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Publishing to

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nos.lol

Last Notes

2023-06-07 18:01:54 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-05-26
📝 Original message:Hello Eric,
Thank you for your question and your time off-list clarifying your position. I’m posting to the list so that a wider audience may benefit.
Original Question: ‘Presumably the "very serious security vulnerability" posed is one of increased centralization of hash power. Would this danger exist without the patent risk?’
I would postulate that if ASICBOOST was originally released without the patent risk, then much of the risk would have been avoided; all of the mining manufactures would have implemented ASICBOOST and had a similar advantage. However, now time has passed and the damage of the patent monopoly exploiting CVE-2017-9230 has been already done. If the ASICBOOST patent was released to the public for free today, while a good thing, it wouldn’t soften the severity of the vulnerability we face today.
The ASICBOOST PATENT provides a miner with a constant-factor advantage. This is a huge problem with zero-sum games, such as mining. In game-theory, a constant factor advantage gives an exponential advantage over the time period maintained.
This explains why the Bitcoin Community initially took very little notice to ASICBOOST: The effects of ASICBOOST stated at virtually nothing, and it took a while for the advantage to been seen over the normal variance of mining. However, it’s influence has been exponentially growing since then: creating an emergency problem that we now face.
The result of ASICBOOST going unchecked is that very quickly from now, surprisingly quickly, the only profitable miners will be the miners who make use of ASICBOOST. This is a grave concern.
I will again reiterate that the virtue-signalling over perceived political motivations is ridiculous in the light what I consider a looming catastrophe, we should be judging by what is real not just perceived.
The catastrophe that I fear is one company (or a single politically connected group) gaining a virtual complete monopoly of Bitcoin Mining. This is more important to me than avoiding chain-splits. Without a well-distributed set of miners Bitcoin isn’t Bitcoin.
Cameron.
PS.
This attack is part of a larger set of licensing attacks, where patens are just one form of licensing attack. These attacks are particularly damaging in competitive markets such as mining. We should be vigilant for other attempts to create state-enforced licensing around mathematical algorithms. ASICBOOST is an illustrative example of what the Bitcoin Community needs to defend against.
> On 26 May 2017, at 11:15 , Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
>
> Signed PGP part
> Hi Cameron,
>
> Presumably the "very serious security vulnerability" posed is one of
> increased centralization of hash power. Would this danger exist
> without the patent risk?
>
> e
>

2023-06-07 18:01:53 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-05-26
📝 Original message:Thank you for your reply Andreas,
I can assure you that I have many motivations for activating SegWit.
Before studding ASICBOOST I wanted to activate SegWit as it is a wonderful upgrade for Bitcoin. It seems to me that virtually the entire Bitcoin Ecosystem agrees with me. Except for around 67% of the mining hash-rate who very conspicuously refuse to signal for it’s activation.
So, I started searching for the motivations of such a large amount of the mining hash-rate holding a position that isn’t at-all represented in the wider Bitcoin Community. My study of ASICBOOST lead to a ‘bingo’ moment: If one assumes that the 67% of the hash rate that refuse to signal for SegWit are using ASICBOOST. The entire picture of this political stalemate became much more understandable.
This only strengthened my resolve to activate SegWit: not only is SegWit great, it partially mitigates a very serious security vulnerability.
This is why I call into question why you would suggest:
“This proposal is unnecessarily conflating two contentious issues and will attract criticism of self serving motivation.”
1. I am not conflating the issues. I would argue that very fact that SegWit has not been activated yet is directly because of CVE-2017-9230.
2. I have no reason to believe that SegWit is contentious, except for the attackers who it would frustrate.
3. I have no negative responses to my endeavours to get ASICBOOST as regarded as a legitimate security vulnerability. This would suggest that it is not contentious in the wider technical community.
If SegWit is NOT contentious within the technical community and it is NOT contentious to regard CVE-2017-9230 as a credible security vulnerability. Then using it as partial security fix for a security vulnerability SHOULD NOT be contentious.
If you believe that SegWit is contentious within the technical community. Or you believe CVE-2017-9230 should not be regarded as a credible security vulnerability. Then I would logically agree with you that we should separate the issues so that we may gain consensus. However, I just don’t see this as the case.
Cameron.
> On 26 May 2017, at 09:52 , Andreas M. Antonopoulos <andreas at antonopoulos.com> wrote:
>
> I rarely post here, out of respect to the mailing list. But since my name was mentioned...
