I'd be very interested.
I'm not sure I see the problem. The scriptPubKey is derived directly
from the address in all cases, which means the unknown witness version
would have to be committed to in the address itself.
So yeah, I can make a P2SH address with a witness version > 0 and a to
me unknown pubkey and then fool you into thinking I own it, but I
don't really see why you'd ultimately care. In other words, if I can
SPEND funds sent to that address today, I can prove that I can spend
today, which is the purpose of the tool, I think.
For the case where the witness version HAS been upgraded, the above
still applies, but I'm not sure it's a big issue. And it doesn't
really require an old node. I just need to set witness version >
current witness version and the problem applies to all nodes.
On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 8:36 AM, Luke Dashjr <luke at dashjr.org> wrote:
> I don't see a need for a new RPC interface, just a new signature format.
All right.
> Ideally, it should support not only just "proof I receive at this address",
> but also "proof of funds" (as a separate feature) since this is a popular
> misuse of the current message signing (which doesn't actually prove funds at
> all). To do this, it needs to be capable of signing for multiple inputs.
I assume by inputs you mean addresses/keys. The address field could
optionally be an array. That'd be enough?
> Preferably, it should also avoid disclosing the public key for existing or
> future UTXOs. But I don't think it's possible to avoid this without something
> MAST-like first. Perhaps it can be a MAST upgrade later on, but the new
> signature scheme should probably be designed with it in mind.
I'd love to not have to reveal the public key, but I'm not sure how it
would be done, even with MAST.
On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 12:12 PM, Anthony Towns <aj at erisian.com.au> wrote:
> Wouldn't it be sufficient for old nodes to check for standardness of the spending script and report non-standard scripts as either invalid outright, or at least highly questionable? That should prevent confusion as long as soft forks are only making nonstandard behaviours invalid.
That seems sensible to me. A warning would probably be useful, in case
the verifier is running old software.
-Kalle.

2023-06-07 18:11:12 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2018-03-14
📝 Original message:Hello,
I am considering writing a replacement for the message signing tools
that are currently broken for all but the legacy 1xx addresses. The
approach (suggested by Pieter Wuille) is to do a script based
approach. This does not seem to require a lot of effort for
implementing in Bitcoin Core*. Below is my proposal for this system:
A new structure SignatureProof is added, which is a simple scriptSig &
witnessProgram container that can be serialized. This is passed out
from/into the signer/verifier.
RPC commands:
sign <address> <message> [<prehashed>=false]
Generates a signature proof for <message> using the same method that
would be used to spend coins sent to <address>.**
verify <address> <message> <proof> [<prehashed>=false]
Deserializes and executes the proof using a custom signature checker
whose sighash is derived from <message>. Returns true if the check
succeeds, and false otherwise. The scriptPubKey is derived directly
from <address>.**
Feedback welcome.
-Kalle.
(*) Looks like you can simply use VerifyScript with a new signature
checker class. (h/t Nicolas Dorier)
(**) If <prehashed> is true, <message> is the sighash, otherwise
sighash=sha256d(message).

2023-06-07 18:02:30 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-06-06
📝 Original message:One thing about BIP148 activation that may be affected by this is the
fact that segwit signalling non-BIP148 miners + BIP148 miners may hold
majority hash power and prevent a chain split. With this SF, that will
no longer be the case, right? Or am I completely confused on the
subject?
On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 9:56 AM, James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Due to the proposed calendar(https://segwit2x.github.io/) for the
> SegWit2x agreement being too slow to activate SegWit mandatory
> signalling ahead of BIP148 using BIP91 I would like to propose another
> option that miners can use to prevent a chain split ahead of the Aug
> 1st BIP148 activation date.
>
> The splitprotection soft fork is essentially BIP91 but using BIP8
> instead of BIP9 with a lower activation threshold and immediate
> mandatory signalling lock-in. This allows for a majority of miners to
> activate mandatory SegWit signalling and prevent a potential chain
> split ahead of BIP148 activation.
>
> This BIP allows for miners to respond to market forces quickly ahead
> of BIP148 activation by signalling for splitprotection. Any miners
> already running BIP148 should be encouraged to use splitprotection.
