<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1rxqlcf4n2aw0urx6l4g7rjkyng8d5w0lkqphnaycrchyh3dwktzsejetyf

Profile Code

nprofile1qqspnq0uy6e4wh87pnd0650petzf5rk688lmqqme7jvputjtckht93gpzemhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgptffpu

Publishing to

relay.primal.net

Last Notes

2023-06-07 17:39:43 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-09-05
📝 Original message:This might also be a useful page to look at:
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Bitcoin_symbol
RicMoo
Sent from my self-aware iPhone
.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸><(((º>
Richard Moore ~ Founder
Genetic Mistakes Software Inc.
phone: (778) 882-6125
email: ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com
www: http://GeneticMistakes.com
> On Sep 5, 2015, at 10:11 AM, Ken Shirriff via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Use of the bitcoin symbol in text is inconvenient, because the bitcoin symbol isn't in the Unicode standard. To fix this, I've written a proposal to have the common B-with-vertical-bars bitcoin symbol added to Unicode. I've successfully proposed a new character for Unicode before, so I'm familiar with the process and think this has a good chance of succeeding. The proposal is at http://righto.com/bitcoin-unicode.pdf
>
> I received a suggestion to run this proposal by the bitcoin-dev group, so I hope this email is appropriate here. Endorsement by Bitcoin developers will help the Unicode Committee realize the importance of adding this symbol, so please let me know if you support this proposal.
>
> Thanks,
> Ken
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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2023-06-07 15:41:51 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-10
📝 Original message:Hey guys,
With all the recent congestion and discussion regarding FSS-RBF, I was wondering if there good reasons not to have CPFP as a default policy? Or is it?
I was also wondering, with CPFP, should the transaction fee be based on total transactions size, or the sum of each transaction’s required fee? For example, a third transaction C whose unconfirmed utxo from transaction B has an unconfirmed utxo in transaction A (all of A’s inputs are confirmed), with each A, B and C being ~300bytes, should C’s transaction fee be 0.0001 btc for the ~1kb it is about to commit to the blockchain, or 0.0003 btc for the 3 transactions it is going to commit.
I tried to test it out a few days ago, sending 0.0008 btc without any fee, then that utxo into another transaction w/ 0.0001 btc. It still hasn’t confirmed, which could be any of: a) CPFP doesn’t have enough hash power, b) the amounts are too small, c) the coins are too new, d) the fee should have actually been 0.0002 btc, e) the congestion is just too great; or some combination.
Just curious as whatnot…
Thanks,
RicMoo
.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸><(((º>
Richard Moore ~ Founder
Genetic Mistakes Software inc.
phone: (778) 882-6125
email: ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com <mailto:ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com>
www: http://GeneticMistakes.com <http://geneticmistakes.com/>
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2023-06-07 15:41:51 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-07-10
📝 Original message:By ignored, do you mean the nodes/miners didn’t even include the low fee transaction in their memory pools, so would no longer have access to it? If a node decides to not include it in its memory pool for this reason, I guess it won’t send out any INV messages either?
Could the broadcaster of TX_b rebroadcast TX_a? Then I guess any node that did add it to its memory pool would realize it’s not new and not rebroadcast it to those who didn’t, so it won’t propagate… Although, after receiving the orphan transaction TX_b, it could re-(pay attention) to an INV with TX_a (for a short-ish time to prevent further DoS vectors)? Assuming the sender of TX_b has a copy of TX_a…
> On Jul 10, 2015, at 12:13 PM, Jeff Garzik <jgarzik at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> CPFP is interesting, but it does not fully cover the case it is trying to address: If TX_a goes out without sufficient fee, sending out a new TX_b will not help TX_a suddenly reach nodes/miners that ignored TX_a.
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 12:09 PM, Richard Moore <me at ricmoo.com <mailto:me at ricmoo.com>> wrote:
> Hey guys,
>
> With all the recent congestion and discussion regarding FSS-RBF, I was wondering if there good reasons not to have CPFP as a default policy? Or is it?
>
> I was also wondering, with CPFP, should the transaction fee be based on total transactions size, or the sum of each transaction’s required fee? For example, a third transaction C whose unconfirmed utxo from transaction B has an unconfirmed utxo in transaction A (all of A’s inputs are confirmed), with each A, B and C being ~300bytes, should C’s transaction fee be 0.0001 btc for the ~1kb it is about to commit to the blockchain, or 0.0003 btc for the 3 transactions it is going to commit.
>
> I tried to test it out a few days ago, sending 0.0008 btc without any fee, then that utxo into another transaction w/ 0.0001 btc. It still hasn’t confirmed, which could be any of: a) CPFP doesn’t have enough hash power, b) the amounts are too small, c) the coins are too new, d) the fee should have actually been 0.0002 btc, e) the congestion is just too great; or some combination.