>
> I much prefer Gregory Maxwell's proposal to defuse covert ASICBOOST (only) with a segwit-like commitment to the coinbase which does not obligate miners to signal Segwit or implement Segwit, thus disarming any suspicion that the issue is being exploited only to activate Segwit.
>
> This proposal is unnecessarily conflating two contentious issues and will attract criticism of self serving motivation.
>
> Politicising CVE is damaging to the long term bitcoin development and to its security. Not claiming that is the intent here, but the damage is done by the mere appearance of motive.
>
>
>
> On May 26, 2017 16:30, "Cameron Garnham via bitcoin-dev" <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hello Bitcoin-Dev,
>
> CVE-2017-9230 (1) (2), or commonly known as ‘ASICBOOST’ is a severe (3) (4) and actively exploited (5) security vulnerability.
>
> To learn more about this vulnerability please read Jeremy Rubin’s detailed report:
> http://www.mit.edu/~jlrubin//public/pdfs/Asicboost.pdf
>
> Andreas Antonopoulos has an excellent presentation on why asicboost is dangerous:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6jJDD2Aj8k
>
> In decisions on the #bitcoin-core-dev IRC channel; It was proposed, without negative feedback, that SegWit be used as a partial-mitigation of CVE-2017-9230.
>
> SegWit partially mitigates asicboost with the common reasonable assumption that any block that doesn’t include a witness commit in it's coinbase transaction was mined using covert asicboost. Making the use of covert asicboost far more conspicuous.
>
> It was also proposed that this partial mitigation should be quickly strengthened via another soft-fork that makes the inclusion of witness commits mandatory, without negative feedback.
>
> The security trade-offs of deploying a partial-mitigation to CVE-2017-9230 quickly vs more slowly but more conservatively is under intense debate. The author of this post has a strong preference to the swiftest viable option.
>
> Cameron.
>
>
> (1) CVE Entry:
> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=+CVE-2017-9230
>
> (2) Announcement of CVE to Mailing List:
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014416.html
>
> (3) Discussion of the perverse incentives created by 'ASICBOOST' by Ryan Grant:
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014352.html
>
> (4) Discussion of ASICBOOST's non-independent PoW calculation by Tier Nolan:
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014351.html
>
> (5) Evidence of Active Exploit by Gregory Maxwell:
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/013996.html
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

2023-06-07 18:01:17 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-05-18
📝 Original message:Hello Bitcoin Development Mailing List,
I wish to explain why the current approach to ‘ASICBOOST’ dose not comply with our established best practices for security vulnerabilities and suggest what I consider to be an approach closer matching established industry best practices.
1. Significant deviations from the Bitcoin Security Model have been acknowledged as security vulnerabilities.
The Bitcoin Security Model assumes that every input into the Proof-of-Work function should have the same difficulty of producing a desired output.
2. General ASIC optimisation cannot be considered a Security Vulnerabilities.
Quickly being able to check inputs is not a vulnerability. However, being able to craft inputs that are significantly easier to check than alternative inputs is a vulnerability.
3. We should assign a CVE to the vulnerability exploited by ‘ASICBOOST’.
‘ASICBOOST’ is an attack on this Bitcoin’s security assumptions and should be considered an exploit of the Bitcoin Proof-of-Work Function.
For a more detailed look at ‘ASICBOOST’, please have a look at this excellent document by Jeremy Rubin:
http://www.mit.edu/~jlrubin//public/pdfs/Asicboost.pdf
The Bitcoin Community should be able to track the progress of restoring the quality of the Bitcoin Proof-of-Work function to its original assumptions.
4. Work should be taken to prudently and swiftly restore Bitcoins Security Properties.
I recommend the Bitcoin Community fix this vulnerability with expediency.
Cameron.
PS:
With a soft-fork it probably is possible to completely fix this Proof-of-Work vulnerability.
(Here is my working list of things to do):
1. Include extra data in the Coinbase Transaction, such as the Witness Root.
2. Lock the Version. (Use a space in the Coinbase Transaction for signalling future upgrades).
3. Lock the lower-bits on the Timestamp: Block timestamps only need ~1minute granularity.
4. Make a deterministic ordering of transaction chains within a block. (However, I believe this option is more difficult).
Of course, if we have a hard-fork, we should consider the Proof-of-Work internal merkle structure directly.