>
> <pre>
> BIP: splitprotection
> Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
> Title: User Activated Soft Fork Split Protection
> Author: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1 at gmail.com>
> Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
> Comments-URI:
> Status: Draft
> Type: Standards Track
> Created: 2017-05-22
> License: BSD-3-Clause
> CC0-1.0
> </pre>
>
> ==Abstract==
>
> This document specifies a coordination mechanism for a simple majority
> of miners to prevent a chain split ahead of BIP148 activation.
>
> ==Definitions==
>
> "existing segwit deployment" refer to the BIP9 "segwit" deployment
> using bit 1, between November 15th 2016 and November 15th 2017 to
> activate BIP141, BIP143 and BIP147.
>
> ==Motivation==
>
> The biggest risk of BIP148 is an extended chain split, this BIP
> provides a way for a simple majority of miners to eliminate that risk.
>
> This BIP provides a way for a simple majority of miners to coordinate
> activation of the existing segwit deployment with less than 95%
> hashpower before BIP148 activation. Due to time constraints unless
> immediately deployed BIP91 will likely not be able to enforce
> mandatory signalling of segwit before the Aug 1st activation of
> BIP148. This BIP provides a method for rapid miner activation of
> SegWit mandatory signalling ahead of the BIP148 activation date. Since
> the primary goal of this BIP is to reduce the chance of an extended
> chain split as much as possible we activate using a simple miner
> majority of 65% over a 504 block interval rather than a higher
> percentage. This BIP also allows miners to signal their intention to
> run BIP148 in order to prevent a chain split.
>
> ==Specification==
>
> While this BIP is active, all blocks must set the nVersion header top
> 3 bits to 001 together with bit field (1<<1) (according to the
> existing segwit deployment). Blocks that do not signal as required
> will be rejected.
>
> ==Deployment==
>
> This BIP will be deployed by "version bits" with a 65%(this can be
> adjusted if desired) activation threshold BIP9 with the name
> "splitprotecion" and using bit 2.
>
> This BIP starts immediately and is a BIP8 style soft fork since
> mandatory signalling will start on midnight August 1st 2017 (epoch
> time 1501545600) regardless of whether or not this BIP has reached its
> own signalling threshold. This BIP will cease to be active when segwit
> is locked-in.
>
> === Reference implementation ===
>
> <pre>
> // Check if Segregated Witness is Locked In
> bool IsWitnessLockedIn(const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev, const
> Consensus::Params& params)
> {
> LOCK(cs_main);
> return (VersionBitsState(pindexPrev, params,
> Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT, versionbitscache) ==
> THRESHOLD_LOCKED_IN);
> }
>
> // SPLITPROTECTION mandatory segwit signalling.
> if ( VersionBitsState(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus(),
> Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SPLITPROTECTION, versionbitscache) ==
> THRESHOLD_LOCKED_IN &&
> !IsWitnessLockedIn(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) &&
> // Segwit is not locked in
> !IsWitnessEnabled(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) ) //
> and is not active.
> {
> bool fVersionBits = (pindex->nVersion & VERSIONBITS_TOP_MASK) ==
> VERSIONBITS_TOP_BITS;
> bool fSegbit = (pindex->nVersion &
> VersionBitsMask(chainparams.GetConsensus(),
> Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) != 0;
> if (!(fVersionBits && fSegbit)) {
> return state.DoS(0, error("ConnectBlock(): relayed block must
> signal for segwit, please upgrade"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-no-segwit");
> }
> }
>
> // BIP148 mandatory segwit signalling.
> int64_t nMedianTimePast = pindex->GetMedianTimePast();
> if ( (nMedianTimePast >= 1501545600) && // Tue 01 Aug 2017 00:00:00 UTC
> (nMedianTimePast <= 1510704000) && // Wed 15 Nov 2017 00:00:00 UTC
> (!IsWitnessLockedIn(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus()) &&
> // Segwit is not locked in
> !IsWitnessEnabled(pindex->pprev, chainparams.GetConsensus())) )
> // and is not active.