>
> Just curious as whatnot…
>
> Thanks,
> RicMoo
>
> .·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸><(((º>
>
> Richard Moore ~ Founder
> Genetic Mistakes Software inc.
> phone: (778) 882-6125 <tel:%28778%29%20882-6125>
> email: ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com <mailto:ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com>
> www: http://GeneticMistakes.com <http://geneticmistakes.com/>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>
>
>
.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸><(((º>
Richard Moore ~ Founder
Genetic Mistakes Software inc.
phone: (778) 882-6125
email: ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com <mailto:ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com>
www: http://GeneticMistakes.com <http://geneticmistakes.com/>
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2023-06-07 15:25:18 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2014-08-19
📝 Original message:Oh, I see. I misread, thinking you wanted the dev team to have a private key and share the public key, similar to alerts. But each peer would have a public/private key pair and use something akin to ECDH for a symmetric key and transport using a block cipher?
How would you share the public key? If I were a man-in-the-middle, I could intercept the public key, generate my own and pass that along and then decouple the pipe when the other side shares their public key.
Also, you should not ignore your SSH fingerprint, as you exactly open yourself to mitm attacks.
On Aug 19, 2014, at 11:11 AM, Raúl Martínez <rme at i-rme.es> wrote:
> Only messages between peers are encrypted, only during transit.
>
> Before sending a transaction to Node B you use his public key, so Node B has the key
>
> El 19/08/2014 17:05, "Richard Moore" <me at ricmoo.com> escribió:
> If you encrypt all messages with an asymmetric cipher, how would each node make use of the blockchain in an encrypted form? Each node would be able to encrypt the data, but only the Bitcoin Core Dev could decrypt it?
>
>
> On Aug 19, 2014, at 5:49 AM, Raúl Martínez <rme at i-rme.es> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>> I believe that all comunications should be encrypted by default, no matter that is public information (tx info), the only exception I would make would be block packets (to avoid increasing propagation time).
>>
>> I suggest that Bitcoin Core should generate a public/private key pair and share the public one with peers.
>>
>> This could provide privacy and integrity but not autentication.
>>
>> This way you can impersonate a bitcoin node (active mitm) but you cant just be passive and record all transactions send or recieved by an IP address.
>>
>> Today you can just watch for incoming/outgoing transactions to determine what tx are created in the Node, when you find one you can see the Bitcoin address inputs and outputs and track that person's bitcoins.
>> As an example, SSH provides this kind of encryption, althogh Bitcoin Core should ignore fingerprint changes (caused due to reinstalls).
>>
>> Please feel free to disqus why this is not needed or why you like this idea.
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
> .·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸><(((º>
>
> Richard Moore ~ Founder
> Genetic Mistakes Software inc.
> phone: (778) 882-6125
> email: ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com
> www: http://GeneticMistakes.com
>
.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸><(((º>
Richard Moore ~ Founder
Genetic Mistakes Software inc.
phone: (778) 882-6125
email: ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com
www: http://GeneticMistakes.com
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2023-06-07 15:24:17 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2014-07-19
📝 Original message:Hey all,
I'm wondering if anyone can help explain to me tx 70f7c15c6f62139cc41afa858894650344eda9975b46656d893ee59df8914a3d...
(https://blockchain.info/tx/70f7c15c6f62139cc41afa858894650344eda9975b46656d893ee59df8914a3d)
The input signature script is:
304402206b5c3b1c86748dcf328b9f3a65e10085afcf5d1af5b40970d8ce3a9355e06b5b0220cdbdc23e6d3618e47056fccc60c5f73d1a542186705197e5791e97f0e6582a3201
Which decodes to:
r= 48560432700441876832361368709121298776045893858160378595187765610521057848155
s= -22732680560694206332190468058638664750027418114195068375538144640549433890254
(http://lapo.it/asn1js/#304402206B5C3B1C86748DCF328B9F3A65E10085AFCF5D1AF5B40970D8CE3A9355E06B5B0220CDBDC23E6D3618E47056FCCC60C5F73D1A542186705197E5791E97F0E6582A32)
The ECC library I'm using is failing to verify this, which I think makes sense, since I the point needs to be positive, no? But it is obviously valid, as it has been verified and spent. I have tried simply modulo curve.order to positive-ify it, but that didn't seem to work either. Given a point P (with Py < 0) is there some fancy way to bring it into the elliptic curve space, such that Px >= 0 and Py >= 0?
Thanks!
RicMoo
.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸¸.·´¯`·.¸><(((º>
Richard Moore ~ Founder
Genetic Mistakes Software inc.
phone: (778) 882-6125
email: ricmoo at geneticmistakes.com
www: http://GeneticMistakes.com