2023-06-07 17:51:39 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2016-06-28
📝 Original message:There are two different topics mixed up here.
1. Link-level security (secure connection to the node we intended to connect to).
2. Node-level security (aka; don't connect to a 'evil node').
The fist requires link-level encryption and authentication.
The second requires identity authentication.
You described the 'evil node' attack; that indeed needs an identity system to stop. However BIP151 doesn't intend to protect against connecting to evil Bitcoin Nodes.
It is important not to mixup link-level authentication and node-level authentication.
When your client picks random nodes to connect to, you are not considered whom in particular runs them. (Rather that you have a good random sample of the network).
If you manually add a friends node; at this point you wish to have node-level authentication. However, this may (and probably should) happen out-of-band.
Sent from my iPhone
> On 29 Jun 2016, at 01:07, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
>
> Hi Cameron, good to hear from you!
>
>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 11:40 PM, Cameron Garnham <da2ce7 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Unauthenticated link level encryption is wonderful! MITM attacks are overrated; as they require an active attacker.
>
> This is not really the case with Bitcoin. A MITM attack does not require that the attacker find a way to inject traffic into the communication between nodes. Peers will connect to the attacker directly, or accept connections directly from it. Such attacks can be easier than even passive attacks.
>
>> Stopping passive attacks is the low hanging fruit. This should be taken first.
>>
>> Automated and secure peer authentication in a mesh network is a huge topic. One of the unsolved problems in computer science.
>>
>> A simple 'who is that' by asking for the fingerprint of your peers from your other peers is a very simple way to get 'some' authentication. Semi-trusted index nodes also is a low hanging fruit for authentication.
>
> It is the implication of widespread authentication that is at issue. Clearly there are ways to implement it using a secure side channels.
>
>> However, let's first get unauthenticated encryption. Force the attackers to use active attacks. (That are thousands times more costly to couduct).
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>>> On 29 Jun 2016, at 00:36, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 9:22 PM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
>>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>> An "out of band key check" is not part of BIP151.
>>>
>>> It has a session ID for this purpose.
>>>
>>>> It requires a secure channel and is authentication. So BIP151 doesn't provide the tools to detect an attack, that requires authentication. A general requirement for authentication is the issue I have raised.
>>>
>>> One might wonder how you ever use a Bitcoin address, or even why we
>>> might guess these emails from "you" aren't actually coming from the
>>> NSA.
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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2023-06-07 17:51:38 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2016-06-28
📝 Original message:Unauthenticated link level encryption is wonderful! MITM attacks are overrated; as they require an active attacker.
Stopping passive attacks is the low hanging fruit. This should be taken first.
Automated and secure peer authentication in a mesh network is a huge topic. One of the unsolved problems in computer science.
A simple 'who is that' by asking for the fingerprint of your peers from your other peers is a very simple way to get 'some' authentication. Semi-trusted index nodes also is a low hanging fruit for authentication.
However, let's first get unauthenticated encryption. Force the attackers to use active attacks. (That are thousands times more costly to couduct).
Sent from my iPhone
> On 29 Jun 2016, at 00:36, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 9:22 PM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> An "out of band key check" is not part of BIP151.
>
> It has a session ID for this purpose.
>
>> It requires a secure channel and is authentication. So BIP151 doesn't provide the tools to detect an attack, that requires authentication. A general requirement for authentication is the issue I have raised.
>
> One might wonder how you ever use a Bitcoin address, or even why we
> might guess these emails from "you" aren't actually coming from the
> NSA.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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2023-06-07 17:35:29 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-16
📝 Original message:Since it was a game theory analysis. I will not address your other comments.
On 17/8/2015 7:22 AM, Andrew LeCody wrote:
>> 4. Setup a fork of Bitcoin XT that allows people to easily make a
> transaction only on the XT fork (while leaving the original BTC coins
> untouched).
>
> I doubt this is even possible.
Trivial.
There are a few ways: here is my favorite (for the moment).
1. Spam the 8mb blocks with 1 Satoshi outputs to the brainwallet 'BitcoinXT'
2. Let these spam tx be in BitcoinXT, however not Bitcoin (easily done).
3. Let the forked XT client includes a unspent dust output with any
transaction. Let the this client create 100 dust outputs for other
people to use in the same transaction.
This transaction will only be possible to confirm with Bitcoin XT. -
Leaving your Bitcoin coins untouched.
I particularly like this approach, as it is ironic as the spam is more
cheaply done with larger blocks.
