<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1tezrev9k6yrwlul4wkham62skpgdsuxeyzr6w4mnphn0ldg463hsmxca36

Profile Code

nprofile1qqs9u3pukzmdzph0706htt7aa9gtq5xcwrvjppa82aesmehlk52agmcpzemhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgqgdwaehxw309ahx7uewd3hkcqg5waehxw309aex2mrp0yhxgctdw4eju6t0tqvlcu

Publishing to

relay.primal.net

nos.lol

relay.damus.io

Last Notes

2023-06-07 17:45:45 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-12-12
📝 Original message:If this means essentially that a soft fork deployment of SegWit will require SPV wallet servers to change their logic (or risk not being able to send payments) then it does seem to me that a hard fork to deploy this non controversial change is not only cleaner (on the data structure side) but safer in terms of the potential to affect the user experience.
—
Regards,
On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 1:43 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Jorge Timón <jtimon at jtimon.cc> wrote:
>> This is basically what I meant by
>>
>> struct hashRootStruct
>> {
>> uint256 hashMerkleRoot;
>> uint256 hashWitnessesRoot;
>> uint256 hashextendedHeader;
>> }
>>
>> but my design doesn't calculate other_root as it appears in your tree (is
>> not necessary).
>>
>> It is necessary to maintain compatibility with SPV nodes/wallets.
> Any code that just checks merkle paths up into the block header would have
> to change if the structure of the merkle tree changed to be three-headed at
> the top.
> If it remains a binary tree, then it doesn't need to change at all-- the
> code that produces the merkle paths will just send a path that is one step
> deeper.
> Plus, it's just weird to have a merkle tree that isn't a binary tree.....
> --
> --
> Gavin Andresen
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151211/63cf45aa/attachment.html>

2023-06-07 17:44:37 UTC

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2015-11-13
📝 Original message:Well I'd like to think that with an economy all parts of it interact with each other in ways more complex than simplistic imperative logic.
I agree that the economic majority is essentially what matters in a hard fork but everyone (miners,devs,public thought leaders,businesses) is part of that economy. Additionally what miners signal as their intention affects the decision of that economic majority (and vice versa). You can see the effects of this in traditional political processes in how preliminary vote polling results affect (reinforce) the final vote.
We also can see the results of this in (dare I mention) the whole XT affair which had the signed intent of many of the economy (payment processors and wallets and one miner pool) and the rest of the miners did not go along with it. This experiment either means that the rest of the miners couldn't be bothered to signal at all (because they didn't know how) or they were affected by the influence of core devs or the opinions of others on the matter and rejected the economic majority. (Which would imply core devs have some power by way of indirect influence) I would be inclined to believe the latter was more likely.
The conclusion which this would seem to imply is that at the very least, miners matter (to what exact extent is debatable). And although there is no direct control of any party over the other in the strict sense, the public vocal opinions of any part of the Bitcoin economy does have an effect in its ability to sway the opinions of the other parts.
Digitsu
—
Regards,
On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 7:29 AM, Luke Dashjr <luke at dashjr.org> wrote:
> On Friday, November 13, 2015 4:01:09 PM digitsu at gmail.com wrote:
>> Forgive the frankness but I don't see why signaling your intent to support
>> an upgrade to one side of a hard fork can be seen as a bad thing. If for
>> nothing else doesn't this make for a smoother flag day? (Because once you
>> signal your intention, it makes it hard to back out on the commitment.)
> It isn't a commitment in any sense, nor does it make it smoother, because for
> a hardfork to be successful, it is the *economy* that must switch entirely.
> The miners are unimportant.
>> If miners don't have any choice in hard forks, who does? Just the core
>> devs?
> Devs have even less of a choice in the matter. What is relevant is the
> economy: who do people want to spend their bitcoins with? There is no
> programmatic way to determine this, especially not in advance, so the best we
> can do is a flag day that gets called off if there isn't clear consensus.
> Luke
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151113/5cadc0d6/attachment.html>