max

FROST certainly has potential to reduce L1 transaction costs and add flexibility and privacy in a system like Bitkey. Right this moment we’re focused on a few other things though, you can see more about our roadmap here: https://bitkey.build/building-better-bitcoin-self-custody/

2025-06-22 22:24:53 UTC

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Nah, I just mostly use socials for representing what I’m building for people and engaging on that. The rest of the time I’m reading and listening and learning here

2025-06-22 22:19:12 UTC

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You can read about what we think can be better on our blog (e.g. https://bitkey.build/seedless-is-safer/), and when I have it I’ll link a video of our Bitcoin Las Vegas panel that expresses some of it as well. Also, I agree there should be a disclosure, will see if we can add one

2025-04-23 01:28:39 UTC

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You can always move your bitcoin without Block using the two keys you hold, even if Block servers are unreachable. And if you can’t get the Bitkey app from the app stores anymore, you can move your bitcoin using Bitkey’s Emergency Access Kit (https://support.bitkey.world/hc/en-us/articles/24395170222868-What-is-an-Emergency-Access-Kit-and-how-does-it-work) using your hardware and cloud backup. Are there other scenarios you’re looking to use seed phrases for?

2025-04-23 01:13:34 UTC

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Right here on nostr works just fine. What do you have in mind?

2025-04-23 00:34:47 UTC

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You can consolidate, but not yet manage UTXOs directly in Bitkey. Could you tell me more about how you want to manage UTXOs? Individual UTXO choice per transaction, or more like two separate accounts, something else?

2025-04-22 19:20:54 UTC

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This is one of the big things we’re working on (check out the post!)

2025-03-21 01:06:01 UTC

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Hopefully can help here - DM’ed

2025-03-06 19:33:04 UTC

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The inheritance plan relies on the Block/Bitkey server to fulfill claims. If we were to go out of business, we'd aim to give 6 months' notice so customers can sweep their bitcoin. After that, they’d need new arrangements to manage inheritance. If you’re using Bitkey and see us go out of business, you could move your funds to another wallet.
If you're concerned about Block going out of business before your beneficiary completes a claim, consider setting up a backup method. You can add their fingerprint to your Bitkey and share a copy of your Emergency Access Kit to ensure they have access to your funds if needed.

2025-03-03 15:37:36 UTC

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As part of the inheritance protocol, your beneficiary must store a decryption key to access an encrypted version of your mobile key stored by Block. They need their own Bitkey wallet (app + hardware) to securely store this information long-term and benefit from our recovery protections. Ultimately this is a safety-focused choice in our design - storing keys long-term is hard, and this protocol is based on your beneficiary having a key, not on their government ID or anything like that. And I’ll look into where we might be able to clarify this more/earlier.

2024-03-04 23:29:10 UTC

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https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/blob/162094322fc75c92d1241f2afd4514131683856d/bitcoin/src/crypto/key.rs#L413 (for mobile and server) & https://github.com/proto-at-block/bitkey/blob/main/firmware/lib/crypto/src/ecc.c#L51 (for firmware)
hope that helps!

2023-11-30 09:43:20 UTC

Curious how #bitkey will help people stay in control of their funds when they lose part of their wallet? Check out the recovery paper we’ve shared today - and let us know what you think! https://bitkey.build/sharing-our-recovery-design/

2023-05-18 17:05:18 UTC

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Great questions.
On (1): the phone can't modify information signed by the hardware, it just forwards it to the server. Bitkey hardware ships with a key (not the one used for signing transactions) that can be used to sign messages and which Bitkey servers can verify. If a compromised phone attempts to modify what the hardware has signed, the server would know they've been tampered with and would be able to surface that to the user via a channel like email.
On (2): if the Bitkey servers that communicate the addresses or transaction details to you in the proposed solution were compromised, what they show/send you wouldn't match your phone's screen.

2023-05-17 20:33:10 UTC

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Not 100% sure I understand your setup, but seems like probably one of these:
If it’s bluewallet on your phone plus Ledger: If your phone is sufficiently compromised, you can’t trust the address shown in bluewallet, or the QR code you’re scanning..
If it’s desktop plus bluewallet on your phone: if your desktop is sufficiently compromised, you can’t trust the address there, or a QR code scanned from there…

2023-05-17 19:50:47 UTC

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What do you usually compare it against? Curious both about what type of device you’re using with your hardware wallet and what specifically you’re usually comparing the wallet screen to

2023-05-17 19:49:13 UTC

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Thanks for the feedback! When we share details of the key portability feature I’d love to hear what you think. You’re right that in multisig there are ways to recover from losing a device without needing the seed, and we’re trying to make that easy for the owner to do using the other device in the multisig setup. You can read more about this in another one of our posts: https://bitkey.build/losing-your-keys-without-losing-your-coins/

2023-05-17 19:30:32 UTC

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Don’t think you need a screen on the hardware (or the “server as a screen” option) to check for clipboard malware - you can catch that on the device you’re doing the copying on

2023-05-17 18:45:12 UTC

Our final post in this week's security series is a big one: why screens aren't all they're cracked up to be, why we think they keep people from self-custody, & how Bitkey can help without a screen on the hardware. Take a read, let us know what you think: https://bitkey.build/screens-are-not-a-panacea/

2023-05-17 13:51:23 UTC

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How would you decide whether to go seedless or seed up front, and if/when to migrate? How do you think others might decide?

2023-05-16 17:44:01 UTC

Our second post in this week's security series: why Bitkey's safe self-custody doesn’t rely on seed phrases. https://bitkey.build/seed-phrases-are-sharp-edges/

2023-05-15 17:33:13 UTC

We're posting about security, seed phrases, and screens over the next few days. Check out our first one, about security goals that shaped Bitkey's design: https://bitkey.build/staying-safe-with-self-custody/

2023-01-10 05:26:55 UTC

#[0] Verifying My Public Key: "@max_guise"