Cam.
A quick political note:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstentionism
Hard forks are not something that is a democratic process. Thus
frustrating a false-democratic process is completely legitimate.
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2023-06-07 17:35:28 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-08-16
📝 Original message:I think that it is important to note that Bitcoin XT faces a natural
uphill battle.
Since it is possible to setup atomic inter-fork coin trades. I do not
see how Bitcoin XT could possibly win if Satoshi decides to sell 10000
XTBTC for BTC everyday for the first 100 days after the fork.
In many ways Satoshi gets to decide the winning fork just by his huge
economic investment in Bitcoin.
Here is some simple game-theory for non-consensus forks:
1. Spoil the ballot. Have Bitcoin Core propagate the Bitcoin XT version
string.
2. Encourage all miners to false vote for the Bitcoin XT fork.
- Now people have no-idea what % of the economy Bitcoin XT holds. -
Making it impossible for people to put economic faith behind Bitcoin XT.
3. Setup good Atomic Swap markets.
4. Setup a fork of Bitcoin XT that allows people to easily make a
transaction only on the XT fork (while leaving the original BTC coins
untouched).
This means that the Bitcoin XT fork will be born per-mature. Probably
with only a small % of hashing power behind it (contrary to the almost
100% that falsely claim to support it). It will be embarrassing that for
the goal of larger blocks, XT instead has blocks (before re-adjustment)
every 2h.
The price for XTBTC coins will plummet, Satoshi progressively dumping
his 1M stash over a year or so will make sure that it doesn't recover
either.
I cannot see how Bitcoin XT is but-not in a extremely weak position from
game theory.
I'm sure smarter people than I could come up with even more ways to
disrupt non-consensus forks.
Cam.
On 16/8/2015 6:39 AM, muyuubyou via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I posted this to /r/BitcoinMarkets but I thought I might post it here as
> well.
>
> ---
> Currently 0 mined blocks have voted for XT.
>
> If it ever gets close to even 50%, many things can happen that would
> reshape the game completely.
>
> For instance:
>
> - Core could start boycotting XT by not relying to them and/or not relying
> from them.
>
> - Core could appropriate the version string of XT, making it impossible to
> know how much they are progressing and a losing bet to actually execute the
> fork.
>
> This kind of node war if the factions were sizeable would make it very
> risky to transact at all - balances in new addresses could end up
> vanishing. Usability of the system would plummet.
>
> Note that any disagreement between the network and the biggest economic
> actors - mainly the exchanges at this point, "wallet services" maybe -
> would mean BTC plummets. Hard. And so would confidence.
>
> It's a risky game to play.
> ---
>
> PS: I consider this attempt at takeover about as foul as it gets. The
> equivalent of repeating a referendum until a yes is obtained: the
> reasonable reaction to this is actively blocking said "referendum". There
> was a fair play alternative which is voting through coinbase scriptSig like
> plain 8MBers are doing, or like BIP 100 proposes for dynamic adjustment.
> Once a majority is obtained in this way, devs have to react or if they
> don't then this sort of foul play would be justified. But this wasn't the
> case.
>
> -----
> 為せば成る
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-07 15:47:16 UTC

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2023-06-07 15:47:15 UTC

- reply

2023-06-07 15:34:09 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-05-29
📝 Original message:First off, I am glad that the idea of dynamic block size adjustment is
gaining some attention, in particular the model that I proposed.
I wanted to take some time and explain some of the philosophy of how,
and why, I proposed this this particular model.
When Bitcoin was first made, there was a 32MB block size limit; this
was quickly found to be open to spam (and potentially DOS, as the code
was not-at-all optimized to support large blocks), and was reduced to
1MB, this was a quick fix that was never intended to last; at some
point the network should come to an understanding, a consensus if you
will, of what (and how much) belongs in a block.
The core point of this is that miners have always, and will always;
hold the power, to decide what goes into blocks; this implicitly,
obviously, includes how large blocks are. Miners are able to come any
sort of agreement they wish, providing the bitcoin clients accept
their blocks as valid.
Say if Satoshi never decided to place the 1MB block limit: It would be
up to the miners to decide what they consider a ‘reasonable’ block is.
However, they would need to find some way to communicate this and
reach an agreement; some protocol. They, say, could have done this
informally on what is now the bitcointalk forum, or used Twitter.
However, what they really need is indeed a "consensus protocol". Some
simple terms to define what is acceptable and what is not.