> {
> bool fVersionBits = (pindex->nVersion & VERSIONBITS_TOP_MASK) ==
> VERSIONBITS_TOP_BITS;
> bool fSegbit = (pindex->nVersion &
> VersionBitsMask(chainparams.GetConsensus(),
> Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) != 0;
> if (!(fVersionBits && fSegbit)) {
> return state.DoS(0, error("ConnectBlock(): relayed block must
> signal for segwit, please upgrade"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-no-segwit");
> }
> }
> </pre>
>
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/compare/0.14...jameshilliard:splitprotection-v0.14.1
>
> ==Backwards Compatibility==
>
> This deployment is compatible with the existing "segwit" bit 1
> deployment scheduled between midnight November 15th, 2016 and midnight
> November 15th, 2017. This deployment is also compatible with the
> existing BIP148 deployment. This BIP is compatible with BIP91 only if
> BIP91 activates before it and before BIP148. Miners will need to
> upgrade their nodes to support splitprotection otherwise they may
> build on top of an invalid block. While this bip is active users
> should either upgrade to splitprotection or wait for additional
> confirmations when accepting payments.
>
> ==Rationale==
>
> Historically we have used IsSuperMajority() to activate soft forks
> such as BIP66 which has a mandatory signalling requirement for miners
> once activated, this ensures that miners are aware of new rules being
> enforced. This technique can be leveraged to lower the signalling
> threshold of a soft fork while it is in the process of being deployed
> in a backwards compatible way. We also use a BIP8 style timeout to
> ensure that this BIP is compatible with BIP148 and that BIP148
> compatible mandatory signalling activates regardless of miner
> signalling levels.
>
> By orphaning non-signalling blocks during the BIP9 bit 1 "segwit"
> deployment, this BIP can cause the existing "segwit" deployment to
> activate without needing to release a new deployment. As we approach
> BIP148 activation it may be desirable for a majority of miners to have
> a method that will ensure that there is no chain split.
>
> ==References==
>
> *[https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-March/013714.html
> Mailing list discussion]
> *[https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/v0.6.0/src/main.cpp#L1281-L1283
> P2SH flag day activation]
> *[[bip-0009.mediawiki|BIP9 Version bits with timeout and delay]]
> *[[bip-0016.mediawiki|BIP16 Pay to Script Hash]]
> *[[bip-0091.mediawiki|BIP91 Reduced threshold Segwit MASF]]
> *[[bip-0141.mediawiki|BIP141 Segregated Witness (Consensus layer)]]
> *[[bip-0143.mediawiki|BIP143 Transaction Signature Verification for
> Version 0 Witness Program]]
> *[[bip-0147.mediawiki|BIP147 Dealing with dummy stack element malleability]]
> *[[bip-0148.mediawiki|BIP148 Mandatory activation of segwit deployment]]
> *[[bip-0149.mediawiki|BIP149 Segregated Witness (second deployment)]]
> *[https://bitcoincore.org/en/2016/01/26/segwit-benefits/ Segwit benefits]
>
> ==Copyright==
>
> This document is dual licensed as BSD 3-clause, and Creative Commons
> CC0 1.0 Universal.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

2023-06-07 18:00:40 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-05-23
📝 Original message:On Tue, May 23, 2017 at 1:03 PM, Steven Pine via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Correct me if I am wrong, but currently core developers are arguing over
> whether or not to allow an optional configuration switch which defaults off
> but signals and enforces BIP148 when used. Who are we protecting users from,
> themselves? Are you protecting core? from what? I am somewhat genuinely
> befuddled by those who can't even allow a user config switch to be set.
Essentially, if we make a potentially very harmful option easy to
enable for users, we are putting them at risk, so yes, this is about
protecting users of the base Bitcoin Core implementation. Users have,
hopefully, come to appreciate this implementation for the peer
review-based strict development process, and making a hasty decision
due to time constraints (segwit activation expiration) may have
undesirable consequences. Opinions among the regular contributors are
split on the matter, which to me is an indication we should be
cautious and consider all aspects before making a decision on the
matter.