Hence, the proposal introducing a consensus protocol for block sizes;
instead of just having a hard limit (enforced by everyone), instead,
we have a constant factor above the average block size over a fixed
intervals that is soft-forked by only the miners. (The next simplest
mathematical construct).
This proposal is entirely a soft-fork and may be implemented without
changing any client code what so ever. In-fact, it could be
implemented by only a simple 51% majority of miners, with-or-without
gaining the wider community consensus. (Assuming that the 1MB block
size rule still applies).
The nice thing about this is that it really is impossible to stop,
for-example, if pre-relaying of block headers is implemented; the
miners could always soft-fork to include the block-size in the
coinbase. The only reason that the miners have not done this yet, is
that there has not yet been a strong will to increase transaction fees.
If we assume the miners will operate in a way to collectively maximize
profit; then we can assume they will not try to maximize utility of
the network (having as many transactions as possible), rather have as
few transactions as the total economy can support the cost. Meaning
that limiting to much smaller blocks will probably be much more
profitable than having large blocks.
Since there is no requirement for the clients to know about the block
size consensus protocol, this truly can be a
‘bi-directional-soft-fork’, in that the miners can choose to change
the rules at any time, with only a simple 51% majority. Therefore, any
parameters that we pick are always up for debate.
Why the 1.5x over 2016 blocks? - Using some game theory, and
deduction: I wished to pick the type of agreement that would be
natural for the miners to come to (selfishly).
First, Why 1.5x, this means that only a super-majority of miners can
easily increase the block size. – There is no natural incentive for
miners to produce large blocks that have very few fees.
Second, Why 2016 blocks for adjusting the average: Miners HATE
unpredictability, for shorter time periods the miner will need to have
infrastructure ready to support potentially much larger block almost
immediately. 2016 blocks is a period that the miners are already well
used to, meaning that it will take slightly less than a month for
blocks of double size to be permitted.
This entire infrastructure can be implemented without needing to
update any clients; once implemented, tested, solid, and well accepted
by the (mining) community then we can revisit increasing the 1M hard
limit. (If we still have demand for it, maybe the average block size
will reduce to say, 100KB).
Cam.
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256
>
> While being in the Bitcoin community for a long time, I haven't
> been so directly involved in the development. However I wish to
> suggest a different pre-hard-fork soft-fork approach:
>
>
> Set a 'block size cap' in the similar same way as we set
> difficulty.
>
> Every 2016 blocks take the average size of the blocks and multiply
> the size by 1.5x, rejecting blocks that are larger than this size,
> for the next 2016 period.
>
> I would of-course suggest that we keep the limits at min 100kb and
> max (initially) 990kb (not 1mb on purpose, as this should become
> the new limit), rounding up to the nearest 10kb.
>
> A: we don't have pressure at the 1mb limit, (we reduce the limit in
> a flexible manner to 990kb).
>
> B: we can upgrade the network to XYZ hard-limit, then slowly raze
> the soft-limit after being sure the network, as-a-whole is ready.
>
> If we on-day remove the block-size limit, this rule will stop a
> rouge miner from making 10mb, or 100mb blocks, or 1gb blocks.
>
> This could be implemented by the miners without breaking any of
> the clients, and would tend to produce a better dynamic fee
> pressure.
>
>
> This will give the mechanics to the miners to create consensus to
> agree what block-sizes they believe are best for the network, and
> allows the block-sizes to dynamically grow in response to larger
> demand.
>
>
>
> On 5/8/2015 10:35 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote:
>> On May 7, 2015 3:08 PM, "Roy Badami" <roy at gnomon.org.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, May 07, 2015 at 11:49:28PM +0200, Pieter Wuille wrote:
>>>> I would not modify my node if the change introduced a
>>>> perpetual 100 BTC subsidy per block, even if 99% of miners
>>>> went along with it.
>>>
>>> Surely, in that scenario Bitcoin is dead. If the fork you
>>> prefer has only 1% of the hash power it is trivially vulnerably
>>> not just to a 51% attack but to a 501% attack, not to mention
>>> the fact that you'd only be getting one block every 16 hours.
>>
>> Yes, indeed, Bitcoin would be dead if this actually happens. But
>> that is still where the power lies: before anyone (miners or
>> others) would think about trying such a change, they would need
>> to convince people and be sure they will effectively modify
>> their code.
>>
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>>
- --------
>>
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>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
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2023-06-07 15:11:48 UTC

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📅 Original date posted:2014-01-17
📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
One of the possible words that haven't been proposed is 'personal' where
bitcoin addressed are commonly incorrectly called public address.
Maybe 'personal account' or even 'personal address' would imply that the
balance on such an account shouldn't be assumed to be public knowledge.
Cam.
On 17/01/2014 5:59 pm, Drak wrote:
> That could also work. Still, didn't we want to ditch the word address?
> Could be a privacy key...
>
> On 17 Jan 2014 09:15, "Mike Hearn" <mike at plan99.net
> <mailto:mike at plan99.net>> wrote:
>
> I must say, this shed is mighty fine looking. It'd be a great place
> to store our bikes. But, what colour should we paint it?
>
> How about we split the difference and go with "privacy address"? As
> Peter notes, that's what people actually like and want. The problem
> with stealth is it's got strong connotations with American military
> hardware and perhaps thieves sneaking around in the night:
>
> https://www.google.com/search?tbm=isch&q=stealth
>
> But everyone loves privacy.
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 8:49 AM, Drak <drak at zikula.org
> <mailto:drak at zikula.org>> wrote:
>
> Peter I agree with you about "reusable addresses", but aren't
> we also trying to get away from the word "address" entirely?
> How about calling it a "payment key" or "reusable payment key"
> instead? using "stealth" is just asking for bad press imo.
>
>
> On 16 January 2014 21:28, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org
> <mailto:pete at petertodd.org>> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 04:05:27PM -0800, Jeremy Spilman wrote:
> > Might I propose "reusable address".
> >
> > I think that describes it best to any non-programmer, and
> even more
> > so encourages wallets to present options as 'one time use' vs
> > 'reusable'.
> >
> > It definitely packs a marketing punch which could help drive
> > adoption. The feature is only useful if/when broadly adopted.
>
> I'm very against the name "reusable addresses" and strongly
> belive we
> should stick with the name stealth addresses.
>
> You gotta look at it from the perspective of a user; lets
> take standard
> pay-to-pubkey-hash addresses: I can tell my wallet to pay
> one as many
> times as I want and everything works just great. I also can
> enter the
> address on blockchain.info <http://blockchain.info>'s search
> box, and every transaction related
> to the address, and the balance of it, pops up immediately.
>
> What is that telling me? A: Addresses starting with "1" are
> reusable. B:
> Transactions associated with them appear to be public knowledge.
>
> Now I upgrade my wallet software and it says I now have a
> "reusable"
> address. My reaction is "Huh? Normal addresses are reusable,
> what's
> special about this weird reusable address thing that my
> buddy Bob's
> wallet software couldn't pay." I might even try to enter in
> a "reusable"
> address in blockchain.info <http://blockchain.info>, which
> won't work, and I'll just figure
> "must be some new unsupported thing" and move on with my life.
>
> On the other hand, suppose my wallet says I now have
> "stealth address"
> support. I'm going to think "Huh, stealth? I guess that
> means privacy
> right? I like privacy." If I try searching for a stealth
> address on
> blockchain.info <http://blockchain.info>, when it doesn't
> work I might think twig on "Oh right!
> It said stealth addresses are private, so maybe the
> transactions are
> hidden?" I might also think "Maybe this is like
> stealth/incognito mode
> in my browser? So like, there's no history being kept for
> others to
> see?" Regardless, I'm going to be thinking "well I hear
> scary stuff
> about Bitcoin privacy, and this stealth thing sounds like
> it's gonna
> help, so I should learn more about that"
>
> Finally keep in mind that stealth addresses have had a tonne
> of very
> fast, and very wide reaching PR. The name is in the public
> conciousness
> already, and trying to change it now just because of vague bad
> associations is going to throw away the momentum of that
> good PR and
> slow down adoption. Last night I was at the Toronto Bitcoin
> Meetup and I
> based on conversations there with people there, technical and
> non-technical, almost everyone had heard about them and
> almost everyone
> seemed to understand the basic idea of why they were a good
> thing. That
> just wouldn't have happened with a name that tried to hide
> what stealth
> addresses were for, and by changing the name now we risk
> people not
> making the connection when wallet software gets upgraded to
> support
> them.
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org <http://petertodd.org>
> 0000000000000001b0e0ae7ef97681ad77188030b6c791aef304947e6f524740
>
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2023-06-07 11:39:14 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2013-03-13
📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
I think that the course of action is quite simple:
1. Upgrade all the clients to implement the lock limits. (in code,
not at the DB exception layer). A bit of research is needed to work
out exactly what these limits are so we can maximise the number of
transactions.
2. Fix the DB layer, and test that all the clients can support 1MB blocks.
3. Once we are confident that the network supports 1MB blocks, set a
date where the lock limits are removed.
For me, everyone signed up to bitcoin thinking that there was a 1MB /
block limit. The lock limits were unexpected, and could be considered
extremely uncontroversial to remove.
The discussion of larger blocks (i.e. > 1MB ), that I happen to
disagree with, is not relevant to the discussion of the removal of
the lock limits.
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2023-06-07 02:56:21 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2012-01-17
📝 Original message:I think that bitcoin.org should remain apolitical. However maybe it
would be good if the blackout to take effect on bitcointalk.org if
theymos and Sirius believes it is appropriate.
Bitcoin.org should provide bitcoin.
On 17/01/2012 11:59 AM, slush wrote:
> > I agree Bitcoin should avoid making any bold political stands.
>
> I agree on this. Please don't turn Bitcoin project/homepage into some
> political agitation. Not everybody care about political attitude of
> main project developers.
>
> slush
>
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2012 at 1:46 AM, Alan Reiner <etotheipi at gmail.com
> <mailto:etotheipi at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> You guys are representing both extremes of the issue. In response
> to Jeff and Luke-Jr, I don't see how this is /just any other
> poltical issue/. It strikes at the heart of everything Bitcoin is
> about. Barring Bitcoin-specific legislation, I don't see how any
> legislation could be more relevant to Bitcoin and the community
> around it.
>
> On the other hand, Bitcoin is still a non-entity, and shouldn't
> get in the business of making statements. A central voice for
> Bitcoin gives the impression that it is actually centralized, and
> one that has opinions. Plus I wouldn't be surprised if some,
> heavily-invested Bitcoin users were of the opinion that
> SOPA/PIPA/whatever could be a huge profit for themselves: once
> SOPA kicks in and businesses around the world start getting cut
> off for legit or illegitimate purposes, a lot of them could
> potentially switch to Bitcoin to keep their business going. That
> could be a huge boon for Bitcoin. You may not agree it's worth
> the tradeoff, but people are selfish and may not actually
> understand or even care about SOPA legislation itself.
>
> I think it's /not inappropriate/ for something to be mentioned on
> the website about Bitcoin's philosophy being threatened by SOPA,
> but I agree Bitcoin should avoid making any bold political
> stands. Users could be reminded that SOPA affects yet another
> thing they care about, but it might be better to avoid it
> altogether. If any response is made, it should be a very light one.
>
> -Alan
>
>
>
> On 01/16/2012 07:30 PM, Amir Taaki wrote:
>> Bunk argument. This is an issue that affects bitcoin directly.
>>
>> Wikipedia has far more need to remain neutral and apolitical than bitcoin ever does- you've read Satoshi's politically charged whitepaper or seen the genesis block quote.
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:SOPA_initiative/Action
>>
>> The Wikipedia community decided on a full and global blackout. Bitcoin should do the same in unison with the rest of the web- sites like Reddit, 4chan and Wikipedia.
>>
>> It's funny / almost comical how you consign this to being just another issue or case of moral alarm. Sad.
>>
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: Jeff Garzik<jgarzik at exmulti.com> <mailto:jgarzik at exmulti.com>
>> To: Amir Taaki<zgenjix at yahoo.com> <mailto:zgenjix at yahoo.com>
>> Cc:"bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net" <mailto:bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net> <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net> <mailto:bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
>> Sent: Sunday, January 15, 2012 10:37 PM
>> Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development]bitcoin.org <http://bitcoin.org> SOPA/PIPA blackout
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 5:09 PM, Amir Taaki<zgenjix at yahoo.com> <mailto:zgenjix at yahoo.com> wrote:
>>> How is this not the most important world issue right now?
>>>
>>> EVERYTHING is under threat. Go nuclear to show our nerd-rage.
>>>
>>> Everybody blank your personal sites too. Americans, take to the streets. World, go scream at the US embassy.
>> There are always issues that raise ire and moral outrage. I would
>> rather thatbitcoin.org <http://bitcoin.org> stay apolitical -- our users will appreciate
>> this in the long run.
>>
>
>
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